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Hands Off Our Shackles, Please

rachel tausendfreund — Fri, 05 Mar 2010 15:15:56 +0000

The momentous decision made by a German colonel in September to call in a NATO air strike on fuel trucks hijacked by the Taliban could become a test of Germany’s maturity 20 years after regaining complete sovereignty. But this incident, and its handling, has already turned a harsh spotlight on the shortcomings of German security policy.

On many levels—equipment, leadership, information, communication, strategy, and perhaps even perceptions of the incident itself—grave mistakes were made, not only by Colonel Georg Klein and his staff, but also by Germany’s military and civilian leadership. These issues are now the subject of a parliamentary inquiry. Yet at best, this forum will only indirectly address the core questions of German security policy. Does Germany actually have a security policy worthy of the name? If so, is this policy actually based on a strategy? How effective are the actors and institutions that shape and implement such policy? Do Germany’s alliance policies bear inspection? Finally, how good are the tools at its disposal? The following theses and recommendations are intended as a contribution to this debate.

Thesis #1: Germany is fully sovereign; its security policy is not.

In the 1970s a U.S. cigarette brand courted the emancipated woman with the slogan: “You’ve come a long way, baby.” The same could be said of Germany. No other country in Europe had as much ground to make up in the field of security policy after 1989 as the Federal Republic. Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, were created as the price for NATO entry in 1956, against massive domestic resistance, with a single mission: to defend the country’s 1,700-mile border along the Iron Curtain against a possible Warsaw Pact attack. The Bundeswehr’s ranks swelled to nearly 700,000 after taking over the GDR’s “National People’s Army.” Twenty years on, it has shrunk to a third of that size. After an agonized national debate about whether the Basic Law even permits “out-of-area missions” (the Constitutional Court handed down a conditional yes in 1994), Germany sent troops to UN, NATO and EU missions in Cambodia, Somalia, the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan; German soldiers saw combat for the first time in Kosovo. All the while, a succession of German governments firmly maintained the primacy of the civilian executive over the military and the pre-eminence of soft over hard power. These were and are remarkable achievements. Still, from the point of view of even its most sympathetic neighbors and allies, Germany still looks like a “nation in shackles of its own making,” as the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Stefan Kornelius put it.

This became particularly conspicuous from 1998 onwards under the “red-green” coalition formed by the Social Democrats and the Green Party. In this period, German security policy lurched wildly between a commitment to the culture of restraint and plunging into military actions, between self-congratulatory paeans to its “civilian power” and hard power projection, between hypermoralism and opportunism. The new “black and yellow” coalition formed by the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats, like the grand coalition before it, operates with rather less heat and noise. Nevertheless, the impression remains that the strategic framework of German security policy is rudimentary, above all when it comes to the “hard” questions now besetting the West: the Afghan “surge,” sanctions against Iran, and a more assertive approach towards Russia and China.

It is symptomatic of this state of affairs that fundamental decisions regarding German security policy have been repeatedly forced into the Procrustean bed of moral necessity, domestic imperatives, or the demands of external alliances. German politicians sent the Bundeswehr into Kosovo in 1998 with the slogan “Never again Auschwitz” and to Afghanistan in 2002 out of “unconditional solidarity” with the United States. More recently, intra-coalition tensions or the need to co-opt the opposition and/or the German public have been cited as grounds for resisting allied entreaties for more German soldiers in the Hindu Kush. It is no less telling that it took the Kunduz bombing to wring her first government declaration on Afghanistan from Chancellor Merkel together with the overdue acknowledgement that the Bundeswehr’s operations in the north of the country had now become a “combat operation.”

The result of all this, as the Hamburg historian Klaus Naumann wrote recently, is a security policy that substitutes “a tactical policy dictated by caveats instead of a strategic logic dictated by goals.” All too often, decision-making and accountability are shunted out of the policymaking sphere and dumped on the military leadership. This is politics fleeing from itself—the very opposite of responsibility. And it inevitably leads to excessive burdens being placed on military commanders.

Hence my first recommendation: Shaping security policy is the sovereign duty of the political leadership. It requires conceptual vigor, a willingness to lead, a sense of responsibility and courage.

Thesis #2: Germany does not have a security strategy.

The United States has a national security strategy. The United Kingdom and France have one. Even the European Union has one. What Germany has is a White Paper issued by the Ministry of Defense and thus a programmatic void at the national level.

The 2006 White Paper is an appraisal of Germany’s security policy and has the approval of the other ministries. But no government has the right to ask its soldiers to die for a White Paper. A national security strategy must come from the chancellery. The fact that all attempts to produce such a policy over the years have foundered on the rocks of petty departmental competition is also a consistent failure of political leadership.

It is not absolutely necessary to write down strategies and publish them, but it helps. It promotes discipline, sets standards, and fosters public debate. But grand strategy is more than assembling a catalog of values, threats, and plans. Strategy is the attempt to translate a nation’s raison d‘état into coherent, long-term governmental action.

What, then, is Germany’s raison d‘état? Quite simply, it is to protect something that many Germans appear to take for granted: the freest, most democratic, open, peaceful, and lawful state ever created on German soil. In a globalized world of porous borders, threats to this momentous achievement can come from far away. Inasmuch as they are man-made, such threats are typically asymmetrical in the sense that they originate from less privileged parts of the world.

The most effective way of protecting Germany’s societal model—the Western-style open civil society—is still to export it (and German policy on Eastern Europe would do well to remind itself of this more often). But sometimes the last resort is to defend it militarily, for instance against a terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda or against the Taliban that provided it with sanctuary and protection. This may displease those whom journalist Gero von Randow has described as harboring “a critical attitude to the new realities of security policy inasmuch as they deny the existence of these realities.” But such denial is not an option in the real world.

Multilateralism, meanwhile, is a method, not a strategy. Nor is it enough to derive a raison d‘état from a conviction of moral superiority based on Germany’s recognition of its responsibility for two world wars and the Holocaust. That is narcissism, not strategy. Such hubris (not to say moral megalomania)alienates even Germany’s most forgiving friends and produces distorted views of reality. How else could a German government attempt to establish its claim to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council not on bank transfers or troop deployments but on the fact that it said no to the Iraq war? The persistent denial of the dangers facing German troops in northern Afghanistan, founded on the conviction that Germany is on the side of the angels (due, among other things, to its refusal to support the Iraq war) is just one more instance of these distorted perceptions.

Every German government—and this is my second recommendation—should commit itself to formulating a national security strategy at the beginning of its tenure and submitting it to the parliament as a government declaration.

Thesis #3: Germany’s security policy elites and institutions are underdeveloped.

According to a popular cliché, Germany does not have a “strategic community.” In reality, there is a great deal of expertise, experience, and a desire to see Germany taking on greater responsibilities in the ministries, the Bundestag, the military, universities, think tanks and non-governmental organizations. The real problem is that the community’s size is in no way commensurate with Germany’s weight. One of the reasons is that—unlike other nations—Germany does not have a tradition of institutions dedicated to teaching the making of public policy. (Germany’s first public policy schools were founded in the 1990s; they are a step in the right direction, but more needs to be done.)

Instead, Germany’s culture relies on a kind of politico-bureaucratic Darwinism: leadership positions are conferred on those who, having clambered laboriously up the career ladder and survived old boys’ networks, hierarchies, the seniority principle, tribal warfare, male feminism, and sundry other mechanisms designed to repress temperament and talent, finally surmount the first ridge in relatively unbowed condition (at about 50 years of age). The consequences of this process are on permanent display in our politics. In a political culture that institutionalizes immaturity, the lack of mature characters should not come as a surprise.

Moreover, the German strategic community, such as it is, is strictly subdivided and circumscribed. In America, there is an institutionalized revolving door between government and civil society, which connects the two and allows for the regular flow of new ideas; its German counterpart is not much more than a crack in the wall.

However, the deficits of German security policy are not primarily due to individuals or a lack of personnel. There is another reason for the cacophony of voices combined with lowest-common-denominator policies (the best example of both being the Russia policy of the last grand coalition). Formally, it is the Chancellor who directs policy; in reality, German foreign policy is being forged in several places at once, and the chancellery’s imprint is often hard to discern.

In fact, the dissipation of energies and lack of coherence that we are only too happy to attribute to the European Union or NATO equally permeates the policymaking process within Germany; this is best exemplified by our engagement in Afghanistan. We demand that NATO and our allies subscribe to our notions of a comprehensive approach and networked security; but we are not even able to implement these ideas at home. The result: paralysis, blockades, and sham control mechanisms. What we need is an interdepartmental, integrative mechanism subject to the oversight of the Chancellor. The Federal Security Council—an interministerial committee which meets ad hoc and essentially restricts itself to oversight of defense exports—would be an obvious candidate for this role.

Thus, my third recommendation for Germany is to do better at training and recruiting security policy professionals. The Federal Security Council should also be remodeled as an organ that coordinates the shaping of security policy.

Thesis #4: Germany’s value as an ally is measured by its will to bear an appropriate degree of risk.

Bluntly put, the policy notions that Germany sets store by, such as the “comprehensive approach,” will never be taken seriously if our combat troops are not. Still, the question of our value as an ally is by no means just a military one. Obviously, it is a problem for our allies when we are unable or unwilling (or both) to supply military clout to joint operations. And when we do decide to contribute military force, we place it under geographical and legal caveats which substantially restrict its efficacy. Lastly, the handicaps we so compulsively impose on ourselves make us politically vulnerable to the demands our allies make.

Still, the core problem of our value as an ally is one of political will. Among NATO members the Germans are seen as passive, reactive, and inclined to block or put a brake on things: in short, the Germans are the new French.

Of course it is acceptable for Berlin to be skeptical toward the volleys of turbocharged concepts that emanate in regular intervals from the United States, such as the revolution in military affairs, global war on terror, global alliances, or a league of democracies. There are legitimate strategic debates to be had here—and Germany is by no means alone with its doubts in the alliance. Even Germany’s position on the current process of rewriting NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999—which might not unfairly be summarized as “it wasn’t all bad”—is defensible. But it is also far from enough.

Quite possibly, it is not so much our lack of will as our lack of ideas that risks relegating us into the second tier of alliance partners. Take nuclear arms control. Germany, as is well known, does not have nuclear weapons of its own, but it stores a small number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Their military value is infinitesimal, as is their relevance in the current arms control debate; however, they do assure us a seat at the table in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. Nonetheless, the majority of our leading politicians have enthusiastically and populistically embraced a “Global Zero” solution for strategic nuclear weapons, and called for a “return to sender” policy for the tactical nukes—ensuring simultaneous irritation in Paris, London and Washington. Here too, we need only remember that Germany was once valued as an expert and honest broker in complex multilateral arms control negotiations; not least, because we were discreet about it. If we want to be taken seriously in this field, we need to bring new ideas and political clout to the table; waxing nostalgic about Cold War institutions and treaties simply does not make the grade.

Much the same is true of Germany’s bilateral relationships with traditional allies like France, the UK and the United States—former ironclad constants of German security policy. Yet our current approach to them is one of listless routine even when, as is now the case in the United States, there is a real readiness to reset policy and engage with the world.

Our frequent use of the term Bündniszwang—an untranslatable term that amounts to saying: we don’t want to, but we have to, because of our allies—is revelatory in this context. In reality, our alliances are force multipliers that we cannot afford to do without.

Which is why my fourth recommendation is: the German government should review its alliance strategies and commit to sharing the burden of military and political risk in a manner that is commensurate with its weight.

Thesis #5: Even measured against Germany’s own ambitions, the instruments of its security policy are inadequate.

As a major civilian power Germany has a lot of experience to offer. And yet it exhibits an odd inability to act on lessons learned. In 1995, Berlin first promised police and judges for Ruanda, then for Bosnia, later for Kosovo, and then again for Afghanistan; today, Germany has a Center for International Peace Operations (ZiF) which prepares civilian professionals for international peace operations, and an “action plan” for civilian crisis prevention. Nevertheless, in all these operations including the current one in Afghanistan, Germany struggles to fulfil the promises made to its allies and partners; and each time we have blamed these shortcomings on our federal structures. (Police or other civilian personnel are mainly provided by the German Länder; and when they fail to do so, the federal government’s powers of persuasion or coercion are practically nonexistent.) Why are we not specifically training police for international deployments or administrators and trainers for nation-building projects? And if we can’t, why do we keep promising them?

All this is harmless compared to the problems facing the Bundeswehr. The military transformation initiated 10 years ago is now in a state of paralysis. Out of 253,000 soldiers only four battalions are ready for combat operations. The military leadership is holding on to compulsory military service because they see it as the cheapest way to attract qualified personnel; in reality it is merely tying up valuable resources. Rigid rules of engagement, inadequate equipment, and above all a public debate that denies operational realities: all this has created a deep sense of frustration in the armed forces, whose achievements have been extraordinary and who deserve better.

My fifth and final recommendation is therefore the creation of a commission charged with formulating proposals for improving the civilian and military instruments of German security policy.

The Bomb for Beginners

rachel tausendfreund — Wed, 24 Feb 2010 23:00:00 +0000

Building a nuclear weapon has never been easier. NATO’s Michael Rühle provides step-by-step instructions for going nuclear, from discretely collecting material to minimizing the fallout when caught. These simple steps have worked for the likes of Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea, among others. The nuclear club is open to your country, too.

Tired of being bossed around? Want your neighbors to treat you with more respect? Want to play in the majors? If so, you have to have your own nukes.

Impossible? Not really. Granted, if your country is a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), as most countries are, the constraints on your bomb building are considerable. Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are difficult to circumvent. And the IAEA can no longer be fooled as easily as in the 1980s, when it failed to uncover Saddam Hussein’s military nuclear program in Iraq despite regular inspections.

The IAEA’s increased awareness means that you have to be imaginative. Here are some steps to consider.

First, begin developing a civilian nuclear program. Under the NPT, you are not only entitled to a civilian nuclear program, you may even ask for help from the IAEA. The IAEA will provide you with the basic ingredients and much of the know-how for a military program. Moreover, you can legally buy reactor fuel, and thus do not have to acquire it by performing hair-raising stunts like those the Israelis pulled in 1968, when they had to hijack a ship carrying uranium after France stopped its supplies.

As you start building your civilian nuclear infrastructure, which should include nuclear plants to produce plutonium and/or uranium and appropriate nuclear research facilities, aim for the full fuel cycle: mining, milling, conversion, enrichment. This allows you the greatest possible independence—which you may need later, once you are caught or go public. And let there be no mistake: you will get caught.

But the notion of getting caught need not concern you at this stage. You will need to build research and nuclear enrichment facilities at several sites. Some will be publicly declared sites, i.e. they can be inspected by the IAEA. Other facilities, however, will remain secret, preferably underground or in mountainous areas (you did not forget to buy advanced drilling equipment, did you?). It is within these military facilities that enrichment of reactor-grade uranium to weapons-grade levels, as well as plutonium reprocessing will take place. If you are not too concerned about raising international suspicions, you can be so bold as to invest in other nuclear activities as well, such as nuclear submarine propulsion. Dubious? Yes. Illegal? No—ask the Brazilians.

Getting Off the Ground

In order to run your secret military program, you need to buy a lot of stuff. Try to be discreet. Once you have raised suspicions, you will be put under international surveillance, and buying critical components will become much harder. Make sure you buy nuclear components from several sources so that you have backups in case one seller drops out. You will be less visible if you use intermediaries to buy certain things for you. In some cases, you may have to buy and then reverse engineer certain technologies. Others have done it in the past, so can you. Intrigued? Ask the Pakistanis.

Too bad A. Q. Khan, the father of all nuclear smugglers, is no longer in business. He could have supplied you with everything you need to give the United States the finger: from centrifuges all the way to warhead designs. With Khan’s help, Libya almost made it into the nuclear club. But along came the Bush administration and shut down the Khan franchise. As a consequence, buying all the necessary items will now take longer and will probably cost you more; but, with enough patience and money, you will still be able to get what you need. North Korea will help you, just as they offered to help Iran and Syria. You need nukes; they need hard currency—a match made in heaven.

If this direct approach is too risky for you, do not despair. Instead, help fund the nuclear program of another would-be nuclear power. In return, you may receive certain nuclear components—or even warheads—when you deem that the time has come for them to return the favor. For confirmation, ask the Saudis why they used to finance A. Q. Khan’s laboratories.

To be a credible nuclear power, you need appropriate systems to deliver your nuclear weapons. One method of delivery uses dual-capable carriers, such as aircraft and cruise missiles. They are not too difficult to purchase, but let us be honest: ballistic missiles are the real thing. To obtain them, you do not have to work alone. If you designate your missile program as a “space launch” program, other states can legally support you, just like Russia is doing in Iran. And even when you have missiles that are obviously not intended for a space program, you can team up with other countries and share test results, as do North Korea and Iran. Sharing test results cuts development time and costs.

When deciding on warhead design, you can play it safe and simply buy some older Chinese or Pakistani designs. These designs have been in circulation for quite some time, and are readily available on CD-ROM.

Once you have built a nuclear weapon, you may want to test it. Of course, you could get around testing by choosing a weapons design that does not require testing, like the first U.S. nuclear bomb in 1945. If your weapon is more sophisticated, however, you need to be creative. The old trick of staging a “peaceful nuclear explosion” will no longer suffice, since no one is going to believe that you need nukes to dig a canal or blow away a mountain. But with a bit of luck, you will find another nation that still conducts “real” tests and allows you to bring your scientists and your technical equipment along for the event. North Korea is a strong candidate, and has acquired a considerable amount of foreign currency that way. You can also try to have another nation test weapons on your behalf, as South Africa did for Israel, and China did for Pakistan. Or you can conduct a “cold test,” without the fissile material. This gives you at least some reassurance that your warhead design will work in a pinch.

Becoming a nuclear weapons power takes years, perhaps decades. So how should you behave internationally while secretly working on your nuclear program?

As a general rule, keep a low profile, even at NPT Review Conferences. Of course, nothing is wrong with you joining in the ritualistic condemnation of the “double standards” of the Nuclear Weapons States, or with arguing for a nuclear free zone in your region. But you should leave the most vocal attacks to others. There are enough diplomats desperate to bask in their 15 minutes of fame by taking on the Nuclear Weapons States during the NPT Review Conferences.

Rally the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) around your cause. Find a few anti-Western countries to front for you. Systematically demarche capitals of small countries whose diplomats try to inject some reason into NAM statements. Raise the topic of Israel. And if the UN Security Council should pass a non-binding resolution about global nuclear disarmament, try to keep a straight face and agree.

Getting Caught: Control the Fallout

You will get caught, either by a US spy satellite (as in the case of North Korea), a disgruntled defector (as in the case of Iraq), or even an indigenous human rights group (as in the case of Iran). So what should you do if you get caught? First and foremost, do not overreact. Deny. Should the evidence become too powerful, then, change tack. Create a distraction. Argue that the uranium particles found in your country were purposely scattered by a hostile nation. Challenge the credibility of the information provided to the IAEA. Bring up Israel again.

Once these lame excuses have run out of steam, shift gear. Admit that you have indeed failed in certain cases to be as open as the NPT requires. Promise to cooperate with the IAEA from now on. But never admit that you are seeking anything beyond nuclear energy. If you are a Muslim country, you can also cite some arbitrary fatwas that argue that nuclear arms are incompatible with Islam. If none can be found, have one written by a clergyman.

Most importantly, continue to insist on your “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy. Since the NPT is not very precise, the international community may spend years trying to agree what to do with you. Claim the “nuclear powers” are trying to deny your nuclear rights and protect the political and economic benefits of monopolizing nuclear weapons and energy. Accuse the IAEA of bias. Raise Israel again.

Once you have mastered the complete fuel cycle, you could, in principle, declare yourself a nuclear power. But since you want to become a true Nuclear Weapons State, you need to achieve weaponization. Should your program become the subject of international negotiations before it has reached that critical stage, the key will be to buy time. Offer concessions. Then take them back. Offer them again, etc., etc. The Security Council will seek to punish you, of course, but the rivalries in that body almost guarantee that no serious punishment will ever be set. If you have access to oil and gas, you are even better off; one or more P-5 members will need your natural resources so badly that they will protect you from severe international pressure.

You can also count on the support of others. The IAEA, for example, will be divided into those who believe that a true watchdog should also bite, and those who feel that they must side with the underdog, i.e. with you. Many non-proliferation experts will take your side as well, writing thousands of pages arguing that you are innocent until proven guilty. Although by this point, buying more paraphernalia for your program on the international market may have become next to impossible, at this stage you should be able to run your program without outside help.

Don’t Blow It (Yet)

Fortunately, time is on your side. Do not blow it by issuing extreme public statements, such as describing your neighboring countries as a cancer that needs to be eliminated. Maniacal outbursts do not go over well, even with the countries that sympathize with your cause. Also, never argue that you need nukes because your neighbors have them, as that would give away your true intentions. Instead, always claim that your conventional defense capabilities are sufficient. You will appear less suspicious, which is necessary to deter your nervous neighbors from preemptively knocking out your nuclear program.

The last choice for you to make is whether to remain a “virtual” nuclear power or announce your arrival with a big bang, i.e. with a nuclear test that establishes your credentials as a Nuclear Weapons State. By this point, you will have spent billions of dollars and much political capital. You may have become an international outlaw, and if you do not control oil, your country may now be impoverished. A decline in relations with your neighbors is complemented by an increase in number of alliances against you. Does all this add up to a net gain? Well, perhaps not quite as good an outcome as you had initially hoped. But no one ever said that being a nuclear power is easy.

Rethinking Iran

rachel tausendfreund — Fri, 19 Feb 2010 23:00:00 +0000

The May review of the NPT will inevitably address the case of Iran. The key to handling the issue wisely and keeping Iran at the table is to distinguish NPT non-compliance from the flouting of UN resolutions. Iran must show, through regional diplomacy, that it does not seek nuclear weapons. Greater realism can yield political and economic advantages.

With a new president in the White House, prospects have improved for a useful review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) when the parties meet in New York on May 3. But one issue on the agenda will be Iran. Mishandling this could cause Iran—with support, perhaps, from Venezuela, Cuba, and Syria—to disrupt the conference, as it did at the last review in 2005. Can this be avoided? A possible approach would involve distinguishing NPT non-compliance from non-compliance with UN resolutions and launching a political process that creates confidence in Iran’s intentions to comply with NPT obligations.

The first point about Iranian NPT non-compliance is that much of it took place years ago. Before 2003 Iran failed on many counts to respect the NPT agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974. Reports from IAEA inspectors suggest that since 2003 this non-compliance (as well as non-compliance reported in 2005) has been addressed, as required by the IAEA statute. Arguably, there is no longer any reason for NPT parties to discuss it; certainly none of the treaty’s provisions require a regular review of past non-compliance that has been addressed.

