Article
Getting to Zero
The new German government has pledged to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. Although this is in keeping with President Obama’s aim of achieving “global zero,” a world free of nuclear weapons, it cannot impede a debate in Germany on Europe’s deterrence strategy.
Since the Cold War, NATO’s concept of nuclear sharing has been a key element of the extended nuclear deterrent provided for Europe by the United States. In short, it was designed to prevent an attack on America’s European allies by presenting a credible threat of nuclear retaliation from bases in Europe, including Germany. This principle enables non-nuclear members of NATO, such as Germany, to participate in the deployment planning and actual deployment of American nuclear weapons, by storing American nuclear weapons on their territory.
Nevertheless, the goal now adopted by the German government of removing tactical nuclear weapons from Germany for reasons of both domestic and foreign policy seems at first glance to make sense. On the domestic front these weapons are unpopular. Moreover, the government has now taken the wind out of the opposition’s sails concerning nuclear disarmament and satisfied a key security-policy demand made by the Free Democrats (FDP), the junior partner in the governing coalition. In terms of foreign policy this step is in-line with the current international debate on providing new impetus for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, reflected in President Obama’s plan for ìglobal zero.î
Another aspect informing this decision is that in recent years support for the concept of nuclear sharing has declined both in Europe and the United States. The end of the Cold War brought with it a change in the function of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The scenario in which such weapons could be deployed against advancing Warsaw Pact troops was replaced by one in which a significantly reduced arsenal of such weapons played a predominantly political role by representing the continuing credibility of American engagement in European security. However, within the German and Western European debate, questions have been increasingly raised as to whether the stationing of these weapons abroad is actually increasing European security. This doubt has been reinforced by the conviction that continued adherence to the nuclear-sharing structure will impede progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament. In the United States, representatives of the military have increasingly argued that maintaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe constitutes an unnecessary and costly diversion from the prevailing military challenges.
Against this background, the German position therefore seems to constitute a logical step and one that could make a fundamental contribution to ending nuclear sharing. Previous American governments have always emphasized that the continuing presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is above all in accordance with European wishes and that Europeans thus indirectly have a say in whether the weapons stay or go. Now Germany, the largest non-nuclear European NATO member, has endorsed their removal.
Costs Versus Benefits
The removal of tactical nuclear weapons only makes strategic sense if it goes beyond a short-term impetus for nuclear arms control and disarmament and is embedded in a new concept of deterrence for Europe. Otherwise the costs of ending nuclear sharing could well outweigh the potential benefits. The German coalition agreement’s reference to the multilateralization of this process already indicates that the interests of NATO members need to be taken into account in order to avoid the establishment of zones across Europe with differing levels of security. For a large number of Central and Eastern European states, extended nuclear deterrence remains a central element of their security needs. The recent German debate tends to overlook the fact that extended nuclear deterrence has traditionally been part of U.S. policy. By stretching a protective nuclear umbrella over Europe, the United States has done more than contribute to the feeling of security among the included states and enable them to refrain from acquiring such weapons for themselves. It has also afforded the United States extensive regional influence. In this respect the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons may well lead to more than just an increased sense of insecurity among Central and Eastern European states due to what is still perceived as a threat from Russia. For these states such a development would be yet another indication of the declining (leadership) role of the U.S. in European defense policy. This also applies to states on Europe’s southern flank such as Turkey, which are located close to international trouble spots.
How can America’s extended deterrence strategy for Europe retain its credibility if a number of its European partners perceive the United States as playing a reduced political role? In the worst case the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Germany could undermine the overall credibility of extended nuclear deterrence in the eyes of several European NATO members. German and European policy makers therefore need to ensure that an end to nuclear sharing is not achieved at the expense of greater insecurity among alliance partners.
Yet Germany itself also has an interest in a European strategy of deterrence at least partially based on nuclear capabilities. This becomes clear when one looks at the strategic environment of European security policy. Regardless of the debate around global zero, nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in international politics, a situation that President Obama has also acknowledged on more than one occasion. Moreover, these weapons will continue to be critical to many states and may in some cases become even more significant. Russia, for instance, sees its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as compensating for its conventional inferiority not only in relation to Western armed forces but also, increasingly, in relation to China. Iran will presumably achieve at least a virtual nuclear capacitywhich could lead to a nuclearization of the Middle East. The ongoing modernization of Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear arsenals completes this picture of a world in which German and European security policy could well have to take into account the existence of more rather than less nuclear-armed states.
