Article
Courting Russia
Russia’s uncertain place in Europe is the greatest structural challenge to both reform in Russia and European security. Tension with Moscow keeps Europe divided and destabilizes it like no other factor. By stamping her imprint on a rejuvenated Europe-Russia alliance, Angela Merkel could cement a place for herself in the history books.
Germany can—and must—play a special part in getting Russia-EU relations back on track. Traditionally, Russian-German relations are considered Russia’s closest and most comprehensive outside of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Germany is its biggest trade partner and fifth largest foreign investor. The largest share of Russia’s imports comes from Germany and Russia is Germany’s twelfth most important trading partner. Energy interdependence is even stronger: 40 percent of German gas imports and 33 percent of oil imports come from Russia.
This interdependence stabilizes and simulates relations, and promotes an intense dialogue. The Russian-German Intergovernmental Commission has successfully supervised dialogue between all the major ministries of both countries since 1998. The two countries also conduct extensive foreign policy coordination in other forums.
Foundation or Facade
Perhaps, however, the facade of a Russian-German ìstrategic partnershipî belies distrust and rivalry beneath the surface. If Russian-German relations are so congenial, and Germany is a leader in the European Union and among the most influential players of NATO, then why are Russian-European Union and Russian-NATO relations so unsatisfactory?
U.S.-Russian relations are one contributing factor. NATO expansion has caused major dissatisfaction. While Germany was among those states that halted the Bush administration’s attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO on the fast track, Berlin still remains committed to the alliance’s Bucharest promise that Georgia and Ukraine will one day become members of NATO.
With the European Union as well, the situation is far from satisfactory. Elaboration of a New Strategic Agreement is virtually stagnant, as is Russian-EU international cooperation. Energy dialogue is gradually degenerating into ìpipeline rivalry,î quarrels over what principles and rules should govern Ukrainian transit, and geoeconomic competition over control of the Black Sea and Central Asian countries. Moscow has rejected three important dimensions of EU policy toward Russia: the EU position on the New Strategic Agreement, the World Trade Organization track, and the Energy Charter Treaty.
The European Union has largely ignored Russian proposals for a new European security architecture and new international energy treaty (as a substitute for the Energy Charter Treaty), and remains unwilling to accept the Russian approach to the New Strategic Agreement. Finally, both sides find themselves in increasing rivalry over the CIS countries, precisely over which integration processes (European Union or Russia-oriented) should dominate. Berlin’s input into EU policies does not follow with a ìstrategic partnership.î
Indeed, Germany plays a role in many sensitive issues of Russian-European Union relations. Berlin supports the Eastern Partnership and the harmonization of Ukrainian energy law governing the transit of Russian gas via its territory, with the EU acquis, thus applying EU rules to gas supplies on the Russian-Ukrainian border. For Russia both this and the Eastern Partnership are perceived as threats to national security. For these projects, clearly interlinked, can switch the dominant integration projects in the CIS from Russia to the European Union and prevent Moscow from playing a major role in the countries’ energy systems.
Finally, a deeper look at the bilateral dialogue between Russia and Germany reveals a relationship strong on economic pragmatism and the realities of interdependence—not a true strategic partnership. The only sphere where substantial interdependence exists for Germany is energy. Even so, Germany’s foreign minister Guido Westerwelle has begun to talk about ìreducing energy dependence on Russia.î This will likely remain nothing more than a slogan, but it still shows the real substance of Russian-German relations and the mood in Berlin. Can we really label the Russian-German relationship a strategic partnership when interdependence is perceived as a sign of vulnerability, rather than a precondition for even deeper cooperation?
False Expectations
The reason for this state of Russian-German relations is that both sides have been disappointed about how relations have developed. Russia is deeply dissatisfied with EU policy toward Moscow and the former Soviet Union, and focuses on bilateral dealing, especially with Germany.
However, Berlin and other EU capitals are often more concerned with a unified European voice than niceties toward Russia. Since member states—Germany in particular—have to factor in the EU ìcommon denominator,î their individual positions on some issues surprise Russia. To many in Russia, the situation looks like a deadlock: genuine EU foreign policy is blocked by member states’ unwillingness to give up even more national sovereignty, while individual foreign policies are blocked by the European Union.
On the other hand, Germany is deeply disappointed with Russia’s development. For the German elite, the 1990s was a period of triumph, stability, and success. In order to institutionalize Europe’s unification, the West started to expand (NATO and EU enlargement), while tying to build a strong link with Russia at the same time. For Russia, this was a time of trouble, humiliation, and severe disillusionment with the West. Russia doubted Europe’s ability and willingness to accept it as an equal partner. Thus, Vladimir Putin’s revision of Russian domestic and foreign policy was bound to happen. When Russia felt stronger, it clearly opposed the development of European matters, concerning both security and economics. Under Medvedev, Russia offered an alternative view of how European security and energy policy could be organized. Moscow argued that if there was to be an indivisible Europe, it must be based on common interests and compromise, not just Western foundations.
This approach shattered German dreams about a single Europe based on enlarged and strengthened Western institutions and values. Some had hoped that Russia would become a junior partner of the West, with a strong NATO partnership and deep integration with the European Union. This vision had Russia and the European Union creating a single economic space based on EU standards and law. It was planned that the Russian energy sector would ultimately be liberalized and governed by EU energy regulations. But this did not—and will not—transpire.
