Balkan Tango

When Lord Paddy Ashdown left Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter “Bosnia”) in February 2006, having served as international High Representative for three and a half busy years, the assumption among international observers was that the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord (that ended the 1992-1995 war) had been largely successful, and that the state-building reforms instituted by Ashdown and his able predecessor, the Austrian top diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch, had launched the country on a course leading to EU membership.

This assumption has since been entirely discredited. Since Ashdown’s departure four years ago, Bosnia has become mired in its deepest political crisis since the war. The local political elites—Serb, Croat, and Bosniak (Muslim)—largely freed of international supervision, have locked horns and amplified the nationalist rhetoric. Reforms to create a single economic space, ensure rule of law, and create a functioning state government have stalled or even reversed. The EU integration process has ground to a halt. Milorad Dodik, the burly premier of Republika Srpska, one of Bosnia’s two entities, dominates the policy agenda by challenging both the Bosnian state’s and the international community’s authority, advocating the revocation of power transfer from entities to the state, and refusing to accept decisions of the High Representative.

The European Union’s policy toward Bosnia lies at the core of this alarming development. The United States began to check out of the western Balkans almost ten years ago, leaving the European Union to play the predominant international role in ensuring the peace and securing Bosnia’s evolution into a self-reforming, democratic, functioning state that can join the European Union and NATO. The European Union moved in, announcing its intentions to merge the peace process and European integration by “double-hatting” the High Representative as an EU Special Representative (EUSR), and then later taking over NATO’s peace enforcement mission as EUFOR. This move reflected the shift “from the push of Dayton to the pull of Brussels.”

But Bosnia’s Dayton-determined state structure has required an active Office of the High Representative (OHR) to render it even passably functional. The European Union’s standard enlargement strategy, used to great effect in Central and Eastern Europe, assumes a functioning state. It also assumes it has “partners” in political elites who genuinely want to join the club, and are willing to undertake the reforms to do so. This is demonstrably not the case in Bosnia, with the political elites empowered by the war and Dayton. To succeed, Brussels needed to adjust its bureaucratic approach to grapple with Bosnia’s unique difficulties and to accept the need to maintain the executive powers of the High Representative and EUFOR until the country was restructured so it could meet EU standards on its own (which the general public does genuinely want). Instead, Brussels lost its patience and began to simply declare progress, in the hope that it would impel the real thing. Expediency and appearances repeatedly trumped proclaimed standards. This loss of will to deal with Bosnia on its own terms led local politicians to conclude that the Union’s conditions were virtual and need not be taken seriously. In 2008, the international Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the body established to oversee the Dayton processes, set benchmarks for OHR closure and the transition to a “reinforced EU Special Representative.” The European Union was increasingly desperate to press “ownership” onto Bosnian politicians, ignoring the fact that the state’s dysfunction is their life-support system.

The Butmir Debacle

Great Britain, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United States (which, under the new Obama administration, reentered the scene dissatisfied with Europe’s performance, but without a clear plan of its own) all advocated a tougher approach, without the same fixation on closing the OHR.  The EU institutions, France, Italy, the Czech and Swedish EU presidencies, and most EU member states not on the PIC Steering Board aligned behind a policy of rapid OHR closure. In October 2009, the U.S. State Department and the Swedish EU presidency convened a meeting of Bosnian political leaders at the EUFOR base at Butmir, just outside Sarajevo, in an attempt to forge a deal to complete the PIC guidelines, gain agreement on a minimal package of constitutional reforms, and generally restart Bosnia’s progress toward entering the European Union. Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg presided. The effort was a marriage of competing imperatives.  While the United States hoped to gain EU support for a push on constitutional reform, Bildt and most EU members desperately wanted to close the OHR and launch its “reinforced EUSR.” While projecting a common front, each sought to bind the other into backing its agenda. The Butmir “package” rolled together completion of the PIC’s criteria (by fudging on the hardest parts) and adoption of some limited constitutional reforms, facilitating further forward movement toward European Union and NATO membership. It was devised as a “take-it-or-leave-it” package, which Bosnian politicians would have to agree to on-site, with some mutually acceptable amendments and trade-offs possible.

