Article
The Hard Choices of Intervention
There is no simple checklist to determine how, when, or where German troops should be deployed abroad. But there are a number of valid questions that can be posed before soldiers are sent to stabilizing, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcing missions around the world.
“When the international community pursues an important, commonly defined goal using military means—such as the war against terrorism or a peacekeeping mission,” said the secretary-general of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, in a 2007 interview with a German daily, “Germany shouldn’t rule out making a bigger contribution.”1 This mild admonition may now seem redundant: Germany is already engaged in a number of international military missions—most intensively in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Bosnia. Over the past fifteen years it has gone from contributing troops to its first major mission in Bosnia to deploying Bundeswehr units around the world.
Even so, there will certainly be further requests from the United Nations and the European Union for German support for crisis interventions in the future. These requests could entail the short-term deployment of UN-led troops alongside the African Union in Darfur or a possible UN-mandated stabilization mission in Somalia. In the coming years, there will certainly be other states in danger of disintegration—in which the ruling authorities cannot or do not want to stop genocide, states that are threatened by civil war or that have just narrowly escaped from it and would slip back into violence without international support.
In the international debate about security and peacekeeping there is broad agreement that, first, peace missions should have “robust” mandates and, second, they must be “multidimensional” in order to protect fragile states from failing and, where necessary, to secure a tenuous domestic peace in such countries.2 In the Bundestag these days, German participation in international interventions is rarely discussed in terms of the fundamental question of whether the Bundeswehr should participate. It is‚ rather‚ viewed in terms of how, when, where, and, in light of the strain on personnel and material resources, increasingly how often.
During these debates some participants occasionally ask for a list of criteria that could facilitate the Bundestag’s decision to send German soldiers into various kinds of stabilizing, peacekeeping, or peace-enforcing missions. Some party delegations in parliament have set out papers and guidelines for interventions.3 However, a checklist of sorts to determine whether sufficient conditions are met cannot replace a serious full-blown political discussion in a parliamentary democracy. Such decisions have to be based on an informed strategic debate, one that reflects the growing skepticism in Germany about foreign interventions. That said, there are a number of critical questions that must be taken into consideration in such a debate.
International Legal Mandates
Four groups of questions are central and indispensable. The first concerns the international legal mandate of the mission in question. Germany should be clear from the start that crisis interventions with German troops can never be carried out unilaterally, but should always come within a multilateral framework and be authorized by an international mandate, usually from the UN Security Council. Self-mandating on the part of NATO, as was the case in the 1999 Kosovo war, should remain an exception even if, in hindsight, this intervention turned out to be politically justified. The kind of legitimacy that only the UN Security Council can provide prior to an intervention not only facilitates international acceptance of the mission, but is also an important element in its success on the ground.
Moreover, it is extremely important that the quality of the mandate be thoroughly considered. Is it realistic and based on local conditions in the country or region in question? And does it correspond to the tasks that the international community will expect of the mission’s soldiers and civilian members? Is it robust enough so that even in borderline cases—normally under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter—the intervention forces will be able to fulfill the mandate in the face of armed resistance? This question was, correctly, raised during the preparation for the 2006 UN Interim Force in Lebanon mission.
The Risks Involved
The second group of questions concerns the mission’s potential for success in light of the various risks. In preparation for international missions, policymakers should seek strategic and area-specific advice. Among other questions, they should inquire about the specific on-the-ground circumstances of the conflict and local antagonists’ attitudes toward the intervention—and toward the participation of German troops in particular. It must be asked whether this conflict can be meaningfully addressed with a reasonable deployment of military forces. Moreover, what relationship does the mission envision between its military and civilian components? Is the number of soldiers authorized by the Security Council, as well as other personnel and material resources, sufficient to accomplish the mission’s stated goals? Where no obvious deadline for the mission’s end has been set—as has been the case with the 2006 EUFOR mission to secure elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo—has the intended success of the mission been defined by relatively clear goals?