Whether Iran is currently non-compliant is another matter. In a legalistic view, since the IAEA board’s formal finding of non-compliance in 2005, relating to breaches which have been corrected, there has been no further formal findings. On a broader view, Iran’s failure to provide early design information on two facilities are post-2005 instances of non-compliance, irrespective of whether the board has made a formal finding. However, Iran contests the IAEA view that unilateral abrogation of Code 3.1 is illegal. And, if these were breaches, then the declarations made to the IAEA in 2009 amount to corrective action.

Perhaps more significantly, Iran’s failure to cooperate adequately with the secretariat to resolve questions relating to possible nuclear weapons work amounts to a continuing breach. However, Iran can claim that under the 1974 agreement, the IAEA has no right to investigate weapons-related allegations; IAEA rights under that agreement center on verifying the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards. (Others would say that the IAEA is entitled to investigate any reports that indicate an intention to divert nuclear material placed under safeguards.)

This legal murkiness suggests that little good can come from a review of the Iranian case in May, and that it would be more profitable for NPT parties to highlight the international community’s need for enhanced assurances of Iran’s intention to respect its NPT obligations, especially its Article II obligation to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. To date, Iran has done a poor job of providing such assurances. Its leaders seem to think it sufficient to state and restate that their nuclear program is peaceful. It is not enough. Iran’s many years of non-compliance prior to 2003, and some of its actions since, notably its failure to cooperate proactively with the IAEA, have created a large confidence deficit. It is in Iran’s own interest to eliminate this doubt and convince the world that it should be viewed like Brazil, Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands: as an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) possessing a significant uranium enrichment capability.

Regional Engagement

A year ago there were hopes Iran would be ready to engage in comprehensive confidence-building in return for a settlement of its historic differences with the United States and improved economic relations with the West. But Iran’s current leaders either lack the political authority to enter into a such a “grand bargain” with the United States—or they lack the will to do so.

This need not mean that the confidence deficit is fated to persist. Iran can instead engage with its regional peers: Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia (all NPT parties). It can do so on equal terms, on the basis of mutual respect. Historic rivalries and animosities need not be an obstacle to confidence-building. On the contrary, they can be a spur, as France and Germany, and Brazil and Argentina, have shown. Iran has a strong interest in reassuring these regional rivals that they have nothing to fear from Iran’s nuclear program, since failing to reassure them could trigger a nuclear arms race in South West Asia that would undermine Iranian security.

By reassuring its neighbors, Iran could indirectly reassure the international community as a whole. In such a process as confidence building, a manifest desire to reassure is as important as the specific confidence building measures (CBMs) that a state puts in place. The nature of the CBMs, however, matters. In this instance, measures that could be envisaged include:

• A nuclear-test-free zone. Turkey has already ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), whereas Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have not. All four could agree to create a Middle East test-ban agreement, open to other states in the region, as suggested by former IAEA Deputy Director General Goldschmidt. Presumably they would not wish to do so unless Israel joined. This could prove easier than might be thought, given that Israel has never conducted a nuclear test and appears to have a no-test policy, no doubt to maintain ambiguity concerning its nuclear status. Such an agreement could be a step toward ratification of the CTBT by Iran, Egypt, and Israel, thereby facilitating that treaty’s entry into force;
• A regional safeguards agency. The report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) rightly notes that regional and bilateral safeguards arrangements can be useful measures. EURATOM is an example of the former, the Argentina-Brazil agency of the latter. Both operate in tandem with IAEA safeguards.
• Conversion of Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium into research or power reactor fuel, either at Iran’s fuel fabrication plant or outside Iran;
• A permanent on-sight inspector presence, either IAEA or regional, or both, at all sensitive nuclear sites;
• Modification of the research reactor under construction at Arak to reduce its effectiveness as a producer of plutonium.

One CBM that it no longer seems realistic to expect is the suspension of all enrichment activity. Suspension has become tainted in Iranian eyes by so much insistence on it—first from the E-3 (France, U.K., Germany) and the IAEA board, and then from the UN Security Council. Suspension could not be offered without loss of face and without damage to Iran’s most likely nuclear objective: acquiring a threshold capability to withdraw from the NPT and manufacture nuclear weapons in the event of “extraordinary events jeopardizing [Iran’s] supreme interests” (Article X).

Does this matter? There is no disputing that confidence in prospects for peace and stability in South West Asia would be enhanced if Iran abandoned enrichment and closed down its enrichment plants. Aspects of the current Iranian regime make it hard for the international community to view with equanimity a nuclear-threshold Iran, even if the regime sets about closing the confidence gap. But it must be recognized that:

• Iran has an NPT right to enrich uranium. It does not forfeit this right by failing to respect its obligations under the treaty’s Article III. Nothing in the treaty calls for the suspension of the rights of those who violate it—an unfortunate omission but a reality, at least for the time being;
• NPT parties have acquiesced in several other NNWS acquiring an enrichment capability. Applying a double standard to Iran would be a poor basis for sustainable security arrangements in South West Asia;
• Iran’s flouting of Security Council resolutions calling for enrichment suspension does not put it in breach of the NPT. Flouting UNSC resolutions is a serious matter, and merits the sanctions that have been and may yet be imposed on Iran. But the political origin of these resolutions must not be forgotten. They were designed to obtain through coercion what the international community was unable to obtain through persuasion: confidence in Iran’s intentions. If Iran shows a will to create confidence in ways other than those foreseen in these resolutions, this creates political grounds for not insisting on compliance with all their provisions;
• Possessing an enrichment capability is far from being tantamount to possessing nuclear weapons. The one is merely a possible step on the way to the other. Taking the one step does not necessarily imply the intention to take the other. It may have that implication; equally, it may not. Until there is evidence that Iran intends to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, the legal and political implications of its enrichment activities differ from those of an unlawful nuclear weapons program;
• The ICNND report recommends acceptance of the reality of Iran’s enrichment activities in return for Iranian acceptance of a very intrusive inspection and verification regime.
Another CBM that seems beyond the realm of the possible at this stage is implementation of the safeguards Additional Protocol, permitting enhanced IAEA monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities. Having applied this protocol provisionally in December 2003, Iran ceased applying it in February 2006, in retaliation for its IAEA non-compliance being reported to the UNSC. Since then, Iranian representatives have affirmed that it would take the lifting of UN sanctions to induce reapplication. This is foolish, as without an AP in force, the IAEA cannot provide assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear activities on Iranian soil, and such assurances would go a long way toward allaying international concerns. But here too “face” is at stake.

The Advantages of Realism

One advantage of acknowledging, tacitly or explicitly, Iran’s right to enrich is the possibility to repair a fissure within the international community. Some non-Western states have built enrichment facilities or are thinking of doing so. They are anxious to preserve their NPT right to enrich and wary of creating a double standard that might be applied to them in the future.

Repairing this fissure can reunite all but a few members of the international community behind a common policy toward nuclear Iran. This united front will be valuable should Iran start to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons in contravention of Article II. A broadly united community would be able to address, through the UNSC, such a grave breach of the NPT, and would give legitimacy to whatever measures were agreed. The West cannot afford a second intervention in South West Asia that lacks legitimacy.
Another advantage of acknowledging Iran’s rights is that this denies the current Iranian regime a popular rallying cause. The regime’s opponents seem less hostile to the West than do leading members of the regime, but those opponents are equally attached to Iran’s right to enrich. Insisting on the abandonment of enrichment risks narrowing the gap that divides these opponents from the regime and reducing the chances of something positive emerging from Iran’s current political unrest.

There are also economic advantages to a less confrontational approach. An Iranian risk premium has contributed to the relatively high price of crude oil in recent years. Somewhat cheaper oil, as a result of a reduction in tensions in South West Asia, would benefit a still fragile global economy.

Longer term, Iran needs foreign investment and technology to optimize development of its vast oil and gas reserves; and the world needs larger supplies of oil and gas from Iranian fields to compensate for declining yields from maturing fields elsewhere. The absence of confidence in Iran’s nuclear intentions is an obstacle to these investments the world can ill afford.

Maintaining Restrictions

In leaving space for Iran’s regional peers to engage, the wider community must not lower its guard. Until the confidence gap has been closed, Iran should not be given the benefit of the doubt. It must be assumed that its current leaders may not intend to stop at acquiring a latent nuclear weapons capability.

Not lowering its guard implies:
• Members of the international community that have intelligence capabilities redoubling efforts to ensure that the community obtains timely (and reliable) warning of non-peaceful Iranian nuclear moves;
• Maintaining measures to deny Iran WMD and missile-related technology. Accepting that Iran may end up with a threshold capability akin to that of a few other NNWS need not entail making that goal easier to achieve;
• Interdicting any Iranian attempt to proliferate its WMD know-how, equipment or material.

In conclusion, the policies proposed in this article cannot “solve” the Iranian case. They could, however, lead to an increase in confidence concerning Iran’s intentions, resulting in political and economic benefits. They could also improve the chances of a UNSC agreement on decisive action if future twists in the drama warrant it.

The Western powers need to understand that they may not always be the best-placed members of the international community to engineer progress toward the peaceful enforcement of the NPT. The West also needs to realize that some problems are not susceptible to the “quick fixes” that Western culture craves. The normalization of Iranian membership of the international community will not come without resolving Iran’s differences with the United States. But many more years may pass before Iran is ready for a settling of scores. In the meantime, patient diplomacy, public and private, can help prepare the ground.

NPT Stipulations
Art. II: Non-nuclear-weapon states shall not receive any transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or gain control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. They may also not manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices nor seek or receive any assistance in doing so.
Art. III: All non-nuclear weapon states agree to accept safeguards negotiated with the IAEA to ensure that nuclear materials in peaceful use are not diverted to military use.
Art. VI: The parties to the Treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Art. X: With three months notice each state has the right to withdraw from the treaty citing extraordinary events that jeopardize the supreme interests of its country.

Balkan Tango

rachel tausendfreund — Thu, 18 Feb 2010 14:41:50 +0000

Bosnia is backsliding into political chaos and possibly even renewed ethnic violence. Failure for the European Union in Bosnia will rightly be seen as a resounding blow to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. First, Europeans need to allign their Bosnia policies. For this they need U.S. help, whether they like it or not.

When Lord Paddy Ashdown left Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter “Bosnia”) in February 2006, having served as international High Representative for three and a half busy years, the assumption among international observers was that the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord (that ended the 1992-1995 war) had been largely successful, and that the state-building reforms instituted by Ashdown and his able predecessor, the Austrian top diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch, had launched the country on a course leading to EU membership.

This assumption has since been entirely discredited. Since Ashdown’s departure four years ago, Bosnia has become mired in its deepest political crisis since the war. The local political elites—Serb, Croat, and Bosniak (Muslim)—largely freed of international supervision, have locked horns and amplified the nationalist rhetoric. Reforms to create a single economic space, ensure rule of law, and create a functioning state government have stalled or even reversed. The EU integration process has ground to a halt. Milorad Dodik, the burly premier of Republika Srpska, one of Bosnia’s two entities, dominates the policy agenda by challenging both the Bosnian state’s and the international community’s authority, advocating the revocation of power transfer from entities to the state, and refusing to accept decisions of the High Representative.

The European Union’s policy toward Bosnia lies at the core of this alarming development. The United States began to check out of the western Balkans almost ten years ago, leaving the European Union to play the predominant international role in ensuring the peace and securing Bosnia’s evolution into a self-reforming, democratic, functioning state that can join the European Union and NATO. The European Union moved in, announcing its intentions to merge the peace process and European integration by “double-hatting” the High Representative as an EU Special Representative (EUSR), and then later taking over NATO’s peace enforcement mission as EUFOR. This move reflected the shift “from the push of Dayton to the pull of Brussels.”

But Bosnia’s Dayton-determined state structure has required an active Office of the High Representative (OHR) to render it even passably functional. The European Union’s standard enlargement strategy, used to great effect in Central and Eastern Europe, assumes a functioning state. It also assumes it has “partners” in political elites who genuinely want to join the club, and are willing to undertake the reforms to do so. This is demonstrably not the case in Bosnia, with the political elites empowered by the war and Dayton. To succeed, Brussels needed to adjust its bureaucratic approach to grapple with Bosnia’s unique difficulties and to accept the need to maintain the executive powers of the High Representative and EUFOR until the country was restructured so it could meet EU standards on its own (which the general public does genuinely want). Instead, Brussels lost its patience and began to simply declare progress, in the hope that it would impel the real thing. Expediency and appearances repeatedly trumped proclaimed standards. This loss of will to deal with Bosnia on its own terms led local politicians to conclude that the Union’s conditions were virtual and need not be taken seriously. In 2008, the international Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the body established to oversee the Dayton processes, set benchmarks for OHR closure and the transition to a “reinforced EU Special Representative.” The European Union was increasingly desperate to press “ownership” onto Bosnian politicians, ignoring the fact that the state’s dysfunction is their life-support system.

The Butmir Debacle

Great Britain, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United States (which, under the new Obama administration, reentered the scene dissatisfied with Europe’s performance, but without a clear plan of its own) all advocated a tougher approach, without the same fixation on closing the OHR. The EU institutions, France, Italy, the Czech and Swedish EU presidencies, and most EU member states not on the PIC Steering Board aligned behind a policy of rapid OHR closure. In October 2009, the U.S. State Department and the Swedish EU presidency convened a meeting of Bosnian political leaders at the EUFOR base at Butmir, just outside Sarajevo, in an attempt to forge a deal to complete the PIC guidelines, gain agreement on a minimal package of constitutional reforms, and generally restart Bosnia’s progress toward entering the European Union. Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg presided. The effort was a marriage of competing imperatives. While the United States hoped to gain EU support for a push on constitutional reform, Bildt and most EU members desperately wanted to close the OHR and launch its “reinforced EUSR.” While projecting a common front, each sought to bind the other into backing its agenda. The Butmir “package” rolled together completion of the PIC’s criteria (by fudging on the hardest parts) and adoption of some limited constitutional reforms, facilitating further forward movement toward European Union and NATO membership. It was devised as a “take-it-or-leave-it” package, which Bosnian politicians would have to agree to on-site, with some mutually acceptable amendments and trade-offs possible.

But Butmir never got off the ground—and was in fact counterproductive. Its prolongation into a two-month-long “process” just compounded the damage. Watering down the reform package to only minor constitutional changes in order to gain Dodik’s acquiescence did not lead to success. Instead, it reaffirmed his strategy of deepening international fatigue through constant confrontation, ultimately goading the international community into simply giving up the executive authorities vested in OHR and EUFOR unconditionally. At the same time, it further alienated the Bosniak political leaders. Bildt’s singular fixation on OHR closure led them to conclude (rightly) that the European Union’s primary interest in Bosnia is to jettison direct responsibility.

The international desperation on display led Dodik and other Bosnian politicians to conclude that there were no longer any barriers to their agendas. Dodik baldly stated that he would not accept being bound by decisions made by the High Representative.

The PIC was forced by the calendar and its previous foot-dragging to decide in mid-December 2009 whether to extend international judges and prosecutors at Bosnia’s state court, a cornerstone of the international community’s post-war efforts to establish rule of law. The court’s leadership and a number of PIC members saw it critical to prolong for three years the mandate of internationals working in the special chambers for war crimes and for organized crime and corruption. Dodik, under investigation for corruption charges, opposed this extension. He warned that imposition of the extension would prompt the Republika Srpska to reject OHR decisions and initiate a referendum on them.

Still hoping to avert a confrontation and leave the door open to reviving Butmir, on December 14 the PIC ambassadors opted for a lex Dodik: they decided to extend only international judges and prosecutors in the court’s war crimes chamber. The United States effectively cast the deciding vote against extending organized crime and corruption personnel in executive roles. No EU members vocally opposed this position, leaving only Turkey and Canada openly in favor of the full extension. In addition to damaging the court and international credibility, the decision failed to achieve its desired effect of placating with Dodik. Dodik immediately announced a referendum on the executive authority of the High Representative (enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution), and he was quoted soon after stating that a referendum would be held on whether Republika Srpska would remain in Bosnia. The U.S. abandonment of its previous position also deepened the sense among many Bosniaks that now even Washington—the pivotal international actor in ending the war and preserving Bosnia as a state—had become unreliable.

International Disarray

Despite the debacle of Butmir, neither the United States nor the European Union has declared the process dead. Some hope to revive it in the coming months, although the prospects for success, even in minimal constitutional changes to eliminate restrictions on election to the Presidency and House of Peoples that the European Court of Human Rights ruled discriminatory in 2009, appear remote. The 2010 electoral season is already in high gear. Even meeting the PIC criteria, such as the apportionment of state property among various layers of government, appears highly unlikely.

EU foreign policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton has changed the line from Brussels, implicitly admitting the failure of Butmir and ceasing the push for immediate OHR closure. She deliberately raised the topic of the deterioration in Bosnia, both at her hearing with the European Parliament and during her first meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Unlike Sweden’s Bildt, the new Spanish EU presidency does not focus on the Balkans, which may prove an asset. Bildt, with his ambition to become EU foreign policy chief, needed a “deliverable.” Spain feels no such pressure. Despite recurrent rumors of a meeting of Bosnian party leaders to be convened in Madrid, Spain appears reluctant to relaunch the Butmir process.

Sweden’s ability to seize the initiative on EU Bosnia policy was only possible because the issue was not a priority in other European national capitals. Except for an increasingly frustrated Britain (which may well become more assertive should the Conservatives come to power in June¹), there seems little impetus for policy change among EU member states, despite increasing unease. For the past three years, Russia has taken advantage of the disarray in Western countries. Along with Dodik, confident there remains no international will to resist him, Russia is the sole winner from Butmir. Without having to expend any political capital, Moscow has supported Republika Srpska’s challenges to the state and the High Representative’s authority and railed against the continuation of OHR and especially the High Representative’s use of executive powers. This makes it more difficult for the international community to forge a coherent strategy, which for Moscow is an end in itself.

So What Now?

Although forward movement or even minimal constitutional reform is unlikely in 2010, this does not mean that Brussels cannot have a positive impact on the overall situation. Reassuring Bosnian citizens of stability is essential. Increasing chatter about the potential break-up of the country, combined with the international community’s listlessness, has reinforced popular fears of a return to violent conflict. While full-fledged war as in 1992-1995 is no longer feasible (there is no more Yugoslav People’s Army, and the former belligerent armies have been unified), there is real potential for interethnic violence. Weaponry is abundant and there are scores to settle. The security element is completely within the European Union’s ability to control. The decision of EU foreign ministers to extend the EUFOR mission beyond 2010 is a good first step. The European Union should make clear that EUFOR will remain with the capacity to ensure the peace and territorial integrity of Bosnia, instead of proclaiming its military mission completed.

The European Union should also acknowledge that until there is wide popular support for a new and functional constitutional order, the need for the Dayton instruments, OHR and EUFOR in their full capacities, will remain. Each self-defined community in Bosnia should receive clear and credible messages from the European Union and wider international community. Citizens and their political leaders must come to believe that none of the threats raised by the national parties’ representatives (state dissolution, secession, a majoritarian state, etc.) will be allowed. Constitutional change acceptable to a majority of each self-defined group is necessary for the country to function. At that point, the country will be capable of self-propelled reform, and Euro-Atlantic integration will follow. Until then, the executive OHR and EUFOR must remain.

The reestablishment of credible deterrence and setting clear and widely understood markers for Bosnia’s progress could considerably reduce tension on the popular level and undercut the leverage of politicians attempting to campaign on platforms of fear.

Once the situation has stabilized, the European Union should then aim to help reshuffle the deck through the October 2010 elections. The incoming parliament will have to address the question of fundamental constitutional reform, so it would be advantageous if it is less dominated by inflexible nationalists than the current one. Until now, Brussels has conducted its public outreach more through flag-waving gestures than explaining how the very process of meeting EU standards before entry can be advantageous for citizens in the here and now. The European Union must treat citizens as partners, publicizing the costs of their politicians’ failures, giving them the facts they need to make informed choices at the ballot box. The European Union’s upcoming decision on whether to grant visa-free access to Bosnians ought to be based solely on whether the technical criteria are finally met.

Following elections, the functions of the High Representative and EUSR should be separated. The countervailing imperatives of Dayton implementation and European integration have led to muddled policy and damaged credibility for both roles.
Efforts to facilitate substantial constitutional reform must begin soon after the October elections. However, a markedly different approach is required to achieve a functional and popularly legitimate result. The general public needs to be involved in resolving this fundamental question from the outset, to ensure that the parliamentarians who will vote on the issue are more likely to do so in its interest, not personal or party interests. The point is to change the incentives in the system to be integrative rather than divisive, so that continued international engagement in the Bosnian political arena becomes unnecessary.

Bosnia Requires American Impetus

Paradoxical though it may seem, a shift in Washington’s policy is a prerequisite for a new alignment within the European Union. Washington is approaching Brussels as if a singular EU policy exists. EU member states, not the new High Representative, still rule on matters of foreign policy, and they are divided, as was evident at Butmir. The United States must work to align a coalition within the European Union for a credible policy in Bosnia.

Since Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg is vested in Butmir, he has no interest in a policy turnaround, which could be seen as an admission of failure. So a policy shift would have to occur at the cabinet level, even untertaken by President Obama himself. Delegation of the Bosnia file to a full-time point person to conduct the bilateral and multilateral strategic planning seems the best approach. A Europe-savvy presidential special envoy could deal with Bosnia on its own terms, not as a mere facet of the larger U.S.-EU relationship, as tends to be done from Washington. The special envoy, perhaps with an EU-counterpart, would devise and advocate a common long-term strategy to first restabilize Bosnia, then press for a thoroughly different constitutional structure that is self-sustaining.

The Swedish presidency shows that few EU members wish to wager political capital on the Bosnia issue. Two of the European Union’s Big Four would allow critical mass to form within the European Union. Germany is a pivotal player if there is to be a shift in EU policy toward Bosnia. Together with Britain, a stronger German policy would bring a number of members who have concerns with the current approach on board, such as Denmark and Poland, and perhaps even France.

A failure for the European Union in Bosnia will rightly be seen as a resounding failure for the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Baroness Ashton seems to recognize this. But success is not up to her alone—it depends greatly on Washington and Berlin.

¹ See David Cameron’s speech at the Brookings Institution, November 2007: “The Balkans: A New Crisis?” and Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague’s joint article with Paddy Ashdown, Mort Abramowitz, Jim O’Brien, and Jim Hooper “Europe and America Must Pay Attention to Broken Bosnia,” Financial Times, December 30, 2009.

Europe’s New Faces

rachel tausendfreund — Mon, 15 Feb 2010 11:59:28 +0000

The post-Lisbon European Union can finally establish itself as a serious player in a multipolar world order. It has the potential to develop a foreign policy combining political, economic, and military elements. But will Brussels make the most of Lisbon? In the end, it is still the member states that call the shots on foreign policy.