There is also a deep conviction among the German elite that sooner or later Russia will eventually find itself on the ìright trackî again, interpreting every move in Russia as a signal of its ìreturn to the West.î
The idea that Medvedev’s foreign policies will differ much from those of Putin is misleading. In fact, Medvedev’s major initiatives in foreign policy—new security and energy treaties—are a logical continuation of Putin’s revisionism, founded on the idea of Russia being an equal partner with the West and on the premise of founding European security and economics on common norms, rules, institutions, and values.
There are two basic reasons why even a ìweakenedî Russia would not accept the model of relations envisioned by Germany and Europe. First, in the eyes of the vast majority of the Russian elite, the era of Western superiority in world affairs is over. The hot topic now is a redistribution of influence in global governance to better reflect the realities of the world’s new power balance. Against this background, it would be foolish for Russia to contribute to pan-European economic, political, and security orders on the West’s terms.
Second, Russia currently faces important foreign policy challenges with the expansion of the Western order. In the 1990s Western expansion largely took place in areas that were not at the center of Russian foreign policy. Then, an ìignore Russiaî policy was possible. But now the Western economic and security order is expanding to countries vitally connected to Russian national interests. Russian security, identity, prestige, and economic development are highly dependent on the actions of these CIS countries.
The CIS region is so vital to Russian national security and policy that Russia will react fiercely to any serious attempt to anchor it in the Western security orbit. This is not to say that Russia demands a ìsphere of influenceî in the CIS. Rather, it wants well-defined rules of the game and clear obligations in the region.
Russia-Europe Strategic Alliance
A strategic alliance of equal parts in a larger single and indivisible Europe might solve this last structural problem of European security and embody a sustainable model of Russian-Europe relations.1 This means creating something new, substantive, and comprehensive: a forum above NATO and the European Union on the one hand, and Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Organization of Eurasian Economic Cooperation on the other. It might be either a series of agreements, or, in the longer run, a series of institutions governing the EU-Russian single economic and security space. Such an alliance would provide Europe with strategic depth in world affairs, create a win-win model for the governing of Russian-EU economic interdependence, and contribute to more efficient global, political, and economic governance.
There should be two pillars of this alliance with different institutional and legal formalization. The first being economic, would be based on mutual elaboration of the new rules governing the Russian-EU energy interdependence in order to reduce the politicalization and securitization of the energy relations, and foster the genuine integration of the Russian and EU energy sectors. Naturally, the new Russian-EU pipelines and exchange of assets should be a part of this integration, as well as a new investment regime granting both sides equal market access and providing the necessary investment protection.
Another dimension of the economic pillar would include a set of rules relating to regulating both sides’ economic relations with the CIS countries to prevent geopolitical rivalry in the region. To do this, both sides should refrain from launching integration processes in the CIS. Russia and the European Union should engage in a dialogue on which integration processes would be helpful in the region. The European Union should be more flexible in its external relations—in CIS countries in particular—and should avoid demands that national legislation be harmonized with the EU’s acquis communitaire as a precondition of cooperation.
The second pillar is security. It has two dimensions—creating a single security space in Europe on the one hand, and promoting the Russian-EU and Russian-NATO international partnerships on the other hand. As the eastern expansion of the Western security order continues, it will probably trigger severe instability and conflict in Europe. The only plausible option for creating a single indivisible space is to build European security on the principle of cooperative bipolarity. This means that both sides will have to agree to two security orders in Europe—NATO and European Union in the West, and CSTO in the East—and possibly even establish a new institution to supervise observance of these rules and govern the pan-European security order.
The preconditions for cooperation are that NATO and the European Union abandon plans of enlargement into CIS countries, and both sides elaborate and fulfill new rules and principles of behavior. Russia has already proposed its vision of these rules and principles in the Medvedev initiative on the New Security Treaty. It is now up to the West—Germany in particular—to engage in a serious dialogue and provide its own visions of how European security must be organized.
Both Russia and Germany are interested in raising the effectiveness of global governance structures, making them correspond more to the real power distribution in the world. Germany deserves a permanent seat in the Security Council, as does Russia, who plays an even larger role in the international economic governance, especially in the energy sector. The sides could intensify talks on these issues. The problem with the UN Security Council, though, is that there are already two EU member states there, and the European Union is striving for a common foreign policy, while the other regions and continents are underrepresented. Thus, Moscow and Berlin could initiate a compromise, such as rotating two European permanent seats between several EU member states, Germany included, or providing one of the seats to the EU foreign minister.
Finally, in the sphere of bilateral economic regulation, both sides should focus on two basic issues: elaborating a mutually beneficial and safe investment regime and encouraging the establishment and multiplication of cooperative production chains between German and Russian companies.
It is obvious that following such advice would be a challenge for the German political elite. However, being first among the major European and Western players to change dated expectations seems to be the only way for Germany to solve the last remaining structural challenge of European security.
1 For existing, similar models of Russian-EU relations see Timofei Bordachev, The New Strategic Union, Russia and Europe before 21st Century’s Challenges: possibilities for a ‘Grand Deal’ (Moscow, 2008), 304 p. (in Russian); Sergei Karaganov, Igor Yurgens, “To the Alliance of Europe” Rossijskaya Gazeta, November 11, 2008 (in Russian).
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