It is often the case that peacekeeping missions last longer than originally envisioned. The necessity of an international military presence in Bosnia a full 12 years after the original deployment, first under NATO and as of 2004 under EU command, is just one example. Nonetheless, it is legitimate to ask from the beginning whether there is a plan, or the scheduled formulation of one, for intervention forces to transfer responsibilities to local security forces, local administrations, and civil society organizations in a timely fashion. Part of this includes building the capacities local actors need in order to take on such responsibilities. Otherwise, the mere presence of foreign troops is at risk of providing reasons for the mission’s extension. Foreign soldiers can be perceived as occupiers—even if they do not see themselves that way—and consequently be confronted with violent uprisings that require yet more troops in order to be contained. At least in some parts of Afghanistan the international mission is patently running the risk of such a development.
More often, however, an international political and military presence causes comfortable dependencies and enables local actors to leave their fundamental political conflicts unaddressed as long as international troops are there to prevent new outbreaks of civil war, or to be held responsible if violence does break out.
Likewise, the question of whether Germany has certain comparative advantages or disadvantages for different kinds of missions in comparison to other states must also be considered. This could be Germany’s lack of a colonial history in a given region or its being perceived as neutral by local parties involved in the conflict. It could also be the case that Germany might have especially good relations in the region, while other external parties are in some way compromised (or vice-versa). It could be that the mission in question requires specific competencies that German intervention forces might or might not have. Soft skills play a particular role here, including language skills, cultural sensitivity to the societies concerned, or expertise in coordinating military and civilian components of international missions, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in northern Afghanistan.
On the whole and in comparison to other international actors within the parameters of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the European Union has at its disposal fairly advanced civil crisis intervention mechanisms, even if they still leave something to be desired. This predisposes the European Union to participation in so-called hybrid missions, which require close cooperation between military battle and stabilization forces on the one hand, and civil reconstruction and administrative authorities on the other. The prioritized development of exactly these capabilities reflects preferences among EU member states in addressing crises and conflicts. At the same time, however, this cannot mean that Germany and other EU states limit themselves to civilian tasks.
Crisis Dynamics
The third group of questions concerns the potential dynamics of a crisis. Although it may appear cynical to the local population, it is legitimate for intervening states to take into consideration whether the crisis in question is purely local or whether it is regional or even has global importance. Germany is not the only state that cannot deploy soldiers anytime, anywhere. Thus when a conflict is truly local and spillover is unlikely, an eventual crisis intervention can usually be left to neighboring states or regional organizations. Yet when the neighboring states themselves are party to the conflict, they will certainly not be of help resolving it.
And, likewise, when regional organizations lack the requisite capabilities to intervene effectively, one cannot expect effective crisis management to come from regional actors alone. When actors with a global agenda, such as Al Qaeda, are involved and are using failed states as “safe havens” an originally local conflict will soon be internationalized. Therefore, one should be aware that local conflict parties, in light of the huge international attention given to terrorist threats, will often try to present their enemies as overt or covert representatives of international terror networks in order to gain international support. The recent conflict in Somalia is an obvious example.
Germany’s Strategic Interests
This brings us directly to the fourth group of questions, concerned with Germany’s strategic interests and the goals of German policy. Since today global problems can no longer be resolved solely within the context of nation states—as the 2003 European Security Strategy contends—it must first be asked whether prospective military intervention would serve to ward off threats to Europe as a whole. Can it contribute to solving regional conflicts, to the securing of state-building, democratization, development, and regional cooperation in the European neighborhood? Does it serve the purpose of fighting global terrorism and stabilizing fragile states? It must also be asked whether the engagement of German soldiers would strengthen or weaken ESDP or the UN. Finally, would the mission contribute to the development of the European Union as a credible international actor? The mission in the DRC certainly raised the profile of ESDP. And from a political perspective it is permissible to inquire whether engagement in such missions—when all other preconditions have been met—serves Germany’s reputation in the world and possibly even the desire to see Berlin have a seat on the UN Security Council. Equally valid is the question of whether enough EU partners are engaged in a certain mission, and whether the mission will strengthen or hurt the Atlantic alliance.