The European Union has entered a new phase. The Lisbon Treaty enables the Union to take an important step forward in closer cooperation and greater integration. Brussels aims to support its new foreign policy with a wide range of instruments. Whether or not it can make the most of those instruments will determine whether the Union will hold its own on the global stage. At least the means to do so are at long last there.

Yet the pitfalls of the European Union’s Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) are diverse and treacherous. First of all, many members are unwilling to give up powers in foreign and defense policy in favor of consensual decision-making. Furthermore, there is friction between the EU Council and the European Commission. The Council, which is responsible for the CFSP and thus for crisis management, wants to act quickly, but has limited funds at its disposal. By contrast, the Commission has a large budget, but a longer time frame to agree on economic promotion, neighborhood policy, and foreign aid. So far, attempts to coordinate between the two have not gone smoothly.

A new president, the Belgian Herman van Rompuy, will chair the European Council and represent the European Union externally in matters of foreign policy. The high representative of foreign policy is British baroness Catherine Ashton, who was previously the EU Trade Commissioner. As the Union’s “foreign minister” (a title that has not caught on since it is evocative of statehood), Ashton is vice president of the European Commission and reports to the Council of the European Union, also chairing its sessions on foreign affairs. Her role is to bridge the gap between the Council and the Commission. She will be supported by a European foreign office consisting of representatives of the Council, Commission, and member states. European diplomats will serve alongside national diplomats in foreign countries (or take the place of representatives of smaller countries).

Van Rompuy and Ashton are not big-name foreign policy celebrities, and their work consists mainly of internal coordination. The fact that they are largely unknown in Europe suggests that EU heads of state and government do not want strong leaders to usurp their policymaking authority. Indeed, true power still resides with the member states, not with the Brussels administration. One role of the president and high representative is to be the face of the CFSP in the wider world. But European Commission President Jose-Manuel Barroso will play a similar role. If all three compete in foreign policy, they will merely demonstrate that the European Union’s “checks and balances” impede joint action abroad. However, at least a structure exists that is capable of action, one in which the organizational barriers are easier to overcome. This has gained importance since the European Union now seeks to coordinate its diverse crisis management resources more effectively—that is, to use political, economic, military, police, and foreign aid instruments to ensure long-term stability in regions. However, when crises occur, other states in the European Union will still first look to Great Britain, France, and Germany, given that, when building consensus in foreign policy, these countries wield greater weight than do the new EU officials.

The European Union also aims to make progress integrating defense policy. If member states are willing and able, they can contribute by participating in “permanent structured cooperation”—a variant of “reinforced cooperation.” Even though the European Union has not yet integrated an advance guard of states, there is hope for structured cooperation in defense policy. A number of states are already beginning to jointly develop their armed forces and give the European Union a greater capacity to act militarily.

In addition to the treaty reform process, there have been other developments relevant to EU foreign policy. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has now been relaunched as “ENP Plus,” including individual action plans for neighboring states and a great deal more money. Nevertheless, this process has not changed the fact that the European Union has dragged its feet on meeting the neighboring states’ most important demands—market access, visa-free travel and, for some, preparations for accession. Efforts to give neighborhood policy a greater regional focus, as reflected in the Mediterranean Union, the Black Sea Cooperation, and the Eastern Partnership, have, in most cases, fallen short of expectations. For the European Union’s neighbors, regional integration is less attractive than direct participation in the European market.

Moreover, the Council revised the highly praised European Security Strategy (ESS) and expanded it to include, among other issues, energy security. The 2003 paper calls for a “strategic culture” of intervention, including the possibility of “robust” engagement. In fact, the European Union is part of more than 20 operations abroad involving military and police units. However, the ESS has not been able to develop a proactive policy that allows the Union to act as a leading stabilizing force in regions deemed strategically important. Although European observers, conflict managers, troops, and border guards serve in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, Brussels—proud of its “soft power”—has not been able to apply much pressure on the most important actors in these crisis regions and has little influence when crises escalate.

Efficiency Is Not the EU’s Main Problem

Once the instruments of the Lisbon Treaty have been put in place, the European Union must resolve a number of strategic questions in foreign and defense policy. For example, should the European Union admit new members or not? Critics argue that EU enlargement will change its character, impede integration and close cooperation, and even undermine the EU value system. They assert that the potential negative impact is too high a price to pay for the goal of greater influence in Eastern Europe. The European Union’s ambivalence on enlargement has damaged its capacity to act on the world stage. For example, the uncertainties surrounding Turkey’s accession process and the annoying linkages the Turks and Greeks have attached to it have prevented the necessary dialogue between NATO and the European Union.

The question remains: Is the European Union a global player? Global influence is certainly an ambition of the CFSP. With operations in Afghanistan, Aceh, and Congo, the European Union has long been involved in conflicts outside its borders. The EU battle groups—highly mobile battalions—are meant to be deployable up to 6,000 kilometers away from Brussels. Nevertheless, the farther the theater of operations is from European headquarters, the more difficult it is to win support for a resolute foreign policy. An obvious additional criterion for an operation is whether the crisis region lies in a former colonial power’s “sphere of responsibility.” This focus on neighboring spheres of interest is legitimate. After all, the European Union is present on various levels in the international arena, like through the UN.

How independent is the European security policy? The European Union currently relies on NATO’s planning and leadership capacities for major operations—based on the “Berlin Plus” agreement. There is, however, a small EU planning unit that can direct smaller independent operations. The European Union is working to develop greater planning and leadership capacity and to improve the integration of military and civilian leadership. Is the European Union doing so independently of NATO? Or perhaps is it even acting to express a growing confidence now that it is replacing the North Atlantic Alliance as the most important security organization in Europe? This process could well lead to tensions between the European Union and its transatlantic partners, as well as among its members.

Who holds the reins in the CFSP? The Lisbon Treaty has not answered this question. Of course, the new leading officials play a more important role in planning the Council meetings devoted to foreign policy. However, the greatest impetus is once again coming from member states. A general discussion is underway in the European Union on whether the Big Three automatically form a kind of directors board—and how this can be prevented.

This also affects foreign policy. Whereas the differences between French, British, and German ideas on European policy have prevented one state from assuming the role as leader in integration efforts, the Big Three’s independent actions during the Iran crisis were unsettling to many Europeans (and annoyed the Italians, who felt left out). Nevertheless, a group of leaders can be beneficial if the group does not always consist of the same states. These states can speed up integration in one area or find compromises that serve as models for consensus-building among all 27 EU states in cases where their positions reflect lines of conflict in the European Union. It will be interesting to see whether those states willing to integrate their defense policies in a form of structured cooperation will also play a larger role in managing foreign policy. Chances are this will probably happen, since the larger EU states are themselves candidates for a common defense policy.

Who determines policies toward strategic partners? The European Union has entered into a number of strategic partnerships with the world’s major powers, including the United States, Russia, and China. Due to its powers in foreign trade policy, the European Commission is their logical partner in this area. Nevertheless, in most cases the agreements with other large powers are not limited to economics but include security policy, humanitarian issues, and questions of freedom and law. This is why the Commission conducts negotiations on a wide variety of issues—such as the partnership agreement with Russia—and allows the member states to remove the last obstacles and approve the agreement. In addition, the larger EU states pursue their own foreign policy toward strategic partners, competing over influence and business. The coexistence of these various levels of interaction in foreign policy can be productive.

More EU Needed in the Neighborhood

The president and the high representative will have their hands full trying to resolve the existing conflicts in the CFSP. At the same time, they will need to fight for a forward-looking EU foreign policy. To this end, it makes sense for the European Union to initially concentrate on neighboring regions, where European interests are directly affected and where important contributions can be made in addressing international issues. This type of policy is already highly developed in the Balkans, combining military presence, economic, and political stabilization, and efforts to introduce states to the European Union. However, the European Union must exert a more powerful, proactive influence on crisis development in other neighboring regions in order to gain credibility as a global player. The European Union can only succeed if its large and medium-sized members push ahead with such a policy.

In the southern Caucasus, the European Union should move from the role of observer to that of a stabilizing force. Although the ESS calls for vigilance in this region, the European Union has been scared off by a potential conflict with Russia. The trick is to win influence in the region without drawing Russia into a confrontation. It must provide more and strategic support for business development and political reform. The European Union should also consider ways to maintain a presence in the rebellious Georgian provinces without officially recognizing the secession.

In the Middle East, the European Union is the most important trading partner of the Israelis and the Palestinians. Although this status does not automatically translate into political influence, the European Union must play an important role in the “quartet” formed by the United States, Russia, and the UN. More development aid for the Palestinian areas could bring greater influence over time. The approach to act locally, as it is done through the EU border mission in Rafah, should be expanded.

In the years to come, North African countries such as Libya, Egypt, and Algeria may face crises as a result of political transformations, with a new generation taking the helm. With the ENP and the Mediterranean Union, the European Union has regional tools that can be expanded, but it must also give greater priority to bilateral relations with these North African states.

As part of its strategy for Central Asia, the European Union is working to promote the regional integration of five post-Soviet states and to expand energy partnerships. It has had little success so far, since the region’s regimes are skeptical about European coordination efforts that do not come with the promise of greater financial aid. But the European Union must remain persistent and not shy away from a potential conflict with Moscow. Better relations with Central Asian states will also help the European Union expand its role in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This focus on neighboring regions alone will result in an ambitious transregional agenda. Conflicts in these crisis-ridden regions can lead to global risks or, as in the Middle East conflict, fan the flames of Islamist radicalism. As part of its regional policy, the European Union should address cross-cutting challenges such as the battle against violent extremism and the diversification of energy sources.

At the moment, the European Union is not an authentic global power. Indeed, most of its members do not want it to be. Brussels will try to expand its global influence over time, but hardly fast enough to be able to compete with China or the United States. Yet action is urgently needed: The Union should step up its efforts in the wider neighborhood, and quickly. Success here would have a global impact. It could also raise the consciousness in the EU states that their security depends on a strong European foreign policy.

Old Myths to New Missions

rachel tausendfreund — Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:09:25 +0000

The European Union is said to specialize in civilian crisis management. It has sent missions of police, judges, and governance experts to trouble spots around the world. But, upon closer inspection, its record is mixed. Brussels’s new foreign policy team would be well advised to initiate sweeping changes in Europe’s civilian capabilities.

As Lady Ashton must be aware, the European Union does not have time to postpone a serious debate about its strategic position. The risk of failure in Afghanistan threatens to leave NATO crippled and Europe’s reputation as a serious strategic player in tatters. The European Union’s members are split over how to respond to Russia’s growing assertiveness. And all along Europe’s southern flank, from Mauritania to Yemen, there is evidence of Al Qaeda and its allies setting up new cells—developing a frightening potential to exploit the instability that exists across the region.

The European Union is in the unenviable position of having to devise strategies to meet these new challenges simultaneously. This is not only a political problem (not unreasonably, as Finns are less worried about Mauritania than Moscow, but Spaniards may feel the opposite); it is also an economic challenge. The financial crisis laid bare the fact that even major European military players, like Britain and France, are struggling to fund their operations and military procurement programs. In the years ahead, we will hear a lot of talk of “doing more with less”: using Europe’s strategic assets as efficiently and cheaply as possible.

In this context, there will be a renewed focus on Europe’s “civilian capacities,” its ability to deploy civilian security specialists, police officers, and justice experts to help stabilize fragile states like Yemen. Sending civilians to trouble-spots is naturally cheaper than deploying large numbers of troops—and in operations from Kosovo to Afghanistan, NATO and the European Union have found that a civilian component is essential to creating stability.

Devising and deploying these civilian missions is supposed to be one of the European Union’s specialties. Since the European Council sent a police mission to Bosnia in 2003, the European Union has deployed fifteen civilian operations worldwide—compared to just six military operations. These have ranged from small police reform missions in Congo to a 3,000-strong mission in Kosovo, launched in 2008, that handles not only policing issues but judicial reform, war crimes investigations, and customs.

The Union’s ability to deploy so many missions—even sending personnel as far away as Aceh, Indonesia—was one of the great successes of Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief from 1999 to 2009. Working with a relatively small group of officials, Solana used personal diplomacy and sheer persistence to get each mission on the ground.

The European Union’s bureaucratic systems have often struggled to keep up. Financing has been a particular headache: when the first personnel arrived in Aceh, they had to use their personal credit cards to fund the mission start-up.¹ European officials also admit that they have been lucky. Although EU civilian personnel have come under attack in the Balkans and Afghanistan, they have yet to suffer any fatalities. Had a European mission suffered significant casualties—as the United Nations suffered in Iraq in 2003 and in Haiti this year—EU governments might have recoiled from approving missions at such a high rate.

If only because Solana’s reputation was closely associated with civilian operations, there is an expectation that Catherine Ashton will build on his legacy. She is ostensibly in a strong position to do so. Whereas Solana’s team had to make up the European Union’s operations as they went along, adapting available mechanisms to new challenges, the Lisbon Treaty gives Ashton a basis to overhaul the European Union’s civilian capacities much more thoroughly.

How much she can achieve depends on how the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions for a European External Action Service (EAS) are implemented. It is unclear exactly how the European Union’s diplomatic corps will be shaped. But member states have agreed on a rough outline and—after much back and forth, particularly between Britain and France—have agreed that responsibility for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), including civilian missions, will be part of its remit.

Further details remain undecided. How, to take a particularly sensitive example, will EU civilian missions be directed in the future? In the past, EU special representatives (EUSRs) have sat atop the civilian mission tree: all the civilian missions the European Union has deployed have taken guidance from EUSRs. But the Lisbon Treaty envisages a new generation of EU ambassadors: will these ambassadors now replace the EUSRs? Lady Ashton has decided to extend all serving EUSRs, giving herself time to consider the issue, but has yet to come to a final decision on how the European Union’s new bureaucracy will handle civilian missions in the longer term.

Yet if Ashton wants to make real improvements to the European Union’s civilian capacities, she will need to look beyond institutional reforms in Brussels, and focus on wider strategic factors. This means taking a fresh look at what types of civilian mission are needed in the shifting security environment, and how effectively member states contribute. Having conducted an in-depth review of Europe’s civilian capacities, we believe that Ashton should address three myths about the European Union’s performance in this area.²

Myth 1: The European Union knows how to make civilian missions work.

EU officials publicly point to their experience obtained since 2003 as proof that they have special expertise in civilian operations. This is comforting but misleading. The European Union knows how to do one particular type of mission fairly well, based on its experience in the Balkans. In Bosnia, then in Macedonia, and now in Kosovo, the European Union has concentrated on a relatively narrow range of priorities associated with embedding “European-style” values in each: strengthening the rule of law, and developing impartial and accountable police forces.

This was the right formula in the former Yugoslavia where police forces acted as paramilitaries during the wars of the 1990s and typically were split along ethnic lines. It was also seen as one step toward readying these countries for EU accession. Nonetheless, the European Union has a mixed record in the Balkans. Organized crime, for example, is still rampant in the region.

Deserving greater concern, the European Union has tried to apply the “Bosnia template” in places where it is unlikely to have much impact. In Congo, the European Union has trained police officers in the capital Kinshasa. But the main threat to stability has been the fighting in the east of the country—1,000 miles away—and the European Union has largely left this situation to the UN to resolve.

The European Union also attempted to apply the Bosnia template to Afghanistan, setting up a police mission in Kabul in 2007, in part to counter American complaints that European NATO members were not sending enough troops. But member states were painfully slow to send personnel, and most police training is still carried out by U.S.-funded contractors. A European police mission in the Palestinian Territories has been undermined by fighting between Hamas and Fatah—at present, its personnel are barred from operating in Gaza.

The European Union has yet to take on the toughest form of civilian mission: a full-scale state-building mission with executive powers, such as those the United Nations ran in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 (although the current European mission in Kosovo partially resembles such a mission). And the European Union has yet to work out a formula for operating in places like Somalia or Yemen, where its personnel would operate under constant threat of terrorist attack. Unless all future European operations are going to take place in the Balkans, the European Union needs new operational ideas.

Myth 2: European governments share a common faith in civilian missions.

A cursory reading of EU documents suggests that all the Union’s members are equally committed to civilian operations. This is not the case. There are significant disparities between those countries (such as Sweden, Finland, and Germany) that take their responsibilities in this area seriously and others who only pay lip-service to the concept.

During its presidency of the European Union in the second half of last year, Sweden attempted to highlight these discrepancies by asking all member states to report on their civilian capacities. The resulting reports are now emerging, and will help Ashton put pressure on underperformers. Having conducted an audit of the members’ efforts to improve their civilian capacities over the last year, we have already divided them into four groups:

The Professionals: Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These countries deploy significant numbers of civilians in EU missions (relative to their populations) and have set up robust mechanisms for selecting personnel, training them and learning lessons from their experiences.

The Strivers: Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, and Romania. These countries want to make a significant contribution to the European Union’s civilian operations—France, Italy, and Romania are among the biggest deployers of civilian personnel. Yet their training mechanisms are limited, and their system for choosing personnel is ad hoc or decentralized. They are trying to resolve these problems. France in particular has made progress in rationalizing its systems, and may soon join “the professionals.”

The Agnostics: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Members of this group supply relatively few civilian personnel to the European Union, and their selection/training mechanisms are weak. This is striking in that two—Poland and Spain—are significant military contributors to EU missions.

The Indifferents: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Malta. Most of these countries are too small to make a significant contribution to the European Union’s civilian capacities (although the Bulgarian government recently declared its desire to do better). Cyprus can boast that it currently deploys 50 percent of its target number of civilian experts with the European Union: but its target number is only four.

While these categories highlight member states’ differing capacities, they also highlight differing opinions on the value of individual EU missions. While France and Belgium are keen advocates of EU deployments in Africa, for example, many other governments view these as post-colonial distractions from higher strategic priorities. Britain favors the EU police missions to Iraq and the Palestinian Territories, which broadly fit with U.S. policy in these places. In June 2008, Portugal persuaded other member states to approve a security sector reform mission to its former colony of Guinea-Bissau: almost all non-Portuguese European officials now describe this as a waste of money, and would like to see it closed.

Even where there is broad support for a mission, governments can clash over exactly how it should be used. This has come to the fore in Kosovo. Advocates of Kosovo’s independence, such as Britain, have pushed for the mission to do as much as possible to affirm the nascent state’s sovereignty. Those EU members that do not recognize Kosovo, most notably Spain, have put pressure on the mission to avoid doing exactly that. The net result is that EU officials on the ground have to ask for approval from Brussels on relatively minor decisions, for fear of offending one set of member-states or the other.

Myth 3: With effective civilian missions, the EU can avoid military entanglements.

As we have observed, some European policymakers may think that civilian missions are a cheap alternative to military missions. There are certainly many things civilians can do less expensively than troops, but soldiers remain necessary. The European Union may deploy more civilian missions than military ones, but they are often protected by other organizations’ troops. The European Union could not send police advisers to the Congo if the UN did not have 20,000 soldiers there. It would have no personnel in Kabul if NATO was not there to defend it. Its work in Bosnia and Kosovo builds on years of UN and NATO peacekeeping.

European governments have, of course, contributed thousands of troops to NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The European Union sent military missions to back up the UN in Congo in 2003 and 2006. So there should be no illusions in European capitals about the need to align military and civilian planning and operations—a lesson the United States learned in Iraq. But because European civilian and military efforts are so often channeled through different organizational routes, they often remain poorly connected. This lack of coordination is exacerbated by a formal block on EU-NATO cooperation due to disputes between Greece and Turkey.

Even in Bosnia, where the European Union has been responsible for military security as well as policing since 2004, the military and civilian chains of command remain separate. When one of the authors (Korski) served in Sarajevo, the EUSR, EU Force (EUFOR), and EU Police Mission often clashed over how aggressively to pursue criminals—and whether it was always necessary to build local capacity in the process. EU police officers were sometimes surprised to find their military colleagues staking out known criminals as part of an operation, about which neither the police officers nor their local counterparts had been informed.

Ashton has reportedly instructed the Bosnian missions to improve their coordination—which suggests that she grasps the importance not only of the European Union’s civilian capacities, but also of genuinely integrated civilian-military operations. If she can apply this insight more widely, this outlook will be a major advance in how the Union thinks about missions.

Myth-Busting: Preparing a New Generation of Civilian-military Operations

What can Lady Ashton and her colleagues do to prepare for the next generation of EU missions? We believe that they should urgently pursue three sets of priorities:

First, she must break the Bosnia template. To help the European Union move beyond the operational habits it learned in the Balkans, Ashton and EU member states should inaugurate a Working Group on Doctrine. This group should be tasked with producing an overarching EU doctrine for civilian-military operations in a year, on the basis of consultations within member states and discussions with NATO, the UN and other significant operational actors. The Working Group should prioritize developing proposals applicable to high-risk theaters such as Somalia, Yemen, and Gaza.

Second, the differences between member states regarding civilian capacities need to be reduced. The European Union’s members are likely to hold very different views on where missions should deploy (and what they should prioritize) in the years ahead. But it is possible to narrow the differences between them in personnel selection, training and other technical matters. Ashton should lobby member states to found an EU Institute for Peace (based on the U.S. Institute for Peace in Washington, D.C.) that can take responsibility for developing common training modules for all EU members, running “train the trainer” courses for national staff, and funding new research into how missions fail and succeed. She should also advocate a mentoring scheme: in which officials involved in civilian capacities among “The Professionals” should be tasked with assisting their counterparts in governments struggling in this field.

Finally, divisions between civilian and military operations should be overcome. Ashton’s team must explore how to bridge the divide between civilian and military crisis management in EU thinking. This can, in part, be resolved through doctrine development and training, but it will also require addressing how EU missions are commanded. We believe that the European Union will ultimately need to end its practice of maintaining separate chains of command for military and civilian missions in cases like Bosnia. Instead, the European Council should invest command responsibility for all its personnel in a single EU Special Representative, answering to Ashton. Instead of dumping the EUSR system, Ashton should revise and strengthen it. Although the UN follows a similar approach, it is unpopular among many European soldiers, who fear that civilians fail to understand their needs. But only a single, civilian commander can guarantee that the European Union genuinely “does more with less,” aligning all its policy tools effectively.

Ashton can initiate these reforms, but only the European Union’s member states can make them work. There will most likely be resistance—but after the European Union’s difficulties in Afghanistan, there can be little doubt that it needs to rationalize its civilian capacities and missions. If it does not, it will have little chance of handling emerging crises like that in Yemen, and Europe’s civilian power will increasingly exist only in the realm of myth.

¹ Nick Witney, Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008) p8.

² Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, Can the EU Rebuild Failed States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).