This scenario derives from the connection between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation often postulated in the German and international strategic debate. In reality, however, the claim that ending nuclear sharing will inevitably help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is extremely dubious. On the contrary, it could well be argued that it is precisely the American policy of maintaining credible, extended deterrence that has prevented the spread of nuclear weapons over recent decades. It is thus no accident that the current spread of nuclear weapons is being seen in regions where American hegemony has been weakened. Consequently, it is hardly likely that in the future Germany’s European allies will want to dispense with nuclear weapons as an ultimate deterrent, whether in the form of their own arsenals (United Kingdom and France) or in the form of a continuing nuclear guarantee by the United States. As long as nuclear weapons continue to exist, extended nuclear deterrence will remain an integral element of German and European security policy. Moreover, even after the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, the tension between nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation will remain.
A New Euro-Atlantic Architecture
A withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Germany is not an end in itself, nor can it be seen as merely serving disarmament objectives. Such a step has to be made an integral part of an intensive debate on the future of a European strategy of deterrence within NATO and the European Union.
A new Euro-Atlantic deterrence strategy could entail the following steps. Firstly, an intensive dialogue within NATO and the European Union on the implications and reform of the European deterrence strategy could take place. The elaboration of a new strategic concept for NATO should include discussion of modernizing the concept of extended nuclear deterrence. The resulting document could make clear that strategic nuclear weapons will in the future remain the ultimate means by which NATO deters a nuclear attack on territory covered by alliance. In addition, the Nuclear Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), U.S. strategy documents that are to be revised in 2010, could confirm this objective. This would maintain the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence while at the same time creating a scope for the reduction in tactical and strategic areas.
However, this debate also needs to be conducted within the European Union. In the face of reduced engagement by the United States in Europe at the level of military policy, the European Union must focus more intensively on independently developing its deterrence strategy. This step is indispensable if the European Union wants to become a strategic actor in the field of foreign and security policy. The question of the future of a European doctrine of deterrence and its nuclear components therefore needs to be addressed. In the long term the European Union must consider the possibility of maintaining its own nuclear capabilities through recourse to the French and British arsenals.
Next, a close dialogue with Russia on concepts of nuclear deterrence could be developed. Could Russia’s military arsenal conceivably provide components of a new Euro-Atlantic architecture of deterrence in the long term? Significant progress in the development of the relationship between Russia and the West requires the development of a new concept of strategic stability that is rooted in the idea of collective security rather than mutually assured destruction. This applies particularly to Russia, for whom future threats will come not from Western arsenals but from the east and south. Such a dialogue is indispensable if a new deterrence strategy is to lead to greater security for the Euro-Atlantic sphere.
Lastly, the nuclear role and upgrading of defensive deterrence components could be reduced. The modernized European deterrence strategy should be based on a new triad analogous to the direction of development in U.S. military strategy: (1) a reduced but still necessary nuclear capability as ultimate insurance against an existential attack; (2) the upgrading of strategic conventional capabilities as a means of projecting extensive military power and strengthening the credibility of deterrence; (3) the buildup of defensive capabilities in the form of strategic and tactical missile defense systems. The two latter elements are preconditions for extensive reductions of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as part of the European deterrence concept, since one-sided disarmament would otherwise weaken its credibility.
The withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Germany stipulated by the government’s coalition agreement has significant strategic implications for European security. In order to ensure that the foundation is laid for a new Euro-Atlantic deterrence strategy, German policymakers need to begin considering what measures will be required. Only in this way can an increased level of security be assured in the long-term. Otherwise the continuation of nuclear sharing within NATO will remain the best strategic option for Europe.
Dr. PATRICK KELLER ist Koordinator für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
BENJAMIN SCHREER ist stellvertretender Direktor des Aspen Institute Berlin.
BENJAMIN SCHREER is deputy director of the Aspen Institute Berlin.