However, these considerations alone do not suffice. While the continued functioning of the transatlantic alliance is certainly in Germany’s interest, the Iraq War has underscored that this cannot mean blindly supporting an ally’s military endeavors of whose legitimacy and rationale Germany is not convinced.
Undoubtedly, it is also legitimate that Germany and its European partners set regional and functional priorities that are realistic rather than idealistic. Of course, the risks and dangers in the world today are of an increasingly global nature. Nevertheless, the countries of the Western Balkans, for example, are closer and more important to us than Somalia. And, naturally, North Africa with its developmental problems and political crises that result in waves of migration across the Mediterranean is more important and closer than Sri Lanka or East Timor.
Realistic responsibility means prioritizing the possible collapse of a state or society over the noble goal of democratizing an authoritarian but functional state. Functional statehood is no guarantee for peace and stability but rather a precondition for bringing these countries onto the path to democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, reconstruction, the rebuilding of state institutions in the wake of wars and civil wars, and the reestablishment of administrative capability is more pressing than the immediate holding of elections.
What does Germany want?
In view of the threats posed by weak states, and the persistence of ethno-nationalist and religious movements in many parts of the world today, Germany will increasingly be requested to supply troops for UN or EU crisis interventions in the coming years. When deciding on such missions, the use of Germany’s limited resources and instruments has to be carefully considered. The fact that neither Germany nor the European Union have the ambition or the capabilities to act as global hegemonic powers must be taken into account. For this reason alone, priorities must be set, without shirking European or international responsibilities.
In the debate about intervention criteria, policymakers and the greater public should be aware that not every conflict that has been recognized as needing European mediation can be solved by diplomatic means alone—or, for that matter, solely by military means. The old mantra that military force should only be used as a last resort is not always appropriate. Some of the wars in former Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda, and the ongoing war in Darfur could probably have been prevented or ended more quickly had sufficient international troops been deployed in time. One has to be aware that certain developments in international law, such as the evolution of a “responsibility to protect,” imply greater involvement for individual countries.
German policymakers have to face the question of whether the country can demand the build-up of tools such as NATO Response Forces and EU Battle Groups and to demand a strengthening of the United Nations, while at the same time rejecting participation in difficult missions. Do we really want to leave interventions in crisis areas to the United States, former European colonial powers driven by vested interests, and frequently under-paid, badly equipped, and insufficiently trained soldiers from developing countries?
1) Der Tagesspiegel, February 21, 2007.
2) Winrich Kühne, “Lessons Learned für den
zivilen Bereich,” in Weißbuch in der Kontoverse.
Sicherheitspolitik vor neuen Weichenstellungen. Dokumentation
des Fachgesprächs (Bundestagsfraktion Bündnis
90/Die Grünen), September 29, 2006, p.32.
3) See CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag,
“Leitlinien für Auslandseinsätze der
Bundeswehr,” Beschluss der XXXI. Klausurtagung der
CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag from 8 - 10 January
2007 in Wildbad Kreuth,
http://www.cducsu.de/upload/F4AADA3AB134A6C71BB4BAC1301DF6ED11376-odkqkm5j.pdf;
Winfried Nachtwei: Auslandseinsätze: Lehren und Kriterien,
12.2.2007, http://www.nachtwei.de/index.php/articles/471.
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Prof. Dr. VOLKER PERTHES, geb. 1958, ist Direktor der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin. 2006 veröffentlichte er „Orientalische Promenaden“; im Herbst 2008 wird sein Buch „Iran – eine politische Herausforderung“ erscheinen.
VOLKER PERTHES is the director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). His latest book is Iran–eine politische Herausforderung.