Starting Over on Climate

rachel tausendfreund — Thu, 04 Feb 2010 23:00:00 +0000

It was a disaster in every respect: In Copenhagen the European Union succeeded neither in establishing itself as a driving force in climate policy alongside the United States and China, nor in reaching its own basic negotiation objectives. Now Europe has to revive the multilateral climate proceedings with a convincing strategy.

The mixed reactions to the outcome of the Copenhagen climate summit illustrate who perceive themselves as the winners and the losers. U.S. president Barack Obama described the agreements as "significant and unprecedented." China's foreign minister Yang Jiechi called the result "important and positive." In contrast, the first European reactions ranged from disappointment to dismay. At a hastily prepared final press conference, European Commission president Manuel Barroso described the Copenhagen Accord as "not perfect, but better than no deal." 

In reality the European Union obtained not a single one of its basic negotiation objectives. Not only did it fail to bridge the gap between the initial emissions reduction proposals of key fellow negotiators like the United States and China and its own goal that called for a reduction commitment of 20 percent to 30 percent, the Europeans did not even manage to incorporate into the closing statement a long-term goal for industrial nations.

Subject to congressional approval, the U.S. climate protection package had intended to cut its own greenhouse gas emissions by up to 4 percent by 2020. At the last minute China offered to increase its energy efficiency by 40 percent to 45 percent as part of its next five-year plan, a marginal improvement over what would have been expected. The Chinese successfully staved off a call to set a target year for the stabilization of its own emissions increases. The Copenhagen Accord does not resolve whether negotiations will even continue over the next few years with the aim of creating an international agreement.  

Above all, however, Europe's chief negotiators needed to grasp that they were left out of the talk's decisive phase. The deal between industrial and developing nations—one that was ultimately expressed in the summit's official final document—was forged in closed-door talks between Obama and his colleagues from China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Europeans and others were only permitted superficial approval of the agreement in an expanded G-20 round concerning several developing nations.

Europe's drastically reduced role came as a surprise to its chief negotiators. Just two years earlier at the 2007 climate summit in Bali, Europe had been applauded for its climate protection goals and for its pioneering role on this issue. In the run-up to Copenhagen, however, the Europeans became mired in petty disputes concerning the individual contributions of the member states toward a financial package for developing nations.  

The European Union failed to find an independent role for itself next to the Americans on one side and the large developing and emerging nations on the other. Obama came to Copenhagen with the clear goal of avoiding any pre-stipulations that could jeopardize the necessary passage of climate protection legislation through Congress. The Chinese leadership surrounding Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was prepared only to offer voluntary consent regarding increased energy efficiency and cited national sovereignty in its defense against international control mechanisms. The European Union held firm to its climate protection goals announced in 2007 and tried in last-minute negotiations to push through a 10 billion euro financial package for the world's poorer developing nations.

Europe punched below its weight in Copenhagen, the result of three possible, in part complementary factors. For one, even before Copenhagen there was fear in European capitals of a "G-2" arrangement. However, there was a total of four somewhat geographically significant emerging nations represented at key negotiations; including China, India, Brazil and South Africa—the recently formed so-called BASIC group—with China as primus inter pares. The absence of Europe in this arrangement, despite its close coordination with the United States, is difficult to explain.  

Secondly, in light of the problematic political conditions at Copenhagen, the compromise between the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gas, the United States and China, took top priority. It was thus in Europe's best interest throughout to give precedence to these two powers. Given this factor, Europe's real potential for influence at the conference was modest from the outset. However, BASIC group succeeded in effectively pushing forward their interests over the course of the conference. Intensive bilateral contact with individual emerging nations in the lead-up to the conference—for example the two summit talks between the German chancellor and the presidents of Brazil and Indonesia—did lead to individual collaboration projects such as the promotion of renewable energies and forest protection, but to no strategic alliance that would have made an impact in Copenhagen.

Lastly, at the summit the European Union did not understand how to exercise its historically established lead role in international climate protection. The disunity (and partly the vanity) of European heads of state explicitly brought to the fore Europe's structural weaknesses. The petty dispute over the European Union's internal cost distribution of climate financing dealt an especially harsh blow to the Union's image. In fact, the member states could only be convinced to participate in the financing package because funds partly committed to the budget quite some time earlier were reallocated before Christmas.   

What must Europe do now? 

Europe can only be effective in unison. Beside political heavyweights like China and the United States, the voice of the European Union can only be heard in unison. The juxtaposition of Europe's dual leadership positions, the Commission and the Council Presidency, further complemented by the self-assured secondary negotiators from important member states, is counterproductive. However, a future scenario in which the European Commission takes over full leadership of the multilateral climate negotiations would lend itself to an overdue leadership reorganization in European negotiations, while the newly created European External Action Service (EEAS) would assume a key coordinating role.  

Individual European states must cease exclusive bilateral action. Important member states like Germany, France, and Great Britain competed for attention before and during the Copenhagen Summit with national initiatives and individual bilateral negotiations. Last summer, British prime minister Gordon Brown presented his climate finance package for developing nations without coordinating with his colleagues first. In the preceding spring France launched a close cooperation with the African Union (AU), garnering only lukewarm support from other member states. Only Great Britain and France took part in a finance package presented in Copenhagen to protect international tropical forests, while Germany would evidently prefer to act alone in employing its own bilateral instruments, such as funds approved by the German Chancellor at the UN Conference on Biodiversity for the protection of tropical forests.  

Europe must determine its position before and not during negotiations. At both the 2008 climate conference in Poznan and in Copenhagen, essential policy points were decided at EU Council meetings over the course of the conference. This meant that experts from ministries were removed from the UN proceedings in the heated phase of negotiations in order to participate in the ongoing and self-engrossing EU proceedings. Conflicts between individual member states concerning climate policy positions and cost distribution within the European Union were carried out parallel to the main negotiations and in full public view.  

Europe must deepen bilateral dialogue with important players (the United States, China, India). The creation of the EEAS offers a historic opportunity for the European Union to bunch together and further develop bilateral relations with important other players, above all the large emerging nations. The Transatlantic Climate Bridge, launched by the German foreign ministry, would offer a manageable starting point. This initiative could be Europeanized and expanded to include important emerging nations like China, India, Brazil, and Russia. The goals of this strategic dialogue initiative could be to bundle technological and financial cooperation as well as the instruments of export promotion and trade policy.   

Europe must create alliances with developing nations. The poorer developing nations and small island states are natural allies of the European Union in international climate proceedings. The European Union can make an attractive and credible offer to these countries through the combination of progressive climate protection policy at home and generous financial support for forest protection and adjustment to climate change. A series of bilateral initiatives were begun before Copenhagen, such as one between France and the AU to provide financial support for renewable energies and African tropical forest protection and one between Brazil, Germany, and France to support the Amazon Fund. In the future these initiatives could be bound together in a pan-European climate solidarity pact with Africa, Latin America, and Asia.  

Effective Multilateralism 

At last, the upcoming creation of the climate policy agenda will focus on the reorganization of a global regulatory framework modeled after the central European theme of "effective multilateralism." In addition to negotiation proceedings within the United Nations, bilateral dialogue between strategic partner nations, EU cooperation with other regional alliances like the AU, and flexible multilateral formats like a "G-20 plus"—which includes those developing nations particularly affected by climate change—should all play an increased role.

The new EAAS must revitalize the "strategic partnerships" between the European Union and Russia, China, India, Brazil; and, of course, transatlantic relations - partnerships that often exist only on paper. A close cooperation in the areas of energy, climate, and green technologies deserves top priority in these partnership initiatives. The African states have a vital interest in the support they receive from the European Union, both financially and technologically in terms of adjusting to the effects of climate change. The partnership between the AU and European Union could offer the appropriate framework in this respect.  

Of central importance is deciding which future role the G-20 will play concerning the advancement of climate issues. The G-8 framework has lost meaning as an appropriate forum because it lacks a critical mass of the nations responsible for global emissions. In relation to climate protection, however, the G-20 format certainly needed to be expanded to target representatives of poorer countries. One task of the European Union should be to prevent China from acting alone as the advocate for the "small guy" amidst the world's great powers.

Exit Strategy for a Culture War

rachel tausendfreund — Wed, 27 Jan 2010 10:41:41 +0000

The West has failed in Afghanistan because it underestimated cultural factors and set the unrealistic goals of democracy and human rights—instead of just establishing a functional state. Now, after eight years, we are forced to reevaluate our moralizing and idealistic concepts of world order, and to make plans for withdrawal.

The Western alliance’s motives for democratizing Afghanistan miss the crucial point: The conflict in Afghanistan is a culture war, with universal Western values clashing with ethnic identities and Islam’s universalist claims. But a culture war cannot be won by the West. While NATO was successful in preserving security in its own hemisphere during the Cold War, the West was a notorious failure outside its own hemisphere—be it in Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Even in nearby Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina, the results of intervention have been ambivalent at best.

The only solution is an Afghanization and Pakistanization of the conflict, returning it to its own specific culture-bearers. This means refraining from imposing universalist Western concepts of democracy and human rights. Nor can we continue to ask ISAF soldiers to serve in the mission as long as they are unable to properly defend themselves.

In any case, the West will have to accept the consequences of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the future limit itself to defending its own hemisphere. This does not rule out air strikes on terrorist camps and punitive expeditions, but only interventions with broad political goals. Responsible security policy therefore does not prohibit selective, limited military interventions against genocide, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, or piracy. But these would be taken with a clear view to the limits of what is possible and the limited goals at hand.

The combination of European foreign policy’s moralizing with an idealistically-based American concept of world order has proved disastrous. Indeed, our values are universal. The West cannot abandon the claim to the universality of human rights without giving up its identity. But politics, as the "art of the possible," requires recognizing the cultural boundaries of the possible and more realistically gauging our own ability to affect change.

The claimed "universality of human rights" in fact applies only to the West. Human rights discourse ignores the fact that the Western, secular concept of the human being is almost the opposite of that in the Islamic world. Even identical words do not always mean the same thing. Everyone swears by human rights, but it makes a difference whether they are anthropocentrically or, as in the 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights, theocentrically based. There is not even consensus on the concept of "human dignity." Everyone is for women’s dignity, but some interpret it as sexual self-determination, and others as virginity before marriage.

Huntington’s Legacy

The American government’s long hesitation to increase troop strength may stem from the realization that this is not about the "right war," but about a culture war that cannot be won militarily or politically. That this realization came so late has much to do with the West’s cultural relativism. Europe’s secularist elite was blind to the significance of cultural and religious soft power. Their concern for a decade was to refute the American scholar Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, though their blundering should have eventually kindled the suspicion that it cannot be refuted.

In the mid-1990s, Huntington was already maintaining that after the Cold War, peoples and nations were returning to their own identities, values, and traditions—their culture in a broader sense—with the implication that global politics had, for the first time in history, become both multipolar and multicultural. Multipolar meant that nations would consciously separate from each other in order to emphasize their identities. Multicultural meant that the world was no longer determined by two ideologies, but rather a multiplicity of varied cultures existing next to one other. In this way, power was redistributed from the long-dominant West to non-Western cultures. On the one hand, other cultures continue to depend on Western aid to achieve economic goals, in particular; on the other hand, they see the West as a culture in decline whose share in global power is decreasing.

Huntington interpreted this revival of identity and religion not least as a reaction to Western secularism and its moral relativism. Asian and Islamic cultures confronted this phenomenon by strengthening of their own values, such as order, discipline, community, religion, and family. Especially Asian and Islamic cultures, he said, were "challenging cultures," both of which, for differing reasons, emphasize their superiority to Western culture. Both are anti-universal and anti-Western, but hardly anti-modern.¹

The fact that leading intellectuals in the West disregard this new cultural paradigm has grave consequences. The reputation of Germany and "Londonistan" as havens for terrorists is connected with a naive concept of tolerance and religious freedom. Even American secret services were forbidden, before September 11, 2001, from classifying visitors to the United States by religion. Meanwhile, the Protestant zealots in the United States who gained the upper hand after September 11 were blind to the limits of their own political messianism.

The denial of a clash of cultures has endangered our internal security and led to overextension abroad. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven fundamental errors. In non-Western cultures, universal values fall not on fertile soil, but on territory sealed by ethnic or religious identities. The clash between universalism and culturalism seems to the West to be a political conflict. Yet the Western value system is not perceived in the non-Western world as universal, but as Western, and thus imperialist.

Corruption as a Cultural System

It is in the nature of the universalist ideal to ignore cultural boundaries. Cultures define their identities through value systems. They differ from other cultures through their intrinsic value. Moral universalism ignores the regional and particularist interests and values in which, for example, drug trafficking or the clan is more important than individual freedom or legal equality.

Extreme corruption is not a specifically Afghan symptom. It arises from the logic of a clan society. The more we intervene, the more we entangle ourselves in conditions we do not control. Identities often combine with interests and behaviors that defy our understanding. We involve ourselves with forces that, in our conception of law, deserve to be arrested.

Abstract ideas like patriotism and the common good are incomprehensible to clan cultures. Corruption is considered an ethical duty towards one’s own family and, more broadly, the ethnic clan. Part of this lack of identification with one’s own nation is the fact that more and more well-qualified Afghans are seeking political asylum in Europe. In Afghan "democracy," who wins is less important than who pays. When multiparty systems emerge in clan cultures, they only strengthen corruption. As long as this can be financed, a level of satisfaction takes hold, which explains the early successes in Afghanistan until 2006. As soon as resources waned, political pluralism generated corruption and civil war.

We play a helpless role in this nexus, but not an uninvolved one. Corruption requires two sides. One pays, the other takes. Of the 80 million euros² of German development aid to Afghanistan, in 2006 less than 25 million euros actually went to projects; the rest disappeared in salaries and "administrative costs." After these figures were publicized, the German government did not attempt to halt the evil, but raised the amount to 140 million euros.

It is now certain that members of President Karzai’s own family play a major role in drug trafficking. For us, this creates not only a moral problem, but also a military one. The opportunities for drug cultivation ruin Afghans’ responsibility for their own security. When the harvest begins, even army officers take off their uniforms and go into the fields. Teachers work as smugglers, mayors operate heroin laboratories. Earnings from drug trafficking or drug smuggling are far higher than government salaries.

As soon as external forces intervene, they mutate from funders to troublemakers and, once culturalist hostility has been mobilized, from liberators to occupiers. The unbroken succession of colonial, communist, and Islamist conquests has taught many Afghans not only to live with war, but to live from it. There are an estimated 1,800 illegally armed groups with a total strength of as many as 130,000 fighters. Religious, national, ethnic, and economic interests are so deeply interconnected that they cannot be distinguished. This makes Islam and the struggle against "unbelievers" even more important as it is the only thing cementing them together. In the highly complex mosaic of groups, it is always possible to change political sides, and it is not at all clear which groups are responsible for which attacks and kidnappings. Convoys from the World Food Program disappear, and civilian aid workers are killed and kidnapped. Two-thirds of the ministries are hopelessly corrupt, the cabinet is split along ethnic lines, and Karzai can only govern, if at all, with the help of warlords.

Moreover, the manipulated electoral results create the impression that Karzai himself is in with the Taliban. Many of the polling stations criticized by the UN Electoral Commission are located in Taliban regions. The results could only have been falsified with their approval. Karzai will have to provide a quid pro quo, not so much in the political arena as in drug trafficking.

The West’s Unavoidable Failure

American military efforts, which accept many civilian victims, have failed because of the principle of vengeance, which stipulates that every person killed must be avenged. Thus new enemies are created. The new ISAF strategy takes account of this and thus resembles the Bundeswehr’s stabilization strategy, which has, however, also failed. The many limits and conditions imposed on the Bundeswehr by parliament have prevented effective action. Since this cannot be a war, some 4,000 soldiers must suffice to stabilize the entire north operating according to police rules that prescribe particularly cautious action.

The schools and wells built as part of the "stabilization mission" have earned little gratitude. They do not offer protection from the Taliban, which would have been crucial to establishing political loyalty. The newly built roads serve the Taliban’s military goals at least as much as civilian needs. While German soldiers work to build up the country in the "quiet north," the Taliban have been able to congregate and strengthen undisturbed. In a culture war, even roads and schools help spread Islamism. Radical Islam, totalitarian in character, does not distinguish between military and civilian missions.

Taking the Initiative?

To both spare and protect the Afghan population, ISAF requires far more soldiers than it will ever get. To ensure a stable security situation similar to that in the Balkans, a troop strength of more than a million soldiers would be needed. The Taliban are already increasing their numerical strength, also for cultural reasons. Statistically, each woman in Afghanistan bears seven children. Of the 500,000 boys born each year, perhaps 150,000 have a chance in the opium fields or the police. In the long run, an increase in troop strength will be no help against 350,000 potential new Taliban fighters each year.³

Another way of taking the initiative, by expanding the conflict to Pakistan, is counterproductive to a culture war. Military intervention in only one country does not solve the problems because they are generally connected to the entire region. The Taliban are a product of opaque Pakistani politics. The majority of Pakistanis reject the Taliban, but do not want to assist the goals of their unpopular ally, America. Expansion of the war in the region through President Obama’s new "AfPak strategy" was militarily successful, but wrong politically. Involving Pakistan in the theater of war created 2.5 million refugees, intensified fighting, and further destabilized the region. The long period of ambivalence on Pakistan’s part in dealing with militant Islamism, which is incomprehensible to outsiders, can be explained only through the Pakistani perception of being surrounded by enemies they fear more than the Taliban—above all India, but also the West. The United States is suspected of trying to destabilize Pakistan and deprive it of its nuclear weapons.

Afghanization and Pakistanization of the War

It is now above all necessary to give Pakistanis the feeling that they are fighting for Pakistan and not for America. The responsibility of regional actors has become the most important element in preparing NATO for disengagement. In Afghanistan, the West should have limited itself to restoring the state’s ability to function. A realistic goal for Afghanistan was not democracy, but the establishment of a functioning polity. This would have helped Afghanistan build a better army, police, judiciary, and prisons. Instead, our money was distributed so broadly that it had no impact.

An exit strategy requires the Afghanization and Pakistanization of the war. This requires promoting and demanding Afghan and Pakistani responsibility for their own security. After eight years, a combative people like the Afghans should be able to defend themselves. Doubts about the Afghans are related less to their ability than to their will. Figures on combat-ready police fluctuate between 40,000 and 90,000. The police are permeated with corruption, and the constant exodus to warlords’ better-paid private armies is hardly an expression of patriotism. The initial goal of German police trainers of creating a "citizen-friendly" police force was naive and ignorant of the culture.

The German Foreign Office’s September 2009 plan "Ten Steps for Afghanistan" provides for withdrawal by 2013. A cabinet decision by the new German government later confirmed this. According to the plan, a road map is to be worked out with the Afghan president that will establish further cooperation and describe the duration and the end of military engagement. The Afghan army and police must assume sole responsibility for security as rapidly as possible. From the beginning, according to the plan, we must demand decisive steps from the government to protect basic rights and combat corruption, mismanagement, and organized drug crime. The international community must insist that corrupt officials be removed from office. Under the Germans, the number of police trainers and the tempo of police training will be doubled. Training of the Afghan army is a top priority.

Until now, Afghans have had priorities other than defending themselves and building roads and schools. They could afford these priorities as long as we took on this work for them. As is generally the case in development aid, good deeds become a curse when support is not sufficiently connected with expectations. NATO should have made Afghan efforts to create a self-sufficient security architecture a measure of its assistance from the beginning.

Self-Limitation as a New Strategy

The West’s interventions often seem counterproductive to peace in the long run. The assumption that only the West can prevent local players from fighting one another overlooks the fact that peace is generally based on the victory of one of the parties, and not on treaties mediated from outside. Democratic majorities instigated from outside through coalitions among former enemies do not produce stable governments.

In large parts of the Middle East, it is not ideological differences and political structures but cultural identities that are most important. The difference between believers and unbelievers is more significant then between, for example, democrats and non-democrats. Without sufficient understanding of the importance of religion and culture, the West will not be able to find its way in the new multipolar world order, which is also a multicultural world order. Huntington named, if only in passing, the West’s new roads through the multipolar world: abstinence, mediation, the search for commonalities. The West’s future tasks lie in maintaining, protecting, and renewing its own unique values of pluralism, individualism, and rule of law, but not in reshaping non-Western cultures in the West’s mold.⁴

Criticism of Huntington always starts by arguing that he reduced people to a single collective identity. Unfortunately, this one-dimensionality is the essence of both fundamentalist religion and ethnocentrism or nationalism. If this one-dimensionality is to be broken, Western pluralism must not be imposed from outside. Nor should collective categories be reinforced in a "dialogue of cultures," which often forces others into collective identities.

What is required, rather, is a coexistence that places its hopes in the time factor and in a "dialogue of individuals," which attempts to replace collective identities with the encouragement of plural and individual identities. In regard to the Taliban and the Afghan culture of corruption, we should attempt to lure them away from their common anti-Western attitude and split them according to their own and their clan interests. But a realpolitik of cultures requires the abandonment of idealistic goals, such as the democratization of Afghanistan.

The more we withdraw from foreign cultural spheres, the more we have to assert our own cultural sphere. With a fraction of the energy we have applied to the war in Afghanistan, our security organs in Hamburg and the United States could have prevented September 11. NATO’s strategy should start with the principle of more external limitation, and more internal self-assertion. But a pragmatic strategy that gives primacy to the limits of the possible requires, first of all, a definition of our own identity and our own limits. Therefore, we need a pragmatic global policy that starts with facts, recognizes our limitations, and is oriented not toward the universalization of Western values and structures, but toward immediate security requirements.

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1998), pp.21-29.

² Reinhard Erös, "Einer nimmt—und einer zahlt," Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 16, 2009. 

³ Gunnar Heinsohn, "Schumpfender Westen, aufsteigender Islam," Merkur, August/September 2007, pp. 771.

⁴ See note 1 above, pp.308-312.

Rebel in the House of Luther

rachel tausendfreund — Fri, 22 Jan 2010 15:07:24 +0000

Margot Kässmann, the new head of Germany’s biggest Protestant organization, has come out strongly against Germany’s military mission in Afghanistan. The committed pacifist has stuck to her guns in the face of a withering backlash.

Merely by dint of her gender, the Evangelical bishop Margot Kässmann took over the top post in Germany’s powerful Protestant Church with the image of a rebel. Last year the 51-year old theologian from Hanover became the first woman ever to assume the leadership of Luther’s church in the homeland of the great reformer.

But Kässmann’s history-making election caused barely a ripple compared to the full-blown public imbroglio she unleashed with her blunt New Year’s sermon critiquing Germany’s military engagement in Afghanistan. “Nothing is good in Afghanistan,” she said. “We’ve been using all sorts of strategies to kid ourselves. Weapons don’t make peace. We need more imagination to achieve peace.” She invoked the mass peaceful demonstrations of the 1980s that felled communism. In other remarks, Kässmann said plainly that Germany should withdraw its troops from the Hindu Kush and that civilian development was being neglected in favor of military options. In defense of pacifism, she even maintained that Nazi Germany could have been defeated by non-violent means.

