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Frozen Conflict
Russia was not explicitly on the agenda at the NATO summit in Bucharest. But Moscow’s views informed the debates on missile defense, NATO enlargement, and the Balkans. With the next summit in spring 2009, NATO must decide what kind of relationship it wants with its difficult, indispensable partner.
Arguably, the turning point in the NATO-Russia relationship was Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007. The Russian president launched a blistering attack on the US government and NATO. Some observers felt icy blasts reminiscent of the Cold War. Yet, just as the West is dependent on Russian support to address joint threats, so too does Russia have a deep interest in stable relations with NATO and the European Union.
A close look at security cooperation with Russia reveals parallel worlds. On the one hand, Russia increasingly defines itself in opposition to NATO and the United States. The Russian leadership has responded to missile defense bases in Eastern Europe and the admission of new NATO members by suspending the agreement to reduce conventional forces in Europe. It is has threatened to retarget positions in (western) Europe with its missiles. Putin has also reserved the right to abandon other arms control agreements, including those regulating nuclear arms. While Russian generals have threatened neighboring countries and NATO members, the political leadership in Moscow has done nothing to rein them in. The Baltic states have had to defend themselves against attacks on their computer networks.
Nevertheless, on the NATO-Russia Council a world of pragmatic cooperation exists parallel to this world of confrontation. Joint military exercises have been held both in NATO states and on Russian territory. There are close consultations in areas as sensitive as armed forces reform, terrorism, and missile defense (albeit only on tactical, short-range missiles). In 2006, a Russian frigate took part in the NATO Active Endeavor operation to bolster terrorism defense in the Mediterranean. Even if this cooperation could be improved in terms of quality, the regular exchanges between NATO and Russia offer a sharp contrast to the view of the two as arch rivals.
That said, it has become increasingly difficult for these parallel universes to coexist. The harsh tones from Moscow impede pragmatic cooperation. Open or veiled threats of deploying the “energy weapon,” announcements of new arms plans, as well as demands for Russian spheres of influence have stirred old fears in Eastern Europe. In Finland and Norway there is even open talk of a serious conflict with Moscow. At the same time, a growing number in western NATO states downplay the country’s substantial democratic failings. This undermines solidarity within the alliance and weakens NATO as a whole. This unfortunate trend must be reversed if the cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia is to be placed on firm footing. Given the developments in Russia, nobody can expect the political leadership in Moscow to act meekly on the international stage. Consequently, NATO must attempt to distinguish between rhetoric and reality, between legitimate Russian security interests and political hyperbole. The real question facing NATO is what potential for action lies behind Moscow’s posturing.
A Not So Powerful World Power
Russia’s claim to world power status rests on three pillars: its international importance as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; its oil and gas reserves; and the might of its armed forces. Upon closer inspection, though, all three pillars are hollow.
Despite its seat on the Security Council, Russia was unable to prevent NATO from taking military action against Yugoslavia in 1999. With its attack on Iraq, the United States overrode opposition from Russia. Nor could Moscow block Kosovo’s declaration of independence earlier this year. Russia’s energy wealth is a limited means to apply pressure. Russia is dependent on both Western markets and Western drilling technologies and expertise. After all, nearly 70 percent of Gazprom earnings originate from sales to EU states. Mismanagement and insufficient reinvestment of earnings are the primary causes of its obsolete pipelines and infrastructure. Moreover, Western industrial nations will increasingly substitute oil and gas with other energy sources if prices continue to soar. As for the military, while Russia regularly announces huge arms projects, both chronic underfunding and mismanagement have kept them from getting off the ground. These problems also undermine military effectiveness. Russian forces are woefully in need of modernization. In June 2005 the Russian Security Council was forced to concede that the five-year plan to reform the armed forces had failed and that Russia’s national security could not be guaranteed.
Belligerent gestures by the Russian president and the planting of the Russian flag on the seabed beneath the North Pole do not change the fact that Moscow has constantly attempted to measure itself against an opponent that is out of its league. This inferiority complex explains Russian security arguments that are otherwise hard to grasp. After all, Russian experts cannot really believe that ten American missile defense systems in Poland will seriously weaken Russia’s missile potential. What they fear is the West’s ability to deploy yet another high-tech system—one that has military relevance.
A To-Do List
The ultimate goal is to steer relations to calmer seas and to prevent the rhetoric of daily politics from undermining pragmatic cooperation. This requires a number of steps from NATO.
First of all, relations with Moscow should not be strained by fruitless debates that are seen as provocation by Russia. NATO’s enlargement process should keep NATO’s door open and at the same time take Russian concerns into account. Countries applying for NATO membership should meet the political and military standards of an alliance of democracies. The decision not to award Georgia and Ukraine Membership Action Plans (MAP) was not “appeasement” to Moscow, as some voices claimed, but it accurately reflected doubts in NATO about the preparedness of both countries to fulfill MAP requirements.
Certainly, transatlantic relations have been improving again. But there continue to be cracks in transatlantic structures into which Russia might drive a wedge. If mutual accusations and misperceptions could be overcome, NATO could more effectively pursue the double-edged strategy of cooperating with Russia whenever possible and clearly calling by name anti-democratic tendencies.
There is no NATO policy toward Russia that is accepted by all members. Even on the continent, the positions of the East-Central Europeans differ markedly from those of their Western counterparts. A clear definition of NATO interests has been replaced by the fuzzy concept of “strategic partnership.” It is necessary to reach consensus on a joint Russia strategy.
NATO and the European Union face the same problem: How to build an urgently needed partnership with an extremely difficult counterpart. Nothing would be more logical than for NATO and the European Union to cooperate closely on this issue. At the moment, this simply does not happen. Russia experts in both organizations, though they toil just a few miles apart in Brussels, hardly know each other. If attempts fail to thaw this “frozen conflict” between the two institutions, Russia will be able to play them off against one another.
Close cooperation is essential in our globalized and multi-polar world. Russia must be reminded that cooperation with NATO, as an alliance of democratic states, requires compliance with democratic rules. The “strategic partnership” that all sides want is only possible if basic democratic principles are respected.
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