Essay
Apocalypse Soon
Despite all the recent attention, climate change is still an under-estimated threat: Should immediate and decisive measures not be taken, it could imperil the economic and social foundations of the democratic order itself. In parts of the world, there are already violent conflicts directly or indirectly related to global warming
Let us start with a presumably fictitious report from the future—say 2018—when the impact of climate warming has become markedly pronounced:
There are severe storms across the globe. But in the rainforests there is barely any rain at all. Fires rage in the bone-dry primeval forests of Borneo, Brazil, Peru, Tanzania, Florida, and Sardinia. New Guinea reports the worst drought in a century and thousands are starving. East Africa is experiencing the most devastating floods in 50 years—in the middle of the dry season. Uganda is cut off from the rest of the world for days, and most of the desert in the north of the country is submerged. Mongolians are freezing to death, and snowfalls in Tibet set 50-year -records. Mudslides in the desert state of California wash buildings off cliffs. One million people are homeless in Peru because of flooding along the coastal strip where, paradoxically, there has been almost no rainfall for years. The water level of the Panama Canal is so low that large vessels are unable to pass through it. Ice storms damage power lines throughout New England and Quebec, forcing thousands to go without electricity for weeks. Simultaneously, the coffee harvest is failing in Indo-nesia and fishing has collapsed in the Eastern Pacific.
These are unpleasant prospects, but does anyone seriously believe this could ever really happen? Actually, though, this is not a future scenario. All the events described above took place in a single year, in 1998, and were related to the El Niño phenomenon—an oscillation occurring in the ocean-atmosphere system that is linked to global climate disturbances. Although these events were not the direct result of global warming, it is assumed that climate change will cause the El Niño phenomena to occur more frequently in the future.
Change? What Change?
Among the things the events of 1998 show us is this: The people not affected by the consequences of radical changes in the environment are not motivated to take action to address them.1 “Shifting baselines” is a term used by environmen-tal psychologists to describe how people perceive the state of the environment during their lifetime as “normal” and “natural.” They do not perceive changes to the social and physical environment in absolute terms, but in relation to their own point of view. For example, not long ago a group of ecologists interviewed three generations of California fishermen, asking what fish they primarily caught, what their largest catch had ever been, and where they thought fishing stocks had declined. The youngest group of respondents was between 15 and 30 years old, the middle group between 31 and 54, and the third group 54 and older.2 Whereas 84 percent of the respondents believed that there had been a general decline in fishing stocks, there were greatly varying opinions as to what fish were no longer caught, and what areas were affected. The oldest fishermen identified eleven species that had disappeared, while the middle group put the figure at seven, and the youngest interviewees named only two species that no longer existed. A similar pattern emerged when the fishermen were questioned about their fishing grounds. It did not occur to anyone in the youngest group that fish could be caught near the coast, and none of them regarded this area as overfished. In other words, in their frame of reference there simply were not any fish near the coast.
These changes in perceptions of the environment explain why most people take a rather relaxed view of declining biodiversity. They believe little has changed because they see the disappearance of diversity from a shifting baseline. Such findings are quite depressing for ecologists who go to great lengths to increase awareness of the need to act and protect wildlife stocks—or who must even create this awareness in the first place—despite that fact that there is concrete scientific evidence of declines.
The alarm among political leaders and the public caused by the 2007 UN climate change report is a further example of how difficult it is to hold public attention on environmental issues. When it became clear that the most -negative consequences of global warming would be distributed in other parts of the world, most people in the north quickly calmed down. While countries in the southern hemis-phere will suffer drought, floods, and soil erosion, states in the north may see positive effects on tourism, agriculture, and industry, provided they are -active in the field of environmental technology. This news allayed fears, and in everyday politics the spontaneous commitment to saving the climate was lost in cries about jobs and the automobile industry. In the end, the climate problem was not even regarded as urgent enough to impose a speed limit on Germany’s autobahns.
Awareness of the climate problem has increased, but the willingness to make changes has remained constant. On the policy level, this translates into business as usual. In many regards, climate change is an underestimated, largely unrecog-nized threat to society. It is not yet clear whether even democratic -societies will be able to make the corrections necessary to avert the danger or to adapt to the consequences. States must work to decrease emissions in the present, and prepare for the economic and social problems caused by competition over scarce resources in the future. Today we already see violent conflicts that are directly or indirectly related to climate change. Climate wars are being fought in regions where efforts to build states have failed and the existence of private “markets of violence” are the norm. As environmental conditions further deteriorate, new niches will open for private and state security entrepreneurs. This is why the wars in Sudan, Congo, and Somalia find no end and spill over borders.
Beyond the violence of war, the consequences of climate change—soil erosion, floods, a shortage of drinking water, storms—are already restricting our living spaces and chances for survival. They are also exacerbating other existing problems. The asymmetry between wealthy and disadvantaged countries is growing more pronounced, and since climate change hits the weakest societies hardest, the ensuing violence is bound to increase refugee and migration movements—not only migration within countries but also the crossborder movements of climate refugees. As shown by both the corpses washing ashore and the refugees landing on Tenerife and Lampedusa, such crossborder movements have already reached the enclaves of Western Europe’s wealthy, forcing politicians to tighten security measures. This, in turn, will produce strategies to shift border conflicts back across the borders—in others words, to keep the refugees in their home countries and make local police or military forces respon-sible for the problem of violence.