The bishop’s barbs have caused such uproar because the eight-year presence of Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, in northern Afghanistan has grown increasingly disputed here in Germany. The mission of the presently 4,200-strong German soldiers has long suffered from a vague mandate, tenuous popular support, and restricted rules of battlefield engagement. Politicians have been unable to convincingly explain why German is in its first shooting war outside of Europe since World War II. Moreover, popular opposition hardened recently in the wake of a German-ordered air strike in September 2009 that killed civilians. Yet while ordinary Germans’ reservations about the war have surged (71 percent are against it), the political leadership – both Germany’s conservative government and most of the leftist opposition – remain solidly behind the deployment.

Even if the foreign ministry responded politely (“everyone is entitled to their opinion”), backers of the center-right administration have taken Kässmann harshly to task. The Bundestag’s military commissioner called her remarks “irresponsible,” especially as she had never even been to Afghanistan, and admonished her as a woman of the cloth to provide spiritual guidance to men in uniform as well as pacifists. In response to her call for more international cooperation, Berlin’s finance minister reminded her that the Bundeswehr is in Afghanistan as part of an international coalition with a UN mandate. The conservative daily Die Welt ridiculed the bishop for her naïveté: Candle-lit marches, mass demonstrations, and peace prayer sessions – as in the Velvet Revolutions of 1989 -- weren’t going to budge anything on the Hindukush.

Public intellectuals and just about very news media has jumped into the fray, turbo-charging a debate that critics say has been much too long in coming. “To Kässmann’s credit, she disturbed the peace,” wrote the Munich daily Süddeutsche Zeitung. “She didn’t intend to do this, but the time was ripe to talk about the war. What good is this mission that is looking more and more like a real war everyday?” The outcry over the sermon, opines the leftist Die Tageszeitung, “shows that the bishop is, in principle, correct about Afghanistan. Everyone knows that if you measure the currents results with the original goals in Afghanistan, the whole things looks like a disaster.”

The brouhaha in Germany comes at a conspicuous moment. The Germans are still unsure how they will respond to Obama’s new Afghanistan strategy unveiled at West Point late last year. While the Americans are said to want Germany to fortify its troop strength by 2,500 men, German sources say it is unlikely that they will be able to add more than 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers. Moreover, the London Conference on Afghanistan [January 28] is expected to chart a new international strategy for Afghanistan. The Germans, along with the British, have high hopes for the gathering to devise a long-term approach to the country, one that combines military and civilian components, and lays the basis for a withdrawal of Western troops in two or three years.

Since her sermon, Kässmann has met with Germany’s defense minister to talk about the Afghanistan mission and her remarks. The powwow resulted in smiles and reassurances that the minister and the bishop were not in fact all that far apart. But Kässmann did not back down altogether. She maintained that the ways forward in Afghanistan were still seen primarily through a military lens at the exclusion of civilian options.

Fountain of Peace

rachel tausendfreund — Wed, 20 Jan 2010 13:48:54 +0000

The vital, increasingly scarce resource of water has the power to spark tension and conflict. But the sheer necessity of water also compels parties to cooperate when the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of conflict. More water resources are available if the international community can revamp global water governance.

Water is essentially a renewable resource that regulates itself. Nevertheless, the global hydrologic cycle, a kind of natural recycling system, is already strained. In many places water is no longer available in sufficient amounts and quality and a third of the world’s population has insufficient access to water. This is due to an increasing demand on the one hand and a decline in the available resources on the other. Global population growth and improved standards of living are also feeding global demand. In parallel, the available resources are decreasing due not only to non-sustainable resource management and ongoing environmental pollution, but also to the consequences of climate change, such as rising global temperatures and changes in precipitation.

Around 1.1 billion people throughout the world today lack sufficient access to drinking water, and approx. 2.6 billion do not have enough water to meet basic sanitary needs. In order to remedy this situation, the United Nations has included a water-related target in its Millennium Development Goals: to halve by 2015 the number of people without access to water. Since the consequences of insufficient access to water go far beyond those of inadequate drinking water supplies, this issue plays a central role in nearly all the millennium goals and is implicated in a number of additional policy fields. These include public health, food production, education and gender justice. Furthermore, water scarcity is not only linked to issues such as energy supply, environmental protection, the preservation of biodiversity, and the problem of expanding deserts, but it also slows down the economic development of states.

Preventing Escalation

What is true of other resources is also true of water: the scarcer it becomes and the fiercer the competition between users, the greater the danger of conflicts – and possibly of violence. An important question is whether and under what conditions water shortages can lead to violence and how escalations can be prevented. Since different actors and parties can be involved in the conflicts, different constellations emerge: at an international level, states fight over the use of joint water resources, while at the national and local levels, different users of water compete for their quotas.

Depending on the type of conflict, different measures are necessary to avoid a violent escalation. Along the lines of imminent wars over oil and gas, in the 1990s it was believed that violent conflicts over water were also inevitable. However, many studies have since demonstrated the lack of an empirical basis for such scenarios.¹ While it is true that water can spark additional tensions in troubled relations, it is just one factor among many and is not the sole cause or trigger of violent conflict. One important reason is that the cost of fighting a war is much higher than the cost of processing plants or purchasing additional water on the world market. Moreover, it is difficult to maintain control of cross-border water resources by military means, as this requires a de-facto occupation of a country.

When faced with conflicts over water, most states prefer cooperation over confrontation. If, under cooperative arrangements, one state withdraws water from crossborder resources such as rivers, lakes, or subterranean reservoirs, this does not necessarily lead to an absolute reduction of the available water at the expense of other states. Ideally, all participants profit. Through shared resource management, the total amount of available water can even be increased. The cooperative potential is so great that water treaties over water have been signed and maintained despite existing territorial conflicts. An excellent example is the 1960 Indus Treaty between Pakistan and India, which today continues to regulate the use of the Indus and its tributaries. In effect, the treaty grants Pakistan the right to use the Indus's western tributaries while India controls the tributaries in the east. Such cooperative agreements on water can serve as a starting point for greater rapprochement between hostile parties, and they demonstrate that water policy can act as a catalyst and ideally contribute to easing tensions between states.

Enough to Go Around

Even if the thesis of interstate water wars has proved wrong so far, there is an obvious connection between water scarcity and intrastate conflicts. Poor-quality water has, for instance, caused health problems in Central Asia, which in turn have contributed to social unrest. When a water shortage is the direct cause of a conflict, it can lead to competition between different sectors (agriculture, industry, and households), between urban and rural areas, and between different social classes. Furthermore, violent struggles often break out along ethnic and geographical lines, as in the clashes between nomadic cattle breeders and sedentary farmers in northern Kenya or in the war in Darfur. Finally, water shortages can indirectly contribute to conflicts by triggering migration movements that increase the strain on water resources at the migrants’ new destination.

Although there is often talk of a global water crisis, enough water exists in absolute terms to supply the entire population of the world. Water shortages result from unequally distributed regional resources. There are only a few regions in the world today—including the Sahel, the Middle East, and parts of Asia—that suffer from a physical scarcity of water, also known as a hydrological shortage. In most cases the reasons for the shortage are economic. In other words, inadequate financial or institutional capacities have made it impossible to increase supplies through the usual methods: tapping new sources, employing efficient technologies, or reprocessing water. Shortages primarily occur in developing countries—often in weak states that lack the capacities to take effective measures. These states’ stability is additionally jeopardized by intrastate conflicts associated with these water shortages.

Learning to Cope

Since water shortages are mainly a problem of distribution and management, they require political solutions. As in the case of Pakistan and India, it can be helpful to treat water distribution as a functional rather than a political issue when conflicts arise between states. However, the only way to wage an effective, large-scale battle against the global water crisis is politically—through global water governance. In order to pursue an effective water policy, basic legal conditions and institutional capacities must be created at all levels: international, national, regional, and local. They must guarantee the fair and sustainable management of water resources and coordinate the practical measures that are introduced at the different levels.

A sustainable concept for coping with water shortages is already available in the form of the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), which also provides the working base for the UN. However, institutional and implementation problems have kept it from being introduced on a large scale. Furthermore, the process must incorporate all the relevant players—not only UN agencies, regional organizations, nation-states, and state-owned companies, but also the private sector, NGOs, community-level organizations, the academic community, and water users. In the past, water scarcity was mainly seen as a technical challenge and a task for engineers, but it is now understood as a political challenge and part of global environmental policy and sustainable development.

Various measures are available to defuse looming conflicts. It is urgent that the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses be put into effect at an international level in order to create a valid global framework for the use of cross-border waterways. Only 16 of the required 35 states have ratified it so far. In addition, cooperative structures must be built and strengthened at the regional and international levels, including interstate agreements and shared institutions for the management of cross-border water resources. A first practical trust-building measure could be the exchange of data and information on water sources. Even in crisis regions, this could facilitate additional common projects such as the construction of dams in river headwaters in order to control water flows, protect all riparian states against storm-related floods, and generate electricity. Regulating water flow could also increase the amount of available water. At a national level, water could be saved by legally regulating irrigation in agriculture or by making investments in deteriorated infrastructure. Small loans and subsidies could also be used to finance more efficient irrigation systems. At the same time, governments must guarantee water supplies for poorer social classes. For instance, targeted consumer subsidies have proved an effective policy tool in South Africa.

Water scarcity needs political answers. The only way to close the existing institutional and implementation gap, particularly with regard to the Millennium Development Goals, is to create a global water governance architecture that not only integrates all players but also combines the different-level measures in a coherent, effective water policy. As is the case with climate policy, awareness must be raised that a sustainable water resource policy protects a global public good.

¹For example: Aaron T. Wolf, Shira B. Yoffe and Mark Giordano, “International Waters—Identifying Basins at Risk,” Water Policy (May 2003).

The Perils of Population Boom

rachel tausendfreund — Mon, 04 Jan 2010 12:26:00 +0000

Population growth is exacerbating resource scarcity, above all in developing countries. Improved family planning is one way of alleviating this pressure, another is immigration. In both cases poor nations require increased international support.

The global population explosion we expect is largely missing in discussions of the planet’s future. Yet the ramifications of population growth are so far reaching that they could well render irrelevant efforts to curtail climate change, increase resource security, and ensure sustainable development.

The UN predicts that by the year 2050 the world population will have increased by a third, from 6.8 to 9.1 billion people. Ninety-seven percent of this increase will occur in the world’s poor and poorest countries. According to projections, the populations of developing and newly industrialized countries will rise from 5.4 billion to 7.9 billion. The greatest burden will be borne by the least developed countries. Their population will double and remain extremely young. Although the median age will also rise globally, in 2050 the population of countries such as Burundi, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Yemen will still have a median age of less than 24.

By contrast, population figures in the industrialized countries will initially stagnate. Above all in the European countries (Germany, Italy, and Spain) but also in Japan, Russia, and South Korea, population will actually have decreased by 2050. The median age in these countries will be significantly higher. After Japan, Germany and Italy—with an average age of 42—are the second and third oldest societies in the world. In Europe the working-age population will decrease as a whole by one quarter while the number of people over 60 will double.

The result of these regionally varied patterns of fertility (the average number of children born to women of child-bearing age), mortality, and migration—the division of the world into regions with a growing, young population and those with a shrinking, aging population—is referred to by scholars as “demographic divide.” Although these trends have been empirically verified and evident for a long time, they are still receiving inadequate political attention both in the industrialized nations and developing countries.

Ignoring Population Policy

In the case of the industrialized countries, there are two fundamental reasons for this lack of political focus. On the one hand, there is a widespread conception that the growth of the global population is a temporary phenomenon. In a very long-term perspective this assessment is actually correct. Fertility rates have dropped sharply over recent decades (worldwide from an average of 5 to 2.6 children per woman since 1950) and from 2050 onwards this decline will be reflected in a slowdown in world population growth. However until this time—and this is the politically important point—the world’s population will continue to grow rapidly. As a result, the coming decades will be profoundly shaped by an unprecedented expansion of the global population. On the other hand, many people in the industrialized countries are convinced that population policy is a blunt political instrument and that birth rates cannot be influenced by political means. In view of failed attempts by industrialized countries to increase their low birth rates (in the short term) via family policies and other means, this argument may well have some cogency. However, it simply does not apply when it comes to the reduction of high birth rates in the developing countries, as shown by the recent decrease in global fertility. Obviously, high birth rates can indeed be reduced through improved economic and social conditions and through access to education, healthcare, and family planning.

There is also skepticism toward population policy in developing nations. In many countries population growth is recognized as a threat to development and internal stability. At the same time, a large and increasing population is often regarded in classical power-political terms as a boon to regional or international influence. From this perspective, the efforts by industrialized countries to reduced birth rates in developing nations is viewed as a neo-colonial intervention with the aim of further weakening the political power of the poorer states. The result of such disinterest or rejection of political measures against population growth has been to distract attention from the influence of population development on resource scarcity.

Which Development Path?

The global demographic divide will have different consequences with regard to the availability of resources. The outlook for the developing countries is obvious. These countries will have to provide for a rapidly growing number of people and integrate them into labor markets. Moreover, these nations need to ensure that competition for scarce resources does not lead to internal conflict. Dealing with the problem of resource scarcity is dependent on how consumption patterns develop. If the populations of developing nations remained constant, an adoption of the consumption patterns characteristic of industrial countries would still mean an immense increase in the demand for resources and energy. However, if as expected developing nations double their population size by 2050 while adopting “industrial” consumption patterns, the result will be an eight-fold increase in the global demand for resources.1

For the industrialized countries the aging and shrinking of their populations raises different questions. Given the decline in population figures, should costly infrastructures be maintained? How should states react to the depopulation of structurally weak regions and to growing spatial disparities? And how is international competitiveness to be maintained with a rapidly aging population?

In theory the demographic development of the industrialized countries could represent an opportunity as a decrease in resource consumption in these countries could compensate for the increasing demand for resources in the developing nations. However, as yet there is no convincing evidence that this will be the case. Above all it is difficult to predict the influence of demographic aging on consumption patterns. It might well be that population aging in the industrialized countries will lead to a rise rather than a decrease in resource consumption. We can see this trend in the demand for living space that is actually increasing in industrialized nations despite the prevailing demographic tendency.

With regard to resource consumption the question thus remains for all, what developmental path should be pursued and to what degree it should be oriented toward growth? A number of experts have concluded that a reduction in global resource consumption is only possible on the basis of a radical reduction of materials consumption. However, apart from the practical political question of establishing and implementing such self-restraint, such proposals raise numerous normative questions, not least of which concerns the “right to development.”

No Simple Explanatory Model

Since the early 1990s linear models have been developed in connection with the debate around environment and conflict that imply direct causalities between resource scarcity and political violence. The basic argument is that the combination of environmental destruction and the overuse of natural resources can trigger destabilizing internal and cross-border migrations, which in turn can lead to violent conflicts. However, empirically verifying such direct connections has proved difficult and this has given rise to a search for more complex, non-linear models. These newer models assume that conflicts are based on numerous economic, political, and social factors and are not driven solely by resource scarcity.

Political demographers have long emphasized the significance of the prevailing political framework for the outbreak of conflicts. In particular, the capacity of a government to mediate between rival groups is generally decisive. A frequently cited example of such complex causes leading to the outbreak of violence is the 1994 Rwanda genocide that resulted in hundreds of thousands of people fleeing into neighboring countries. Recent analyses identify the causes of this genocide as involving a combination of land scarcity, unequal land distribution, extreme poverty, a division of labor based on ethnic distinctions, a lack of economic prospects, and political mobilization by extremists.

Similarly, the danger of “water wars” is often referred to in connection with population growth and climate change. However, empirical observation suggests that a shortage of water tends to contribute more to (interstate) cooperation than conflict.2

Nevertheless, it is obvious that due to global population growth the amount of water available per capita will significantly decrease. Regions already experiencing low rainfall and with a high population density will be particularly affected by water shortages. These regions include above all the Middle East and Northern, Eastern and Southern Africa.

Furthermore, in many places farming yields will decline. Population growth tends to lead to the extensive farming and overuse of agricultural land, which results in a substantial and lasting reduction in yields. Whether the per-capita decrease of cultivated land and declining land productivity can be offset by new production methods is a matter of dispute, particularly in light of the fact that the use of fertilizers in grain production over recent decades has resulted in lower yield gains.3 In the foreseeable future many countries with high rates of population growth will no longer have adequate land for subsistence agriculture. One consequence of such shortages can be migration to other areas or into neighboring countries, where migrants hope to find better opportunities.

Migration As a Way Out

Migration needs to be taken into account when considering the consequences of population growth and resource scarcity. Along with fertility and mortality, it constitutes the third component of population development.

As in the case of research into the causes of conflict, there is now widespread agreement in the field of migration research that no direct connection can be made between resource scarcity, migration, and violent conflicts. Most researchers agree that the effects of migration are indirect and result from an interplay with other factors—poor agricultural conditions, a failure of governance, or the absence of mechanisms to regulate conflict—with migration playing an intermediate role.

However, rather than as a problem, migration can also be considered as a way out of a local, competitive situation, as an exit option that can help contain conflicts over resources. Ibrahim Sirkeci in Transnational Mobility and Conflict has recently presented a model that explains migration in terms of the individual’s aspiration to security. On the one hand, migrations can trigger conflicts in multiple ways and at different levels. At the level of states, conflicts can develop between countries of origin, transit, and destination when the country of origin forces parts of its population to migrate although neighboring countries are reluctant to immigration. At the level of group relationships, conflicts can result when locals regard immigrants as competitors for scarce resources. And at the individual level, conflicts can be triggered when migrants are subjected to xenophobic or racist violence. On the other hand, migrations out of areas affected by resource scarcity can also help to ease local tensions, as in the case of the Sahel region of Africa.

At least for regions from which migrants originate, the risk of violent conflict is greater when the “migration option” is blocked.

Three conclusions

First, global population growth will increase current resource scarcity, and this will affect above all the rapidly growing developing nations. It remains unclear whether the demographic aging and shrinking of the industrialized countries will ameliorate or increase resource scarcity.

Second, even if there is still no empirical evidence for a direct and linear connection between resource scarcity and violent conflict, it is to be expected that poorer states will find it increasingly difficult to deal peacefully with conflicts over resources intensified by demographic changes.

Third, one reaction to sustained resource scarcity can be migration, the consequences of which are ambivalent. While migration has the potential to trigger conflicts in regions of destination, it can also ameliorate resource scarcity in the regions of origin and thus, at least in these regions, reduce conflict.

What Next

Against this backdrop, industrialized countries urgently need to take action. Efforts to promote family planning and reproductive health should be significantly and rapidly strengthened. It is precisely the poorer countries that need support in their efforts toward sustainable population development. As it is, contributions by Western industrialized countries family planning have decreased rather than increased over the last fifteen years. In 2007 the industrialized countries provided less than a quarter of the funding agreed upon at the 1994 World Population Conference. According to figures compiled by the Bixby Center for Population, there are 80 million unintentional pregnancies annually across the world. The institute estimates that 200 million women would prefer to postpone or prevent their next pregnancy and that 100 million women do not use any contraception because they have no access to it. It is also estimated that the number of couples in developing countries who use contraception will rise from 525 million in 2005 to 742 million in 2015.4

Industrialized countries should therefore provide a much larger amount of aid to the poor and poorest countries targeted at allowing women in particular to decide when and how many children they will have. Family planning alone can certainly not prevent violent conflict, but foregoing aid for family planning will increase the potential for such conflicts in the long term.

Moreover, industrialized countries should reevaluate migration movements from countries suffering from resource scarcity, taking into account that such migrations can reduce the potential for conflict and contribute to stability. Given that the majority of migrations from such countries remain confined to the affected regions (south-south migration), the industrialized countries should increase their efforts to ensure that receiving regions are in a position to deal with these additional challenges. Such efforts can take many forms: targeted use of development policy and other political instruments, nationally or internationally coordinated humanitarian aid programs, or adequate funding of international organizations, in particular the United Nations Refugee Agency—but also through a greater preparedness on the part of industrialized countries to accept more refugees in crisis situations and thereby to ease the burden on receiving countries in the south.

1) See Friedrich Schmidt-Bleek: Nutzen wir die Erde richtig? Frankfurt/Main, 2007, 29–50.
2) See, for example, Dirk Messner: Klimawandel und Wasserkrisen der Zukunft, Entwicklung und Frieden, No. 3, 2009, 167–173
3) See FAO: How to Feed the World in 2050, Rome 2009; Klaus Hahlbrock: Kann unsere Erde die Menschen noch ernähren?, Frankfurt 2007.
4) See Philosophical Transactions B, No. 364, October 2009, 2977 f.

Six Wrong-Headed Cliches about Disarmament

rachel tausendfreund — Wed, 30 Dec 2009 10:31:00 +0000

When it comes to disarmament and arms control, we are currently living in breathtaking times, from President Obama’s Prague speech on global zero to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference scheduled for May 2010. Yet, tragically, these debates continue to be dominated by old stereotypes.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a Cold War relic.

Wrong. The treaty that came into force in 1970 was largely the work of the superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union However, the NPT also serves the national interests of the nuclear have-nots, whose main concern is to prevent dangerous nuclear arms races in their regions.

Currently, in the wake of the renaissance of atomic energy, nuclear technology for both peaceful and military applications is becoming accessible to increasing numbers of states. Thus the NPT is more important than ever. It guarantees at least three things:

Transparency. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carries out more than 2000 inspections in nuclear installations annually. The aim is to prevent the misuse of such technology for military purposes. Through these inspections, the Vienna-based agency is able to obtain a clearer picture of peaceful nuclear programs. States parties that already ratified the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards are subject to more comprehensive notification requirements and are now obliged to report on the complete spectrum of their nuclear activities, including research and development projects. The IAEA inspectors have improved access rights and are even authorized to take environmental samples at any place of their choosing.

Unfortunately, around half of the signatories to the NPT have not yet implemented the protocol. These countries must be convinced to join. However, in the total absence of IAEA inspectors there would be a great deal of uncertainty as to whether atomic programs, declared peaceful, were not being secretly abused for armament purposes. Furthermore, it could prove easier for terrorists to obtain access to fissile material. It is only on the basis of the IAEA inspectors that states are forced to compile transparent material inventories and implement safety measures that make it harder to secretly steal plutonium or enriched uranium from nuclear installations.