But Butmir never got off the ground—and was in fact counterproductive.  Its prolongation into a two-month-long “process” just compounded the damage.  Watering down the reform package to only minor constitutional changes in order to gain Dodik’s acquiescence did not lead to success.  Instead, it reaffirmed his strategy of deepening international fatigue through constant confrontation, ultimately goading the international community into simply giving up the executive authorities vested in OHR and EUFOR unconditionally. At the same time, it further alienated the Bosniak political leaders. Bildt’s singular fixation on OHR closure led them to conclude (rightly) that the European Union’s primary interest in Bosnia is to jettison direct responsibility.

The international desperation on display led Dodik and other Bosnian politicians to conclude that there were no longer any barriers to their agendas.  Dodik baldly stated that he would not accept being bound by decisions made by the High Representative.

The PIC was forced by the calendar and its previous foot-dragging to decide in mid-December 2009 whether to extend international judges and prosecutors at Bosnia’s state court, a cornerstone of the international community’s post-war efforts to establish rule of law. The court’s leadership and a number of PIC members saw it critical to prolong for three years the mandate of internationals working in the special chambers for war crimes and for organized crime and corruption. Dodik, under investigation for corruption charges, opposed this extension. He warned that imposition of the extension would prompt the Republika Srpska to reject OHR decisions and initiate a referendum on them.

Still hoping to avert a confrontation and leave the door open to reviving Butmir, on December 14 the PIC ambassadors opted for a lex Dodik: they decided to extend only international judges and prosecutors in the court’s war crimes chamber. The United States effectively cast the deciding vote against extending organized crime and corruption personnel in executive roles.  No EU members vocally opposed this position, leaving only Turkey and Canada openly in favor of the full extension. In addition to damaging the court and international credibility, the decision failed to achieve its desired effect of placating with Dodik. Dodik immediately announced a referendum on the executive authority of the High Representative (enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution), and he was quoted soon after stating that a referendum would be held on whether Republika Srpska would remain in Bosnia. The U.S. abandonment of its previous position also deepened the sense among many Bosniaks that now even Washington—the pivotal international actor in ending the war and preserving Bosnia as a state—had become unreliable.

International Disarray

Despite the debacle of Butmir, neither the United States nor the European Union has declared the process dead. Some hope to revive it in the coming months, although the prospects for success, even in minimal constitutional changes to eliminate restrictions on election to the Presidency and House of Peoples that the European Court of Human Rights ruled discriminatory in 2009, appear remote. The 2010 electoral season is already in high gear. Even meeting the PIC criteria, such as the apportionment of state property among various layers of government, appears highly unlikely.

EU foreign policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton has changed the line from Brussels, implicitly admitting the failure of Butmir and ceasing the push for immediate OHR closure. She deliberately raised the topic of the deterioration in Bosnia, both at her hearing with the European Parliament and during her first meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Unlike Sweden’s Bildt, the new Spanish EU presidency does not focus on the Balkans, which may prove an asset. Bildt, with his ambition to become EU foreign policy chief, needed a “deliverable.” Spain feels no such pressure. Despite recurrent rumors of a meeting of Bosnian party leaders to be convened in Madrid, Spain appears reluctant to relaunch the Butmir process.

Sweden’s ability to seize the initiative on EU Bosnia policy was only possible because the issue was not a priority in other European national capitals. Except for an increasingly frustrated Britain (which may well become more assertive should the Conservatives come to power in June¹), there seems little impetus for policy change among EU member states, despite increasing unease. For the past three years, Russia has taken advantage of the disarray in Western countries. Along with Dodik, confident there remains no international will to resist him, Russia is the sole winner from Butmir. Without having to expend any political capital, Moscow has supported Republika Srpska’s challenges to the state and the High Representative’s authority and railed against the continuation of OHR and especially the High Representative’s use of executive powers. This makes it more difficult for the international community to forge a coherent strategy, which for Moscow is an end in itself.

So What Now?

Although forward movement or even minimal constitutional reform is unlikely in 2010, this does not mean that Brussels cannot have a positive impact on the overall situation. Reassuring Bosnian citizens of stability is essential. Increasing chatter about the potential break-up of the country, combined with the international community’s listlessness, has reinforced popular fears of a return to violent conflict. While full-fledged war as in 1992-1995 is no longer feasible (there is no more Yugoslav People’s Army, and the former belligerent armies have been unified), there is real potential for interethnic violence. Weaponry is abundant and there are scores to settle. The security element is completely within the European Union’s ability to control. The decision of EU foreign ministers to extend the EUFOR mission beyond 2010 is a good first step. The European Union should make clear that EUFOR will remain with the capacity to ensure the peace and territorial integrity of Bosnia, instead of proclaiming its military mission completed.