An additional theater of conflict will soon be opened when the deposits of natural resources lying in the Arctic become available. Various countries have already staked claims and are attempting to expand their sovereign territories. Already we see conflicts that are linked to energy strategy, such as the recent Russian invasion of Georgia. Climate change will definitely not make the world a safer place, this much is obvious. In fact, for many people life will become a great deal more dangerous. What can be done in view of such unsett-ling prospects?
Scenario 1: Business As Usual
This scenario, in the context of an ever-expanding world economy, calls for a growing percentage of biofuels to be mixed into gasoline in order to extend the availability of oil. Use of biofuels, however, is contingent on clearing new fields in order to plant oil-yielding crops. This is already happening in many countries in South America and Asia, and it is often accompanied by violent seizures of land and the expulsion of the local population. The “hunger revolts” that broke out in large cities in Africa and Central America in spring 2008 are striking proof of just how immediate the link between policies in one part of the world and consequences in others is.
Business as usual is also associated with an economic and foreign relations strategy that aims to secure supplies by entering into treaties and agreements with states that neither respect human rights nor comply with environmental standards. As resources grow scarcer, states that serve as producers or suppliers of fossil resources will gain greater political clout. The example of Georgia this year shows that such advantages can bring explosive problems: If a state is rich in natural resources or offers favorable conditions for pipelines, it becomes vulnerable to the geostrategic goals and greed of more powerful states. All of this can be tolerated until the consequences of climate change and relentlessly increasing emissions begin to impact those states that were at first relatively unaffected—be it through environmental disasters or increased migratory pressures. Nevertheless, for middle-aged people living today—the core of the elite—business as usual can be seen as the most rational strategy, especially since it does not raise any real moral dilemmas.
The nation state is a representative rather than an individual actor, and categories of behavior that apply to individuals, such as egocentricity and ruthlessness, are not considered relevant. However, if we imagine world society as an individual implementing the business-as-usual strategy, what we have is a sociopath. This sociopath has no qualms about earning seventy times what everyone else earns and consuming large quantities of their resources; about using fifteen times more energy, water, and food than his neighbors and releasing nine times more emissions into the environment. Furthermore, this sociopath is categorically uninterested in the living conditions of his children and accepts that 852 million are starving and another 20 million are refugees because of his actions and those of people like him.
As long as there are no personal attributions of responsibility in the context of state collective action, morality will have no relevance. It is therefore highly improbable that wealthy countries will select a different strategy than business as usual. The consequences will include an inexorable rise in energy costs, on the one hand, and an unrelenting increase in climate-damaging emissions, on the other. This will translate into substantial risks to the economic and social foundations of democracy and cause a radical break with the current view that climate warming can be confined to the two-degree rise in global temperatures that is still considered manageable. The development that will be triggered has consequences and dynamics that can hardly be calculated on the basis of our present knowledge. What climate models suggest is that a warming rate of even four degrees as opposed to two will not be limited to a gradual increase in weather-related disparities but will affect the earth’s entire ecosystem.
Scenario 2: The Good Society
People to whom such prospects are unacceptable, because of their own survival or the injustice to future generations, will have to deal with the problem of climate change differently. The question of our future survival is thus a -cultural question and as such must be seen in relation to the organization of society. This question can be broken down further: Can a culture be successful over the long term if it is based on the systematic exploitation of resources? Can it survive if it accepts the systematic exclusion of younger generations?
Translating the climate problem into a cultural question can bring oppor-tunities to enhance the collective identity of society’s members. Let me cite four examples to illustrate this point: Norway has invested the national assets it -receives from energy resources in climate-friendly energy supplies and power plants, which are selected on the basis of ethical criteria. Switzerland boasts the most extensive public transit system in the world even though, as a -mountainous country, it has unfavorable conditions for mass transportation. The average Swiss citizen takes 47 train trips per year, far exceeding the EU average of 14.7. -Estonia guarantees free Internet access as a fundamental human right. Providing the entire population with communication opportunities has reduced bureaucracy and created the potential for more direct forms of -democracy. It is also becoming the driving force behind a modernization process that is especially appealing to -younger members of society.
Although the subject matter is different in each case, all of these political decisions are related to societal identity. They are based on the self-image of a political community that has not only reached a decision on a specific problem, but also on its own character. The question of what needs to be done about climate change, and how, cannot be addressed without first posing a greater question about the future of society as a whole. How do we want to live in 2020? How do we wish to organize society? How can we improve the quality of life and radically reduce emissions? The new initiatives on zero-emission communities show the viability of alternative practices that do not diminish our quality of life. They also allow citizens to experience the effectiveness of their own actions. This has greater psychological impact than the simple appeal to change lifestyles. When appeals remain abstract, people do not see the tangible results of their own efforts and are only left with the experience of abstinence.
The goal now is to overcome the dominant culture of waste and all the restric-tions it places on the quality of life. The remodeling of our Lebenswelt must be made to seem appealing. Seen in this light, for example, the constant increase in transportation requirements will not be regarded as a step forward, but as an undesirable development that places strains on the individual and the environment. The foundations of this type of cultural project are the material wealth of the West and the obligation implied by this wealth in an international context.
1) Fred Pearce, Das
Wetter von morgen (Munich, 2007), p. 275.
2) Andrea Saenz-Arroyo et al, “Rapidly
Shifting Environmental Baselines among Fishers of the Gulf
of California,” Proceedings of the Royal Society, 272
(2005): 1957–1962.
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Prof. Dr. HARALD WELZER ist Direktor des Center for Interdisciplinary Memory Research in Essen und Autor von „Klimakriege“ (S. Fischer Verlag 2008).
HARALD WELZER is the director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Memory Research in Essen and author of Klimakriege.