Formation of international coalitions. The NPT is the precondition for the formation of international coalitions against potential nuclear proliferators. Without the NPT the formation of the E-3 plus 3—the coalition of France, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Russia, and China established to counter the threat of Iranian nuclear armament—would have been much harder, if not impossible. These states pursue different interests in respect of Tehran, however they are united in their determination to uphold the non-proliferation norm. Without the NPT many of the major powers would probably support the nuclear weapons programs of states that they are favorably disposed toward, while other major powers would attempt to combat such developments. This would lead to a considerable increase in international instability.

Political style. The NPT is frequently described as the cornerstone of the entire international non-proliferation regime. And rightly so. It would be virtually impossible to uphold the treaties on the banning of biological as well as chemical weapons if it was not for the NPT. In its absence, the concept of limiting access to the world’s most dangerous weapons by cooperative, diplomatic means, would be completely lost.

Thus the NPT proves to be far from a relic of the Cold War. On the contrary, in a globalized world in which dual-use technologies that can easily be used for military purposes are becoming increasingly accessible, it is indispensable.

The NPT is in crisis because the nuclear powers are not disarming enough.
True, in a limited sense. In fact, the NPT is built on three main pillars. In addition to the non-proliferation norm, that is, the permanent relinquishment of nuclear weapons by over 180 states, the treaty also commits the nuclear powers, the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China, to serious nuclear disarmament within the framework of general disarmament—for which all states are responsible. The third pillar is the free access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

For some time, many non-nuclear-weapons states have complained of an imbalance in the emphasis placed on these three pillars by the major powers. Above all, the Bush administration had been heavily criticized for continually indicting potential norm violators such as Iran or Syria, while appearing to neglect the issue of its own disarmament. In fact the Bush administration showed little interest in disarmament treaties. However, it reduced the United States’ arsenal of nuclear weapons to a level deemed necessary by Washington, resulting in the decommissioning of several thousand warheads. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama announced a general change of course: the American goal is now “global zero,” the elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide. (The international community confirmed this vision, with the UN Security Council approving a historic resolution in a unanimous vote on September 24, 2009.) As a first step on this new course, Washington and Moscow are working on a new treaty on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons to be concluded by the end of 2009.

Aside from this, NATO has already implemented a concept of minimum nuclear deterrence. While at the height of the cold war the United StatesA had more than 7,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons on a range of different carriers stationed throughout Europe, today only approximately 200 American airborne bombs remain in Europe.

But is there actually any empirical connection between nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament? In the 1980s, as Ronald Reagan and Michail Gorbachev finally began to massively reduce the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals in the course of the INF (intermediate range weapons) and START (strategic weapons) treaties, countries such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iran, Libya, and North Korea, began their nuclear programs. The determining factors were ambitions of supremacy (Iraq), security needs (Iran in respect of the then wartime enemy Iraq), prestige (Libya) or the pursuit of a form of life insurance policy and the extortion of economic aid (North Korea). Whether Moscow or Washington made progress in terms of nuclear disarmament was irrelevant to these countries. Even today, no one would seriously maintain that Kim Jong Il or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would relinquish nuclear weapons or a corresponding option simply because the United States and Russia had reduced the numbers of their nuclear weapons.

However, there is a political connection between disarmament and non-proliferation: The greater the progress in disarmament, then the easier it will be to convince previously reluctant countries at the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in May 2010 of the measures necessary to strengthen the treaty—such as the implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol.

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty cannot come into force because it has not been ratified by the United States

Also true, in a very limited sense. In 1996 the UN General Assembly voted for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which forbids all nuclear weapons tests as well as so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. The test ban is seen as an important symbol of nuclear disarmament by many non-nuclear-weapons states. In order that the treaty be enacted under international law it has to be ratified by 44 countries listed in a treaty annex which are in possession of nuclear power stations or research reactors.

Naturally, the United States is part of this group. The Clinton administration submitted the Test Ban Treaty to the United States senate for ratification. However it rejected the treaty in October 1999 by 51 to 48 votes. The Bush administration rejected a renewed submission to the senate. In contrast, President Obama is soon to undertake a new attempt. Although the Democrats now have a majority in the senate, at least seven Republicans must support the Test Ban Treaty in order to reach the required two-thirds majority. Even if this is achieved, the Test Ban Treaty would still be a long way from enactment. Further states such as China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Israel still have to submit their instrument of ratification. Following a U.S. ratification the political pressure on these countries would increase enormously, however this would be a long way from guaranteeing their agreement.

Bejing’s intention is to keep open the nuclear test option in order to develop its nuclear weapons arsenal and strengthen its position as a nuclear power. The situation is similar in the case of India, whereby indications are mounting that a supposedly successful hydrogen bomb test in 1998 failed to yield the expected results. In order to check the design of its hydrogen bomb it is possible that further tests will be required. As long as India fails to enact the Test Ban Treaty, a ratification on the part of Pakistan is ruled out. Islamabad’s decision is strictly linked to India’s actions. In light of their uncooperative behavior, test ban ratifications on the part of Iran and North Korea are unlikely. And even Israel is hardly likely to ratify, having fought shy of all multilateral arms control treaties to date. As on site inspections are also inscribed in the Test Ban Treaty, Israel will be required to radically alter its policy of rejecting such monitoring measures out of a fear of revealing military secrets; however, this is not to be expected.

Conclusion: At best, an American ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be a political signal from Washington that disarmament is to be taken more seriously again. However, in no sense would this go hand in hand with an enactment of the treaty.

Iran has a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in particular uranium enrichment.

Yes, but not unconditionally. The NPT does indeed specify free access to the peaceful use of atomic energy, although specific technologies such as uranium enrichment or reprocessing are not mentioned in the treaty. However, within the terms of the NPT the right to the civil use of nuclear energy is strictly linked to the categorical exclusion of all forms of military misappropriation. This is not the case with Iran. As a result of Tehran’s intransparent behavior over the course of many years, the IAEA is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Rather, the IAEA is concerned of the existence of a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.

Furthermore, in five resolutions to date, the UN Security Council has called on Iran to cease its uranium enrichment activities as well as its heavy water program in compliance with international law—two technologies that are especially suited to misuse for military purposes. To date, unsuccessfully.

Aside from the fact that Iran has forfeited its right to unrestricted access to civil nuclear technology through its misconduct, it was never the aim of the United States or its European partners to deny Tehran such access, either as a matter of principle or on a permanent basis. On the contrary, the West principally supported the completion of the Iranian light-water reactor in Bushehr, as long as the fuel rods were supplied by Russia and taken back after use. In its proposal from July 2006, the E3 plus 3 even offered Iran support in the construction of further light-water reactors, should Tehran suspend its uranium enrichment activities and heavy water project and clarify open questions with the IAEA. Once Iran has dispelled the doubts raised by its own behavior, the E3 plus 3 is prepared to lift its call for the suspension of uranium enrichment and other nuclear technologies on a step by step basis. At no point in time was the goal to fundamentally and permanently deny Iran a right to which it is entitled. Rather, it is up to Iran to win the confidence of the international community as a step to utilizing the full spectrum of nuclear energy for civil purposes.

A world without nuclear weapons is unachievable – and dangerous.

That depends. The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons should not be abandoned. In this respect, President Obama’s disarmament goals and the latest UN resolution are to be welcomed. Nuclear deterrence may fail. Contrary to popular opinion we do not even know whether it actually functioned during the Cold War, as we logically can not prove why an event – in this case war between East and West – did not occur. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union were fortunate that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis did not end in nuclear escalation. A far cry from successful crisis management.

And who is prepared to bank on the parties to future crises having as much luck, for example India and Pakistan? After all, they have already waged a limited conventional war—the Kargil war in 1999. Nuclear weapons states are perfectly capable of launching aggression against nuclear neighbors in the hope that the other side is prepared to accept a limited defeat out of fear of nuclear escalation. However, as Clausewitz was aware, war leads to extremes. The prevention of nuclear escalation is by no means guaranteed. This applies all the more in the Near East, where Israel, by virtue of its geography alone, would not have any second-strike capacity should the sword of Damocles hanging over its territory—the threat of Iranian nuclear armament—happen to fall. Consequently, it must strike the nuclear weapons out of Iran’s hand at a relatively early stage in the crisis, which in turn would dispose Tehran to the early deployment of its nuclear capacity—before it is lost.

Relying on nuclear deterrence as a means of maintaining continued stability ultimately means building the future on a foundation of sand. In this respect, the goal of complete nuclear disarmament is unavoidable. However, who has ever claimed that this goal is easy to achieve?

In fact, this is more than a Herculean task. In order to make a world without nuclear weapons a safe place, secret nuclear rearmament must be excluded. All states must join the nuclear weapons ban. However, to date, a similar success has not been achieved with either the biological or chemical arms bans. Furthermore, a reliable and very intrusive verification system would be required. This would generate high costs and create a gigantic bureaucracy.

Would the dictatorships of this world be willing to comply with the required openness? And what would happen if a state was caught developing a secret nuclear program? Would the highest international authority, the UN Security Council, be prepared to take military action against such a treaty violator in the event of an emergency? And what if the violator was a permanent member with a right of veto? A member against whom it would be impossible to pass legally binding resolutions without their consent? Consequently, the right of veto in the Security Council must be abolished along with nuclear weapons.

In other words: A world without nuclear weapons presupposes a new world order. It is a goal that will not be achieved over night. However, we should begin. At some point in time, the assumption that humanity can continue to live with nuclear weapons without deploying them will prove to be a misapprehension.

Missile defense impedes nuclear disarmament.

Here again, this is not necessarily the case. Despite his September 2009 decision not to pursue the Bush administration’s plans for missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, President Obama has far from abandoned missile defense per se. In light of the continued threat that Iran or other countries could procure long range nuclear missiles, the United States will continue to rely on missile defense, albeit with a changed set of priorities and on a reduced scale. Even Russia is continuing with its missile defense projects, even if Moscow is keen to give the impression that it is only the United States that is pursuing such schemes.

In light of continued proliferation, missile defense could in fact provide important damage limitation options. Should a Middle East crisis involving a nuclear-armed Iran at some time in the future no longer prove controllable, then Europe will be happy not to be completely at the mercy of an Iranian nuclear threat.

However, at the same time, missile defense must not lead to an offensive nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia. For this reason, both parties should thoroughly examine the options for cooperation over missile defense. A start has already been made in this respect. China, which fears a joint American-Russian missile shield, should also be included.

Should this prove successful, a cooperative missile defense strategy could even form an important component of a worldwide nuclear weapons ban. Such a world would not be free of dictatorships. This would continue to place a limit on verification. Neither would it be a world without missiles, as increasing numbers of states would pursue civil space projects. Consequently, there would be a danger of secret nuclear armament, which, in a country in possession of missiles, would enable it to threaten others over great distances. However, in contrast, a cooperative missile defense strategy would provide counter insurance, thus laying the basis for the abolition of all nuclear weapons.

Interview with Social Democrat and Bundestag member Hans-Peter Bartels

rachel tausendfreund — Mon, 21 Dec 2009 10:22:02 +0000

The events of early September in northern Afghanistan and the German government’s handling of the crisis have exposed the German deployment in Afghanistan to scrutiny like never before in its eight-year history. The German-ordered air strike and the incomplete information provided to the Bundestag and the public have forced the resignation of two senior defense officials and the former defense minister, Franz Josef Jung.

Hans-Peter Bartels is a Social Democratic MP from Kiel. He serves on the parliament's defense committee and is deputy defense policy spokesperson for the SPD.

IP: What does this episode tell us about Germany and its ability to participate in multilateral missions in conflict zones where military force might complement crisis management and state-building efforts?

Bartels: I’m hoping this was an isolated case, in which the Germans acted in contravention of NATO strategy. Germany has had positive experiences with missions abroad, including those with a military component. Germany has also been an important part of the strategy discussions within ISAF. A wrong decision was made, with grave consequences, and then at the time it wasn’t owned up to by the defense minister, Mr. Jung, who wanted to keep it out of the election campaign. I think Germany can play a constructive role as an ally in Afghanistan and in other world trouble spots. We are doing a good job there now.

IP: The events of September 3 and 4 have already led to resignations; now there is mounting pressure on the new defense minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg.

Bartels: Now is not the time to demand more resignations, but rather to determine exactly what happened on these days in Kunduz and afterwards in the German chain of command. In front of the Bundestag on September 8, Chancellor Angela Merkel told the German public that there would be full disclosure. But this didn’t occur until October 29, well after the general election. During the interim, Bundeswehr reports were made available to Mr. Jung that he didn’t mention until October 28. Only then did the Bundeswehr General Inspector mention the NATO report.

As late as November 6, Minister zu Guttenberg said that the air strike was correct and legitimate, even if mistakes had been made. How did he come to this conclusion, which he has since recanted? This is one of the primary questions for the Bundestag’s Defense Committee investigation. Everyone else who has read this same NATO report came to a completely different conclusion. Minister zu Guttenberg maintained an untenable position on this matter far too long and serious questions remain unanswered.

IP: Two-thirds of the German public is against the deployment of Bundeswehr troops in Afghanistan. Yet the bulk of the political elite, including your party, stands behind the mission. How do you explain this?

Bartels: It’s all about how pollsters pose the questions. If they’d ask ìAre you for the Bundeswehr pulling out immediately even if that leads to civil war and provides a base for terrorists?î I don’t believe a majority would say ìout from Afghanistan immediately.î But it’s also true that Germans aren’t enthusiastic about being in Afghanistan. There’s neither a gung-ho patriotism about sending troops into conflict nor is the political class angling to have more such missions abroad. This is because of Germany’s history, and I think it’s understandable. I’d be concerned if it were otherwise. We are cautious and don’t want to see German soldiers stationed abroad for the long-term. But we want to help carry out the UN mandate and the NATO mission, which do contribute to Germany’s security. We can’t be there forever but we have to prepare the ground so that we can leave Afghanistan together with our allies in a responsible way.

IP: Even so, Germany’s politicians have been unable to convince Germans of the necessity of the mission...

Bartels: Let’s not forget that when the Bundestag first approved sending German soldiers into Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission in 2001, the majority of Germans were convinced it was the right thing to do. Since then the public has become more sceptical. This is because the mission was not immediately successful but rather it became more difficult and complex. This is in stark contrast to the Balkans missions where we could gradually reduce the number of troops. The majority of Germans will not tolerate irresponsible policy decisions when it comes to our troops abroad.

IP: President Obama has said that he wants the Europeans to help him with his new strategy in Afghanistan. How can Germany best to this?

Bartels: I think it would be wrong to try to replicate the American strategy one-to-one, namely to increase our troops by a third just because the Americans are. We have to see where we can do better. It’s no secret that police training hasn’t gone as planned. This is because of German federalism and our police statutes. We simply haven’t been able to muster enough police from the L‰nder (the federal states) and the federal government. Thus we have to rely more on the Bundeswehr’s Feldj‰ger, the military police, to play a greater role, including as police trainers. Germany can make other contributions, too, but that will be decided at the Afghanistan conference in January.

IP: Many critics hold the Social Democrats to blame for the failure to build up an effective police force in Afghanistan. After all, your party was in power from 1998 to late fall 2009.

Bartels: For the last four years it was a Christian Democrat interior minister who couldn’t convince the Länder to send more police officers. Only this year did Bavaria send its first two officers to Afghanistan. That’s pathetic. Yet we can’t just sit around and complain that we’re not getting enough regular police to Afghanistan. I think the best thing to do is send military police. Some are already there and they’ve been praised for their effectiveness.

IP: In a recent issue of Internationale Politik, the Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid argued that the German troops are unnecessarily restricted from engaging in combat under the same rules as other allies.

Bartels: This hasn’t been the case since Germany took over the Quick Reaction Force in the north. German solders are engaging in the same way our NATO partners do under the ISAF rules of engagement, although differently than the American troops operating under the Operation Enduring Freedom mandate.

IP: President Obama mentioned 2011 as a date to begin withdrawal. Should Germany now also begin thinking about a fixed date?

Bartels: Obama mentioned a date when withdrawal can begin, which is easier to do now considering the surge in troops that will begin soon. There are already benchmarks that have to be reached for withdrawal to begin. Obama gave this discussion new forward motion and the Afghanistan conference will provide more goals and conditions for withdrawing. There can be a plan for drawing down, but whether that is 2011 or later will depend on whether the goals have been reached. The Afghan government has to be ready with its police and military to provide security. This handing over of responsibility has already begun. Obama’s statements have added pressure and underscored that this mission will not go on for decades, but rather will be completed in a mater of years.

Interview by IP-Global editors

Letter from Berlin

rachel tausendfreund — Mon, 07 Dec 2009 14:44:12 +0000

Berlin's barely visible memorial to soldiers killed in service is a concrete manifestation of Germany's conflicting attitudes to its Bundeswehr military. But with the recent Kunduz scandal, a full-scale debate on the role of Germany's military and the Afghanistan mission can no longer be avoided.

Few, if any, of the visitors to the defence ministry pavilion notice—behind and above their heads—the barely legible names projected through a concrete panel. Some 3,100 German soldiers have been killed on duty since 1955. But it seems less accident and more design that they are displayed in a place most people wouldn’t think of looking. It reflects Germany’s attitude to its military: ‘yes’ in principle, just spare us the detail.

The irony is that the memorial was supposed to represent a new era of openness and honesty toward the Bundeswehr's role in the world, one that President Horst Köhler assured Germans would not serve a “false hero worship” or a “victim cult.” “It reminds politicians,” he noted, “that their decisions can cost lives.” And jobs. As he spoke last September, officials in the defence ministry building behind him were in frantic damage limitation mode. Four days earlier, a German general had ordered an air-strike on two petrol tanks hijacked by the Taliban near the northern Afghanistan city of Kunduz.

The attack had forced the defence minister at the time, Franz Josef Jung, on the offensive. He had two messages: yes, it was the bloodiest military incident with German involvement since 1945, but no, there were no civilian casualties. Definitely none.

That version of events began to unravel in the following days, with estimates of up to 40 dead civilians. But three months, several reports, and one general election later, many assumed the incident had lost its explosive charge. That was until a defence ministry report—compiled after the strike, discussing the very civilian casualties Jung denied existed—was leaked to the mass circulation tabloid, Bild-Zeitung.

Not only had the report been kept under wraps until after September’s general election, officials in the defence ministry kept it from the their new minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. Only when the ministry got wind of Bild’s looming exclusive was zu Guttenberg informed. Hours later the minister accepted the resignations of Germany’s military chief and a leading official. A day later, Jung decided that he, too, would resign, leaving the labour ministry after just a month in charge. Three heads in two days. By the sluggish standards of German politics, it was a whirlwind of a scandal.

And what of the fall-out? Short term, the already high hopes surrounding the youthful zu Guttenberg have been given a further shot in the arm. He has spotted the chance the scandal offers him to clean out a ministry described variously as a “snake pit” and a “collection of warring fiefdoms” that thrived under the sub-optimal Jung. On his watch, zu Guttenberg can tackle the culture of secrecy and catastrophic communication that has long characterised the defence ministry.

The medium-term outlook is far more mixed. Whether Berlin wants it or not, the country is now hurtling toward a full-scale debate about its role in NATO in general and in Afghanistan in particular. It’s a debate that began a decade ago ahead of its first post-war military mission in Kosovo. But the debate has been pushed aside by successive governments since Berlin’s ‘no’ to the war in Iraq.

Of course Germany has something resembling debate about Afghanistan every year around this time, when the annual mandate for the mission comes up for renewal in parliament. But those debates are closely choreographed rituals that no longer work since September’s air-strike blew the mission off the rails. Soldiers once responsible for peace-keeping, reconstruction and police training in the once relatively peaceful northern regions say they have no time for any of that now. Instead, they spend their time defending themselves against Taliban attacks, up from nine in 2007 to 31 last year and 53 so far in 2009. Some 35 German soldiers have been killed and 118 injured. And all this in a mission described by Berlin as one of “stabilization and civilian reconstruction.”

The times are slowly changing. Last month zu Guttenberg broke a semantic taboo by admitting that German soldiers faced “war-like conditions” in Afghanistan. Then in front of the Bundestag, he rowed back from the previous government line and admitted that September’s air strike was “militarily inappropriate.” Yet a decade after its first foreign troop deployment, Berlin is still playing the role of NATO wall flower.

Instead of taking the floor and chairing a national debate on Germany's military role in the world, Angela Merkel sticks out her head just long enough to repeat the stock phrase that Afghanistan is about tackling international terrorism in its own back garden, rather than waiting for it to reach Europe’s door. She then vanishes before a debate can start, leaving the floor open to the post-communist Left Party and its demands for a pull-out of all military operations and an end to Germany’s membership of NATO.

Not that the other politicians are much better than Merkel. The Social Democrats, on whose watch the mission to Kunduz began, are too busy with their internal political meltdown to decide what they want on Afghanistan.

It’s clear what voters want: 69 percent want German soldiers home as soon as possible. According to a poll for ARD public television, three quarters of the public no longer believe the government’s line on Afghanistan. It’s a catastrophic situation: The German public wants an end to a dangerous military mission the German government denies ever turned hostile. The surveys show two things: Thanks to their history, Germans are inherently cautious about military deployments. But they are allergic, too, to being treated like children by the government that, on Afghanistan, is playing a double game. Berlin informs NATO allies it cannot boost its 4,500 troops, implying the physical and political danger is too great. Then it does an about-face and tells an incredulous German public, still raw from satellite images of smoking petrol tankers, that its mission in Kunduz is peacekeeping and reconstruction.

German politicians have kept their feet dry on the moral high ground for years refusing to discuss war. Now the Kunduz cover-up has created an even more hostile public and a political opposition with the means to scupper any hope of a sober political debate on Germany’s military role in the world.

Finally, after holding out against the troop demands of the Bush administration, it seems ironic that it will be the more popular President Obama who may finally force Berlin’s hand. Chancellor Merkel is holding out for now on Washington’s reported request for an extra 2,000 German troops. That would require a new mandate—and a parliamentary debate—that reflects the new reality facing German troops in Afghanistan.

Support for a new mandate will depend on Berlin being willing to communicate the message from Washington: to get out, NATO needs to get in more. After the tortuous information striptease over the Kunduz bombing, Chancellor Merkel’s government has one last chance to come clean with the German public about Afghanistan. Hiding in plain view, like the names of dead soldiers in the Bundeswehr memorial, is no longer an option.

After Lisbon

rachel tausendfreund — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 10:10:50 +0000

The European Union will start 2010 with a dual leadership composed of an EU president, Hermann von Rompuy, and an “EU foreign minister,” Catherine Ashton. This duo is supposed to provide the Union with a single voice in the wider world. So, will the European Union now finally be taken seriously or will foreign policy continue to be made by the most powerful of the member states?