The European Union should also acknowledge that until there is wide popular support for a new and functional constitutional order, the need for the Dayton instruments, OHR and EUFOR in their full capacities, will remain. Each self-defined community in Bosnia should receive clear and credible messages from the European Union and wider international community. Citizens and their political leaders must come to believe that none of the threats raised by the national parties’ representatives (state dissolution, secession, a majoritarian state, etc.) will be allowed. Constitutional change acceptable to a majority of each self-defined group is necessary for the country to function. At that point, the country will be capable of self-propelled reform, and Euro-Atlantic integration will follow. Until then, the executive OHR and EUFOR must remain.

The reestablishment of credible deterrence and setting clear and widely understood markers for Bosnia’s progress could considerably reduce tension on the popular level and undercut the leverage of politicians attempting to campaign on platforms of fear.  

Once the situation has stabilized, the European Union should then aim to help reshuffle the deck through the October 2010 elections. The incoming parliament will have to address the question of fundamental constitutional reform, so it would be advantageous if it is less dominated by inflexible nationalists than the current one. Until now, Brussels has conducted its public outreach more through flag-waving gestures than explaining how the very process of meeting EU standards before entry can be advantageous for citizens in the here and now. The European Union must treat citizens as partners, publicizing the costs of their politicians’ failures, giving them the facts they need to make informed choices at the ballot box. The European Union’s upcoming decision on whether to grant visa-free access to Bosnians ought to be based solely on whether the technical criteria are finally met.

Following elections, the functions of the High Representative and EUSR should be separated. The countervailing imperatives of Dayton implementation and European integration have led to muddled policy and damaged credibility for both roles.
Efforts to facilitate substantial constitutional reform must begin soon after the October elections. However, a markedly different approach is required to achieve a functional and popularly legitimate result. The general public needs to be involved in resolving this fundamental question from the outset, to ensure that the parliamentarians who will vote on the issue are more likely to do so in its interest, not personal or party interests. The point is to change the incentives in the system to be integrative rather than divisive, so that continued international engagement in the Bosnian political arena becomes unnecessary.

Bosnia Requires American Impetus

Paradoxical though it may seem, a shift in Washington’s policy is a prerequisite for a new alignment within the European Union. Washington is approaching Brussels as if a singular EU policy exists. EU member states, not the new High Representative, still rule on matters of foreign policy, and they are divided, as was evident at Butmir. The United States must work to align a coalition within the European Union for a credible policy in Bosnia.

Since Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg is vested in Butmir, he has no interest in a policy turnaround, which could be seen as an admission of failure. So a policy shift would have to occur at the cabinet level, even untertaken by President Obama himself.  Delegation of the Bosnia file to a full-time point person to conduct the bilateral and multilateral strategic planning seems the best approach.  A Europe-savvy presidential special envoy could deal with Bosnia on its own terms, not as a mere facet of the larger U.S.-EU relationship, as tends to be done from Washington. The special envoy, perhaps with an EU-counterpart, would devise and advocate a common long-term strategy to first restabilize Bosnia, then press for a thoroughly different constitutional structure that is self-sustaining.

The Swedish presidency shows that few EU members wish to wager political capital on the Bosnia issue. Two of the European Union’s Big Four would allow critical mass to form within the European Union. Germany is a pivotal player if there is to be a shift in EU policy toward Bosnia. Together with Britain, a stronger German policy would bring a number of members who have concerns with the current approach on board, such as Denmark and Poland, and perhaps even France.

A failure for the European Union in Bosnia will rightly be seen as a resounding failure for the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Baroness Ashton seems to recognize this. But success is not up to her alone—it depends greatly on Washington and Berlin.

¹ See David Cameron’s speech at the Brookings Institution, November 2007: “The Balkans: A New Crisis?” and Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague’s joint article with Paddy Ashdown, Mort Abramowitz, Jim O’Brien, and Jim Hooper “Europe and America Must Pay Attention to Broken Bosnia,” Financial Times, December 30, 2009.