It is almost 40 years since Henry Kissinger demanded a single telephone number from the Europeans. The joke is as old as Methuselah. But now the European Union finally has one. Well, actually, it is not one but two telephone numbers, and if you include the Commission then it is three. And, frankly, it is questionable whether President Obama will ever dial any of them. Nevertheless, the European Union’s new competences and power structures are beginning to crystallize. They are still not completely clear. There will be toings and froings over von Rompuy’s and Ashton’s actual remits within the European Union. However it is clear that there will soon be more foreign policy governance at the EU level than before, and that is fantastic news.

Jean Monnet said that institutions generate gravitational force, extending their influence into the political sphere, clearing a space for themselves. This should also apply to the new posts at the top of the European Union and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Union’ foreign service. The objective is to turn the EEAS into an innovative, post-modern foreign policy instrument that will not only enable the European Union to defend its values and views in the world, but also better protect the common interests of the member states.

This noble goal was severely jeopardized by a grotesque dispute over personnel in the run up to the nominations. Weeks before the special summit in November, second rate names for the posts designed to embody the European Union’s future strength were circulating, while prominent candidates were refused nomination in order not to jeopardize their national careers. Important EU countries such as Germany failed even to make any personnel recommendations at all. The symbolism of the Lisbon Treaty appeared to dissipate before its ink was dry. The European Union was on the verge of botching one of its finest hours.

Admittedly: von Rompuy and Ashton are not the most well known. However, they have the bonus of being unknown quantities – not an a priori disadvantage for a new office. Following the difficult nominations, everything now appears to be proceeding quickly and the establishment of the new posts and institutions is rapidly exerting a unique gravitational force within the system.

Citizen-Friendly Conductor

In the future, a European president will preside over the work of the European Council, the Union’s highest body composed of the heads of the member states. Furthermore, together with the President of the Commission, the new president will be responsible for the preparation, continuity, and cohesion of the European Council’s work. He reports to the European Parliament. In addition, von Rompuy will act as the European Union’s foreign representative in matters of foreign and security policy. The treaty lays down guidelines for the exercise of office, however it does not specify the tasks in detail. It is also unclear whether the president will receive his own administrative apparatus. His executive powers will be de facto restricted; here the Commission President, today Jose Manuel Barroso, will prevail. The work of the Council of Ministers will also be largely beyond his remit. Here the rotating national presidencies, next up Spain, will steer the course. And with a view to foreign policy, it will be necessary to outline his responsibilities relative to the foreign minister, who will head the European diplomatic service and the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Nevertheless, the prominent role of the EU president in the future system will enable him to present himself as the face of the European Union, and provide what the European Union is most lacking: a profile that European citizens can identify with. Through him, Europe will become tangible and visible. Beyond the filigree legal competence structures, and in spite of the pre-programmed conflict potential, as President of the Council of the European Union, von Rompuy will have the opportunity to prepare the European themes of concern to its citizens, establishing a set of priorities, and guiding the debate such that the individual EU institutions are all working together under his direction. This would enable President von Rompuy – as a man of strong ideas and chairman of the debate – to become the actual choreographer of the new Europe, without losing himself in petty-minded questions of authority or becoming sidelined. Whether this proves successful will depend on his personality – however the prestige of the new office should provide a good basis.

The Real Trump Card

The new foreign minister has a pragmatic mandate, but with a well-equipped power base. Of central importance is her role as vice president, firmly anchoring her in the European Commission, while simultaneously presiding over the new EEAS. The EEAS represents the successful overcoming of the previous pillar structure (common policies vs. intergovernmental decisions), which led to the division of the individual policy areas according to Council and Commission jurisdiction. The Council frequently had a political agenda, while the Commission had the structures and the financial means to implement policy. The EEAS, which will be composed of civil servants from the Council, the Commission, and the member states, will serve to bring together these two pillars. At the same time, the European Union will establish diplomatic missions.

Will EU foreign policy automatically present a unified face? Naturally not – or at least not to the same extent everywhere. For the foreseeable future there will still be national embassies in Washington, Moscow, or Beijing, which will have a greater influence than the EU missions. However, the European Union will be able to successfully play its new foreign policy trump card -- the common diplomatic missions -- elsewhere. In the Balkan states, Ukraine, or Armenia, EU policy, like structural aid and the pre-accession programs, has already generated considerable added value compared to the efforts of the national embassies.

Furthermore, many countries, above all the smaller member states, are hard pushed to maintain their own embassies everywhere. However, at a time when the world’s geostrategy and that of Europe is undergoing a shift, it is precisely these states that are of special significance. States such as Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan or even Georgia, which until very recently tended to be of secondary importance, are now developing into strategic nodal points for European energy supply and European security architecture in general. The new EU foreign policy will be particularly effective in Tbilisi, Baku, and Odessa, places where it is especially needed. Here the EEAS will be able to demonstrate its new strength. Should the experiences prove positive, then in time the relevance of the EU missions will extend to other states and regions, for example the African states. The same applies to the Western Balkan states. Even now the EU missions in the region, albeit still divided according to Commission and Council jurisdiction, are the de facto first port of call for emerging foreign policy and its future in the respective countries. With the establishment of strong, unified EU missions, the preconditions, at least in institutional terms, will be in place for EU foreign policy to act as the main lever for development in the Balkans.

Post-Modern Foreign Policy

The European Union’s next objective is the establishment of a post-modern foreign policy. This will include breaking down the classic departmental divisions, for example, the division between classic foreign and development policy, as well as that between foreign and security policy. These divisions are still reflected at a national level in the majority of the EU member states. The differences between the “communities” of foreign and development policy makers are great. The resources of the various jurisdictions are jealousy defended. Consequently, whether that section of the Commission responsible for development policy project work should be integrated into the EEAS or not, was and remains one of the most contentious issues for the EEAS. Nevertheless, the EEAS will work toward strengthening links between development projects and foreign policy, i.e. strategic goals, integrating civil military missions into foreign policy, and connecting climate protection goals with development policy. The interdisciplinary aspect, even though it will take time, should emerge as a decisive advantage of the EEAS, an area in which the European Union has traditionally been strong. The turn away from “classic foreign policy,” could, for example, consist of establishing EU diplomatic missions responsible for climate protection in those Chinese megacities that are the greatest emission sinners.

Not a Power Like the US or Russia

Judging EU foreign policy on whether it will operate like the United States or Russia, or as a “counterweight” to the United States, is in danger of overlooking the salience of the new diplomatic service. Despite all the European Union’s institutional statehood and state-like elements, it is not about the imitation of the superpowers. The European Union will never be able to compete at this level with the likes of China or the United States. The objective is better coordination of the diplomatic services of the nation states and the EEAS. The task is not the substitution of the national by the European, but rather the creative participation of the national diplomatic services in the European service. Only by such means will the European Union be true to its motto “unity in diversity.” It is less about one voice, than a well-led choir. The foreign minister as conductor would be well advised to integrate the national foreign ministers into her work through a delegation of responsibilities, not least because she has a huge workload. For example, place the Spanish foreign minister in charge of a mission for Latin America, maybe entrust Italy with a mission for Libya, put the French in charge of the Mediterranean region, or entrust the Polish with the task of keeping a special eye on Ukraine.

These measures would not just make sense in terms of promoting a better integration of national and European policy, they would also grant the member states more say and generate a greater sense of “ownership.” This would not only allow the expertise of individual countries in particular regions to be used effectively -- specific policy goals could also be given more weight by channeling them through the European Union. Far from being a competitor, the EEAS could function as a transmission belt for national foreign policy goals, which the smaller member states in particular stand to profit from, while the EEAS itself reaps the benefits of a tightly woven fabric of experience, networks and traditions. At an institutional level, the European Union would be better equipped for establishing its influence in regions such as the Middle East, if Ashton – as the European Union has already done in the case of Iran – were to concentrate on focusing and coordinating the policy approaches of the major states, and then reinforce them with the weight of the European Union.

Superpower without Teeth?

The Lisbon treaty provides clear advantages in security and defense policy. For the first time, the European Union will delegate a specific defense policy task to a “group of states” and deploy a multinational “EU battlegroup.” The treaty also establishes the so-called “permanent structured cooperation,” enabling those states that display strong commitment to defense policy issues to join forces on a sustained basis and make decisions according to a qualified majority. These combined measures do not turn the European Union into a military power: it has no standing army nor the intention of establishing one. Nevertheless, the reform allows a whole series of flexible military measures beneath the combat mission level, elements of a post-modern foreign policy that combine classic diplomacy and civil military factors.

The more energy and commitment the European Union invests in establishing European Union missions, then the greater the likelihood that non-member states will respond to a common European Union foreign policy, and the more unified it will ultimately be. Naturally, this will take time. The same applies to the two new offices.

The new personnel and institutions will push for a common EU foreign policy agenda, albeit gently, as offices and institutions require, in fact compel, compromise and consensus. The institutional framework and content of European foreign policy are mutually related. It is correct that the European Union has not so much suffered from the lack of a uniform policy analysis in recent years, but from the absence of a suitable instrument for its common implementation. However, with the Lisbon Treaty, this is now in place. Even if the European Union uses this treaty patiently and consistently, it is unlikely to be transformed into a superpower in the near future, but maybe it will become a trend setter for a modern form of foreign policy in a globalized world.

Time for Germany to Step Up

rachel tausendfreund — Fri, 27 Nov 2009 16:44:00 +0000

After eight years, Germany’s position in Afghanistan has deteriorated dramatically. The Germans do not need more troops. They need to empower their forces that are already there to fight. Not doing so only plays into Taliban hands.

Germany’s foremost failure in Afghanistan has been its inability to build-up the Afghan police force, for which it assumed responsibility in late 2001. Germany set up headquarters, but then failed to commit enough manpower and resources. Ordinary policemen were not recruited and trained in the numbers needed. After much criticism, the mission was finally taken over by the Americans. With this in mind, recent reports of the new commitment by the European Union led by Germany, in which they would provide police training, were met with some skepticism, ultimately resulting in the abandonment of the initiative.

However, the most important issue deals with the way in which German troops have been deployed in their area of responsibility in northern Afghanistan, as well as in and around Kunduz. Their mode is defensive and the consequences have been telling: over the last six months, the Taliban have launched a successful offensive in western and northern Afghanistan, targeting troops which, like Germany's, operate under certain restrictions and caveats attached to their mission. Spain is another such example. In this way, the Taliban have moved to the north relatively undisturbed. In fact, U.S. troops have recently had to go in and clear out some of the outposts created by the Taliban in the north.

The German government has not acknowledged these setbacks. This is problematic because both the governments of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel have failed to carry out a proper parliamentary and public debate concerning why Germany is in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, this is true for a lot of European countries where governments are trying to keep everything concerning Afghanistan under wraps and pretending that they are involved in peaceful development operations. On the contrary, the situation has been deteriorating further: Germany is now threatened directly by Al Qaida and other extremist groups.

Therefore, what Germany, and other European countries, need first and foremost is a more transparent policy. The fear that these governments apparently have—that this will only further weaken public support for the mission in Afghanistan—is in my view completely misplaced. On the contrary, the public would be better off if it were better informed. Because the mission is not clearly spelled out and there is no acknowledgement of the deteriorating situation, resolve has grown weaker.

This would mean taking a political risk, but I am absolutely sure that people could be wooed, especially now that the danger Germany faces at home is so clear. Just think of the plot to attack the Ramstein airbase by the so-called “Sauerland group.” German intelligence has long been aware of the fact that certain German converts to Islam or Germans of Turkish and other descent are travelling to Pakistan or Afghanistan in order to get training and fight. Some, but not all, get caught once they return. At some point many more will come back. Germany is a principle target of Al Qaeda now. There is the belief that a major terrorist incident will lead to the withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan, similar to the situation in Spain in March 2004, when train bombs attacked Madrid and led to Spain’s retreat from Iraq.

Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, Germany needs to wave the restrictions on its troops operating in the north; in other words, the German government has to empower its military to fight. The Bundeswehr has recently suffered casualties due to roadside bombs and other means, but they have so far not been able to retaliate. This only works to embolden the Taliban. Afghanistan does not necessarily need more German troops right now. However, those who are there need to become more active and effective, so that they can take on a proper counter-insurgency role in fighting the Taliban.

Thirdly, increased efforts, resources and development—especially concerning the training of the Afghan army—are needed. In earlier years, Germany has done quite a lot of successful development in the north; this has now come to a standstill. Initially, Germany operated in relative safety, within a peaceful environment. This has changed completely since the beginning of the year. Such efforts could coexist alongside laudable regional projects, for instance the recently announced railway project linking the frontier town Hairatan in Uzbekistan with Mazar-e-Sharif. Germany has been very active in its support, and the Asia Development Bank is backing the project with 165 million dollars. After the massacre of Andijan, when dictator Islam Kamirov’s security forces killed hundreds of peaceful protesters in March 2005, Germany retained its Termez base in Uzbekistan, but was widely criticized for this. Now, I believe, the situation has changed. Germany could play a larger role in bringing the governments of Central Asia closer to Afghanistan, NATO, and ISAF. The Central Asian governments have been watching NATO’s intensions in Afghanistan very suspiciously, and Germany, as well as all of Europe, could do more to encourage cross-border contacts, and bring the Central Asian states into the picture.

Fourthly, on the diplomatic front, Germany needs to be tougher, more vocal, and more resolute. Hamid Karzai is likely to keep the Afghan presidency in his hands. Therefore, it is very important to both return some credibility to the Afghan government, as well as to be tougher on it. The United States under President Barack Obama seems determined to act in this fashion, giving the Afghan government more precise targets and timelines in which to achieve things, demanding more than George W. Bush ever had. Yet, it would be impossible, to leave this to the Americans alone; what is needed is a true, multinational effort.

Hamid Karzai has now been elected president of Afghanistan for a second term, but some western countries are now openly voicing their apprehension, fearing that he will not pursue better governance and the fight against corruption. Germany must add its voice to these fears and play a role in uniting Europe in order to create a proper set of benchmarks that Karzai will have to adhere to if his government is to retain the support of the west. In the past, Karzai has managed to blame everything on the Americans, including corruption. A more vocal policy by German and European policy would make this more difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, the United States and Europe should take steps to increase the effectiveness of the Afghan government.

Fifthly, in looking at the whole region, it is noteworthy that Germany started pursuing a regional strategy about a year ago, even earlier than the United States. Again, however, this has been kept under wraps. A more public policy needs to be put into place, perhaps one with a face (as the Americans have with Richard Holbrooke) specifically concerning Pakistan. Berlin has privately encouraged Islamabad to go after the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda more vigorously. It should be made publicly clear that Germany—and other states—do indeed pursue this policy, and that it is not only the United States that is faced with increased anti-American feelings in Pakistan. It is important for the people in Pakistan to see that demands for stricter policy concerning extremists are not coming from America only, but that the whole of the developed world expects Pakistan to behave in that way.

I see a great danger in a new Afghanistan conference as proposed by Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as it could be misused to set a timetable or a fixed date for the withdrawal of foreign troops. This would be extremely dangerous—for Afghanistan and the region as a whole—and would represent a great victory for the Taliban and other extremists. Instead, a new conference should concentrate on how the international community can increase the effectiveness of the Afghan government, especially the army and the police, and on how it can create better regional ties. I don’t think a date for withdrawal can be set now. It would be extremely dangerous and have terrible consequences right now when the situation is so critical.

Assuring Peace

rachel tausendfreund — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 14:07:00 +0000

Three former High Representatives to Bosnia and Herzegovina have issued the following statement in light of the negotiations at Butmir in Sarajevo. They argue that the destructive use of the original Dayton accord is blocking the peace process. The country must follow the recommendations of the Council of Europe and its Venice Commission in order to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into a fully fledged European democracy.

We welcome that the European Union and the wider international community are again paying serious attention to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ad hoc talks at Butmir evoked both our concerns and hopes. On the one hand, they present a real possibility to address the current political stalemate in the country and to realize a European future for Bosnia and Herzegovina. All negotiating partners have both the opportunity and the duty to support the creation of viable arrangements that further stabilize the region and enable a sustainable, functional system of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the other hand, the way in which the Butmir initiative has been prepared has imperiled the international community’s and the future European Union Special Representative’s authority and integrity. It is imperative to integrate the High Representative into the process to allow for a proper and dignified conclusion of the peace implementation process and the opening of a new chapter. Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be supported by the international community if we ourselves work in a serene, inclusive, non-antagonistic, and transparent manner in good faith and based on objective criteria. The following points are in our view of special relevance at this juncture:

1. For the reform process to succeed in stabilizing state institutions, strengthening democracy and the rule of law, and enabling and accelerating European integration, it is indispensable that the presidency, the governments, and the parliaments—including the opposition parties—are integrated as full partners. Talks this week must pave the way for a sustainable constitutional reform process anchored in the institutions and civil society of Bosnia and Herzegovina and supported by the European Union and the Council of Europe. In close cooperation with the United States, Europe should provide financial, structural and organizational support to facilitate a final, effective reform process.

2. We are convinced that there will only be a stable future for Bosnia and Hercegovina in peace and prosperity if a balance is found between the democratic principle of majority rule and the consideration of the interests of the three constituent peoples—as well as others and minorities. Blocking mechanisms that have been manifested through a destructive use of the original Dayton constitutional decision-making, have to be modified by implementing the recommendations of the Council of Europe and its Venice Commission in order to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into a fully fledged European democracy whose constitution meets all requirements of the European Convention of Human Rights. If no new formula is found to replace entity voting, these blocking mechanisms and discriminatory provisions in the constitution will continue to harm the life of all citizens and endanger Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European future. It may not be necessary to tackle this vital issue at these talks, which comprise the first step on a long process toward Europe. It is essential, however, that all parties are in no doubt that, before the end of the process on which they are currently embarked is reached, the abolition of entity voting in its present form will be required for BiH to fulfill the conditons necessary for a European state.

3. We wish, hope and believe that this week’s talks do not fail. However, it is prudent that we should consider what would happen if they do. The Peace Implementation Council must maintain reserve power to internationally guarantee Bosnia and Herzegovina’s peace and stability as well, after the closure of the Office of the High Representative. This is what happened in Germany after the Second World War when the Allied Control Council kept ultimate sovereignty rights until Germany’s unification in 1990. The reserve power is the ultima ratio in extremis if the peace, stability and territorial integrity of the state were endangered. The existence of such reserve power is no impediment for further EU integration and NATO membership as the German post-war history has shown. To the contrary, it will be an umbrella under which these processes can develop and a real commitment by the international community to the country.

4. At the beginning of October 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina applied officially for NATO’s Membership Action Plan. The countries of the Steering Committee of the Peace Implementation Council (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom) together with the other EU member states that belong to NATO, are the ones who will be able to decide right now on a clear schedule for the NATO membership by 2011. Already today Bosnia and Herzegovina contributes to NATO operations world-wide. The country’s integration into the alliance is a concrete security guarantee and partnership. In addition to the NATO-memberstates Albania and Croatia, the regional security network has soon to be consolidated by Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Therefore the US-initiative of Senators John Kerry and Richard Lugar deserve adequate support (NATO-Western-Balkans-Support Act, August 2009).

5. The member states of the European Union should authorize the European Commission to immediately abolish the visa-obligation for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided the conditions of the visa liberalization road map are met. Bosnia and Herzegovina have undertaken great efforts in this respect, thanks to clear benchmarks. The EU has both the right and obligation to be strict but today it needs to show that it is fair and not treating Bosnia and Herzegovina differently than her neighbors. Visa free travel is crucial for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to experience Europe in a positive way, and should not be used as a lever in the Butmir talks. Allowing the freedom of travel to be connected to other political issues in these negotiations seriously damages the credibility of the European Commission and of EU member states.

Still Searching for Answers

rachel tausendfreund — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 13:17:01 +0000

On October 1, 2009 the former presidents of the Czech Republic and Germany sat down to discuss “20 years of freedom.” The two former leaders look back on the peaceful revolutions in the East bloc and forward to the future of their countries and the common project Europe.

President Havel, when you think back 20 years to Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution, what comes to mind?

Havel: I’m still amazed by it today, all of it. I was the last one to believe that my becoming president wasn’t some kind of a joke. From the first moment of my presidency I considered Richard von Weizsäcker a mentor. He is a bit older, and wiser, and more experienced—he helped me a number of times. Do you remember Salzburg in 1990?

von Weizsäcker: Yes! Vaclav Havel had agreed to hold the opening speech for the Salzburger Festspiele in early 1990 and we traveled there together. He spoke about Sisyphus who rolls a giant stone up a mountain every day, only to find the next morning that the stone is once again at the bottom and he must start anew. Every day he rolls this stone up the mountain. One morning, the stone remains at the summit. What to do now? So it was, Mr. Havel said, for him. Every day they fought for freedom, and every new day freedom wasn’t there. The dictatorship remained in power. And one morning suddenly there was freedom. But now we must learn to live with this freedom, he said. How do we handle this responsibility? And this responsibility remained his focus, for himself, his country, and for all of us.

President Havel, this stone has now been at the summit for twenty years. Looking at the world today and at the domestic politics in your country today, I can’t imagine you are anything but disappointed, disillusioned, and frustrated. Am I right?

Havel: Yes, the destiny of Sisyphus is ours again.

In a recent interview you said that the most important goal of the revolution, basic freedom for the people, has been achieved. But you added that there were birth pains, and you emphasized business. Are you disappointed looking back that much has turned out differently from how you envisioned it?

Havel: Yes, of course. Everything was more complicated and slower than we thought it would be. I’m not obsessive or fanatic; I’m a skeptic and a realist. But I never imagined how many obstacles we would have to overcome, and how long everything would take. For example, privatization: There was no precedent for that kind of transfer of ownership; everything was owned by the state and, within a very short time, everything had to be privatized. We had a puzzle before us, something that’s easy to take apart but putting it back together in a new form is extremely complicated. And so it was with the economy. We didn’t realize how enticing it would be for mafia and other shady characters to take advantage of the situation. And they weren’t the only ones who took advantage. But history would be boring if everything went smoothly.

But what was the main problem? Was it that the tradition of the private sector had been dismantled? Or was it the lack of the rule of law and institutions? Or could it be that the necessary moral foundations weren’t there, or had been broken?

Havel: It’s all connected. On the one hand a legal framework had to be created, and that took time. But it’s also true that a legal order can only function if there is a moral order. A person without morals can find loopholes in the best legal system. But I have the impression it’s still not widely recognized that a moral code is a precondition for legal order which, in turn, must exist in order for freedom to develop—freedom in all areas, from culture to business.

President Weizsäcker, you have stressed time and time again that it was the people of East Germany who brought about the fall of the Wall, not the politicians and not organized political powers. Would you say that the former GDR citizens today are not proud enough of what they did, and that we also don’t recognize it enough?

von Weizsäcker: Well, I would say even in the west of the country people are clear that the fall of the Wall was brought about by the people of the GDR, that they were the ones that weakened the system—and not first on November 9, 1989, but in the months before.

The Euro-skeptics might be a minority in the Czech Republic, but they are there. Very recently, the British opposition leader David Cameron wrote to the Czech president Vaclav Klaus to ask him to delay ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, if possible until after the next House of Commons elections in the UK. Is the idea of an integrated Europe threatened by your successor?

Havel: Well, it’s not something I like to talk about, but I have to. The Czech Republic legitimately agreed to and signed the Lisbon Treaty, and both of our federal legislative bodies ratified it. In my opinion, the ratification process has been completed and the president’s signature is simply an affirmation that everything was done regularly and legally. So I think President Klaus will sign it. And, even if he doesn’t sign, I think the constitutional court will decide that the treaty is valid.
von Weizsäcker: And who knows, maybe President Klaus will set an example for the conservatives in England...

I’d like to switch topics, to the remains of dictatorship. In Germany we have an agency that processes the Stasi files. It’s opened a lot of wounds, but also helped toward reconciliation. But we repeatedly hear calls to finally quit digging up the past. In the Czech Republic a similar agency was formed last year, the Zatschek Agency. Why so late? What were your thoughts about how these matters should be handled?

Havel: From the very beginning, there was a lot of uncertainty. We didn’t know how to handle it, and nowhere was it handled well. Maybe Germany dealt with it the best, relatively. I think the young generation is the first that might be able to learn to handle this history. I don’t think that things should be kept secret, but specific topics need to be seen as a whole, with all the historical connections and not taken out of context. I always say, the communists existed for the first time in history. Thus no one had any experience dealing with it. Post-communism then was also a first in history, and for the same reasons we didn’t have enough experience. It’s been 20 years, but we’re still searching for answers.

At the time it seemed reasonable to think that the communist party was so discredited that it wouldn’t pose any problems in the future. But it is still around as a political force.

Havel: I have some understanding for those who vote for the communists, even if I don’t like it. Imagine elderly people who lived their whole lives under communism; everything from their first loves to first jobs happened in the system. The nice memories stay, but those of bad experiences fade away. Then these people are suddenly told that the entire world in which they lived was absurd. It’s very difficult for them; they grew up knowing they would be taken care of from birth to death. And suddenly they are forced to make decisions, and they’re not used to it. With the older generation I can understand it. As for the young voters, they see themselves as a kind of opposition to the establishment— the easiest way to express this opposition is to reach for this prepackaged ideology.
We are sometimes accused of having treated the communists too nicely, that we didn’t finish them off right after the revolution. That’s easy to say now, but at the time the communists still controlled the army, the police, the media, and the economy. And we had suddenly assumed great responsibility and had to choose our moves carefully. We had to also consider the worst possible response from these political forces. Thank God it happened like it did. But I would say there was no general consensus at the time to ban the party. Some called for it, but they were a minority. Millions had been connected with the communist party and they were afraid it could be used against them; the society wasn’t ready for it. It is not that Havel prevented a reckoning with the communists; I wasn’t such a powerful dictator as to be able to decide something like that. And I didn’t want to. The public most likely just didn’t want it. And I believed that we had to give the party a chance to transform itself into a socialist party, as it did in Poland. But it didn’t happen. The party didn’t change and now it’s an enormous burden on the entire political system.

President von Weizsäcker, listening to President Havel’s analysis of the young communist party voters, would you say that this applies to Germany’s Left Party supporters?

von Weizsäcker: You really can’t compare the two. On the one hand, the Left Party is a mishmash of people connected with the old East German communist party, the SED. But it’s also undeniable that throughout the history of Germany’s oldest party, the Social Democrats, there were always problems on its left wing. It’s not surprising and it’s understandable. Coming to terms with its left fringes, or sometimes not coming to terms with them, led to splinter groups in the direction of a communist party, already in the Whilhelmine monarchy and again in the Weimar Republic. Think about the first debates Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in West Germany had to participate in. His main interlocutor was head of the communist party. This problem with left splinter groups has always been there for the center-left party and now its joined with some remains from the SED time. But we can’t really draw such close parallels from country to country.

I’d like to talk about German-Czech relations. In 1989 there were some concerns about German reunification, even from the allies of West Germany such as France and Great Britain. And there was certainly some fear about it in the eastern neighbors Poland and Czechoslovakia. President Havel, how do the Czechs see Germans today? Are there still fears or reservations, or is that a thing of the past?

Havel: During the Cold War, the opinion in our opposition circles was that a united Europe without a united Germany was unimaginable. This idea was already around in the 1980s and many of our German friends didn’t agree with it. But in the end what we argued was confirmed: that reunification was necessary and an important prerequisite for consolidation throughout Europe. And as for now, I think that there was probably no time in history when relations between our countries were better than now. I don’t think the relationship is in any way negative at the moment, or that there are worries or fears on the Czech side.

At the time, you made a grand gesture toward Germany. One of your first acts in office, I think after three or four days, was to travel to Munich. And at the beginning of your presidency you apologized for the displacement of Germans. But you received a relatively cool reaction from the German federal government at the time. Were you disappointed?

Havel: Yes, especially regarding this trip: in fact on the Friday after I became president I traveled to Germany, but to two countries. First to East Germany, where I met with the Round Table participants and then to Munich, where we met with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. With this itinerary I also wanted to symbolize the idea that a united Europe wasn’t possible without a united Germany. At the same time I wanted to demonstrate that we were at the time an independent and free country with Germany as our biggest neighbor. But it’s not exactly right that I apologized for the displacement, I repeatedly said that we should somehow apologize. I said that we needed to critically examine the subject, which also happened.

Our topic tonight is 20 years of freedom. Has it also been 20 years of German-Czech friendship?

von Weizsäcker: Considering our history, the current neighborly relations and cooperation are fantastic. Naturally we have some economic conflicts and challenges regarding progress and profile for the European Union or arranging, together with the United States, cooperation between eastern and western countries in Europe. Vaclav Havel also spoke to President Obama when he was in Prague to deliver a very important speech earlier this year. Prague is reclaiming its place in history as one of Europe’s central cities.

A question then for Prague: What role would the Czech Republic like to play in the future of this united Europe?

Havel: I can’t speak for the Czech Republic, only for myself. I think that our country should reflect it’s sensitive position within Europe. It is a central position and it should be filled with life, inspiration, and concrete actions. The politics of our country shouldn’t be petty or narrow-minded, too careful or too nationally egocentric.
I can remember that long ago—end of the 80s, beginning of the 90s—my presidency teacher, Richard von Weizsäcker told me something about civil society. He said, “when civil society weakens so do political parties and when civil society is developed and alive, parties thrive.” I’ve thought about this sentence many times. I think of civil society as a kind of free structuring of society from the ground up. In the Czech Republic at the moment there is political crisis. But I am not worried because I see that civil society is truly free and developed to the point that it has room to breathe. It can’t be taken by surprise.

Considering the good relations between Germany and the Czech Republic, what can Germany do to be a kind of mentor for the Czech Republic in the European Union? There used to be a great German cultural tradition in Prague. I’m thinking of Franz Kafka or Egon Erwin Kisch. The Czech Republic’s last great German-speaking author Lenka Reinarova died this year. Is there still something there to cultivate, or have the roots been destroyed for good?

von Weizsäcker: No, I think especially the cultural connections between Prague and Germany are among the most interesting and fruitful in history. As a result, the connections are also among the liveliest now and will stay so in the future. Culture is often handled like a side topic, but culture is essentially the tenet of human coexistence.
The impact of cultural thinking on the drive behind political action is personified by Vaclav Havel. That culture can be politically important and can be mobilized, President Havel always understood that. And that is why Prague and the name Vaclav Havel remain absolutely central for us.

*The podium discussion "20 Years of Freedom - 1989-2009" with Vaclav Havel and Richard von Weizäcker was organized by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the Robert Bosch Foundation, and the embassy of the Czech Republic. Matthias Nass of Die Zeit and Peter Lange of DeutschlandRadio Kultur moderated the discussion.

Guido Westerwelle's Foreign Policy

rachel tausendfreund — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 10:24:00 +0000

The coalition talks between Germany's Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats have been concluded. FDP leader Guido Westerwelle is designed to become Germany’s foreign minister. IP asked Westerwelle for his response to the most pressing issues of German foreign policy, from the European Union and transatlantic relations to Iran and the Afghanistan mission.

IP: Europe
With the decision handed down by Germany’s Constitutional Court, what are the prospects for the European project if the role of national parliaments is to be strengthened? Can Germany continue to function as a motor of integration? And is the issue now one of expanding or of deepening the Union?

Westerwelle: Expanding and deepening the European Union are not contradictory objectives. However, the most pressing issue at the moment is to ensure that the European Union is able to continue fulfilling its vital function. The Lisbon Treaty is a milestone in this respect and an important prerequisite for the success of all subsequent steps towards integration.

The German Constitutional Court’s ruling on Lisbon emphasizes that in transferring sovereign rights, a particular responsibility for integration falls to the legislature. The Lisbon Treaty provides for the transfer of sovereign rights by nation states to the Union, in many cases without requiring formal ratification. The court’s ruling makes it very clear that this is not possible without the parliament’s agreement. The necessary democratic legitimation needs to come from the citizens, not governments.

At the same time, it is vital that Germany retains its capacity to act at an international and a European level. The Constitutional Court has also taken this into account by emphasizing the compatibility of European law and the German constitution. Germany’s role as a motor of integration is not called into question by this ruling. Germany is part of a federation of states whose historical success is based on a capacity for compromise and the renunciation of national unilateralism. Equally important is the fact that only those with a degree of flexibility can hope to exert a significant influence on policy at the EU level.

IP: The Transatlantic Relationship
Junior partner or equal partner? What has Europe got to offer the United States, and can it deliver?

Westerwelle: For many people the United States has always represented freedom, prosperity, and justice. For this reason many Germans looked to it during the difficult era of the Cold War and afterward—including Germans on the other side of the Iron Curtain, where the U.S. always exerted an enormous appeal. Over the last eight years this image has been fractured by the many external and internal policy mistakes of the previous U.S. administration. By electing Barack Obama as their president, Americans have emphatically illustrated their capacity for political change. It is important to bear in mind that what distinguishes Obama from his predecessor is more the means than the ends—dialogue rather than isolation, integration rather than containment, cooperation rather than unilateralism, the power of law rather than the law of the powerful.

A glance at the international political issues we are facing—Afghanistan, Iran, proliferation, free trade instead of protectionism, climate change, HIV/AIDS, and many others—makes it clear that there are no two regions in the world that share more values and interests with one another than Europe and the United States. Experience has shown that neither partner can solve these problems alone. For this reason it is in all our interests that the nations of the West stand together when facing the challenges of the 21st century. We want and need a close alliance with United States.

The role of Germany and Europe in relation to the United States has unarguably undergone a fundamental change over the last twenty years. As a “frontline state” in the Cold War, Germany’s role in U.S. foreign policy was very different from today. My party regards the current German government’s failure to seize the opportunity to influence American foreign-policy reorientation in the wake of the presidential election as an enormous failure of judgment. The German government wasted its chance to present its own ideas and proposals and thus to influence the reorientation of U.S. geostrategy. One reason was that the enthusiasm for Barack Obama in Germany was nowhere less evident than in the German government.

IP: Germany in Afghanistan
Exit strategy or commitment to engagement?

Westerwelle: We want to end every German military deployment as quickly as is realistically possible. However, it is important not to create the impression that “exit strategy” and “commitment to engagement” are somehow alternatives that lead to the same goal. Withdrawing from Afghanistan now would mean again abandoning the country to radical Islamists who first terrorize their own people and then extend their terrorism to the world at large. The images of public executions and the destruction of religious sites by the Taliban remain in my mind as clearly as the images of 9/11. These things cannot be allowed to happen again. At the same time it is very clear that outside actors cannot guarantee that such acts of terror will not occur. Consequently, we need to ensure as quickly as possible that the Afghans are able to provide security within their own country so that development in other areas can move forward. Then we will have reached the point where we can start a staged withdrawal of the international military presence. In the case of police training, the German government has been far too slow in meeting its own, self-imposed obligations. A precipitous withdrawal will only result in Kabul once again becoming the capital of world terrorism. Our engagement in Afghanistan is not based on altruism. We are there to protect our own security interests.

IP: Difficult States
How can Iran be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons? And what is our plan B: How should we deal with a nuclear-armed Iran? Lastly, how can Germany and Europe contribute to a peaceful solution in the Middle East?

Westerwelle: The dispute with the Iranian government over its nuclear program is one key aspect of the Iran situation. The other key aspect is the series of demonstrations in the wake of Iran’s presidential election. It is extraordinary to see so many, above all young people, in Iran engaging in the struggle for the rule of law and democracy. In Iran we are seeing a generation of extremely well-educated and Western-oriented people take a stand. They see the opportunities the world has to offer them obstructed by the current regime and its policies. These are people who want to take advantage of globalization’s possibilities. They rightfully regard enemy stereotypes, conflicts, and self-isolation as restricting their freedom to structure their lives as they wish. Repressive measures cannot easily cap the spirit with which these people are struggling for a better future.

Finding a solution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program is proving so difficult for the parties involved in part because their relationship with one another is so complex. One of the keys to finding a solution lies without doubt in the relationship between Iran and the United States. In his Cairo speech, President Obama confirmed a change in policy and took an initial, courageous step. In expressing his admiration for Iranian culture and offering direct negotiations, he unambiguously differentiated his approach from his predecessor’s policies of containment and escalation. Obama has proved his capacity for de-escalation without at the same time appearing naïve. This approach is correct because it prevents the hard-liners in Teheran from being able to present the West as a provocateur, which is exactly what are they are trying to do in the face of the internal political pressures they face. Another obvious key element that can contribute to the diffusion of the nuclear dispute is the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that is, a consistent policy of disarmament and arms control. Two fundamental elements of the NPT are the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and the guaranteed right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The more seriously the existing nuclear powers take their obligation to help create a world free of nuclear weapons, the greater credence they will have in the eyes of states like Iran, who find the prospect of possessing a nuclear arsenal extremely tempting. As regards the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, we need creative approaches that can balance the energy needs of one country with the legitimate security interests of all the others. The idea of a multilateral organization of the nuclear fuel cycle is an approach that may be helpful. And, as is the case of all questions regarding disarmament and arms control, the issue of how such schemes are to be monitored is, of course, crucial.

Regarding the Middle East conflict, the FDP has long been proposing a regional approach modeled on the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process. Experience has shown that it makes little sense to approach the different conflicts in the region separately because they are simply too interconnected. We therefore need to try to integrate all relevant parties into a framework of negotiation that avoids the kind of highly charged situations that repeatedly develop between different stakeholders. My own party’s view is that ensuring Israel can exist in peace and within secure borders is a goal that Germany will always remain obligated to, but that this cannot be separated from the need for an independent, viable Palestinian state.

Germany is in a position to contribute to the resolution the Middle East conflict because we not only enjoy a close friendship with Israel but also have a good reputation in large parts of the Arab world. Furthermore, the fact that we have convincingly overcome the obstacles created by the Cold War proves our ability to diffuse and ultimately overcome even the most entrenched political antagonism. We now need to apply our experience and skills to the resolution of the Middle-East conflict.

At the same time, it would be a great over-estimation to imagine that Germany and Europe alone might somehow be able to find a solution that has eluded the region for decades. The United States, Russia, and the United Nations all need to play a major role if a viable and peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East is to be found. It is also for this reason that I wholeheartedly support President Obama’s early and intensive engagement with the Middle East and the fact that he has urged all parties to provide clear signals of their readiness to embrace peace and compromise.

IP: New World Order
There are a range of catch phrases and issues: “effective multilateralism” or “networked security,” reform of the UN, WTO and IMF, expansion of the G-8 to the G-20: How should German foreign policy handle the rise of emerging powers?

Westerwelle: Emerging powers like India, China, and Brazil have long ceased to be developing countries, and are now playing a decisive role in world politics. And their influence on world affairs will only increase in the future. The role such countries play in global security, energy, climate change, health care, and food production is now central to any policy addressing these fields. In effect this constitutes an enormous challenge for the West because we must cooperate more closely with states that do not necessarily share our values and in fact may actually violate them. On the one hand, we therefore have a strong interest in strengthening the United Nations and thus the rule of law in international relations. On the other hand, we need to call on emerging powers to assume a greater degree of responsibility in return for greater influence on international policy.

With regard to Afghanistan, for instance, China, Russia, and India are three large states that have just as little interest in seeing the return of the Taliban regime as we do in the West. However, the contributions of these countries to the stabilization of Afghanistan are comparatively modest at present. In my opinion, more engagement beyond the mere level of military involvement is needed and is also possible. On another level, the same could be said in relation to North Korea and even Iran.

Moreover, I do not believe we need to be reticent when it comes to asserting values such as universal human rights when confronted with their violation by emerging powers. In our opinion, the principle of non-interference ceases to apply when universal human rights are being systematically violated.

The G-20 and the Doha Development Round illustrate the workings of a globalized world based on participation and cooperation. The reconciliation of interests functions best in multilateral organizations.

IP: Your priorities for German foreign policy?

Westerwelle: We Liberals want to see Germany taking a lead again in a consistent policy of disarmament and arms control. Such a policy creates greater security and increased trust. The trend we have seen in recent years—increasing mistrust and, as a consequence, the danger of a new arms build-up—needs to be reversed by home-grown initiatives. We consider it an enormous failure on Germany’s part to have remained so passive on the subject of disarmament and arms control, although our country enjoys a high degree of credibility in this area. Disarmament and arms control were key elements of rapprochement during the Cold War, and indeed in ending it. Germany has convincingly proved that enduring peace, freedom, and prosperity can be achieved without possessing weapons of mass destruction. This experience can provide a fruitful model. We Germans have no interest in seeing a new arms race on the European continent or in regions on our borders such as the Middle East. Moreover, we increasingly face the danger of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction or the knowledge and technology required to build them. The greater the arms build-up at a state level, the more this danger increases. We therefore need to take decisive steps in the area of nuclear and conventional disarmament. We thoroughly endorse President Obama’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. Germany could set an example by working within NATO toward the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons still stationed on our soil.

In relation to our neighbors, it is time we started looking eastward and extending the process of reconciliation and the development of close alliances that has been so successful to the west. I would like to see the same deep friendship between Germans and Poles as has now been established between Germans and the French. Germany and others have paid far too little attention to bilateral relationships within the European Union recently. It is clear that increasing the internal cohesion of the European Union ultimately augments our capacity for action in the international arena. Internal European cohesion is based on the principle of equality of all members of the Union. The formation of alliances and “directorates” within the Union contradicts this principle and is therefore a mistake. German foreign and European policy was so successful in the 80s and 90s because we took the interests of smaller states seriously and considered them when formulating our own policies. We have to find our way back to this kind of approach. It is a scandal that the government’s policy toward smaller European countries is so conspicuously marked by derogatory statements from our finance minister.

1989

rachel tausendfreund — Tue, 20 Oct 2009 22:00:00 +0000

Across our region, there has never been a better run than the last 20 years. But today, Europe faces a trial. Freedom is threatened by a cynicism that undermines the liberal value system. In the same spirit, the temptations of authoritarianism are seductive. The task before us is nothing less than the defense of the republic.

Why did what happened 20 years ago happen? The most banal answer to this question is that communism proved economically ineffective. But there are still communist countries today, despite their systems’ inefficiencies: Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and China. Therefore, we cannot be satisfied with a purely economic answer to this question.

The year 1989 was a year of miracles, an annus mirabilis. Yet the explanations about the causes of communism’s demise differ. Americans answer that it was the result of U.S. policies. A Democrat would say it was the human rights policies put in place by Jimmy Carter, namely “détente with a human face.” A Republican would credit Ronald Reagan’s policies, which initiated an arms race that the Soviet economy could not match.

In the Vatican, meanwhile, one hears that the fall of communism was mainly due to John Paul II and his actions, which deprived the system of its legitimacy, especially in Poland. If you live in Kabul, you are told that communism collapsed because of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resistance of the Afghans, which placed the Soviet empire in a hopeless situation. In Berlin, it is said that the fall of communism was the result of a prudent Ostpolitik, which led the Soviet Union to talk about things it never wanted to talk about. In Moscow, anyone will tell you that it was a result of Gorbachev’s perestroika, and in Warsaw that it was because of the independent trade union Solidarity and its leader Lech Walesa.

In short, there is more than one answer to this question. A complicated bundle of facts made the political elite in the Soviet Union aware that a degree of democratic modernization was unavoidable, and that socialism would not survive otherwise. I am convinced that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to modernize socialism but not destroy the U.S.S.R. Yet communism turned out to be like the joke about the Jewish shoemaker’s trousers. When his wife tells him he should get his trousers cleaned, he energetically resists. His wife wants to know why, and complains that they are getting dirtier and dirtier. Finally Mordecai answers, “Yes, they are getting dirtier, but if I get them cleaned, they’ll fall apart entirely!”

That is what happened with the Soviet Union. Communism fell, paradoxically, because the Soviet elite believed it could be reformed. In fact, those who did not want to change anything, the hardliners, were right. We do not know how long communism will continue in China, Cuba, or North Korea. Seen in historical perspective, it is condemned to death. But it could still last a few generations. Thus 1989 was a sign that something was ending, but no one had any idea how it would end or when.

Four Perspectives

When I look back, I have four perspectives: a Polish one, because I am a Pole; a Russian one, because the cards were really shuffled there; a Central European one, because the fall of communism was not a purely Polish phenomenon; and finally, the perspective of the West.

The West was not at all prepared for what happened. I do not mean only Western Europe, but also the United States. I remember my talks at the time with many important U.S. politicians who came to Warsaw. They were absolutely unprepared for what happened. They did not assume that the communist dictatorship would shatter; they could not diagnose what was happening in the Soviet Union, and—not unlike us in Poland, by the way—they had no idea at all that the Soviet Union could collapse entirely. The decisive factor was Russia. The perestroika reforms set new forces free, and they triggered further processes that developed a new dynamic. For a long time, neither the ruling communist elite nor the opposition in Central Europe understood what was actually underway in Russia.

In 1989, it was not at all clear that Gorbachev would be in a position to accept the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and talks on the unification of Germany in order to save communism in the Soviet Union. That was all but clear at the time. It is no accident that in 1990, George Bush was still trying to convince the Ukrainians not to seek independence.

The year 1989 is an extraordinarily important one. At its start just two states, Poland and Hungary, were trying to take their own path. But this changed like a kaleidoscope. What was not possible in January became reality in February, and in March one could demand even more.

At the beginning of April 1989 I was in Italy. Catholic priest and newspaper editor Adam Boniecki was generous enough to take me with him to see the Pope. This was after the Soviet elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies. The vote was not entirely democratic, but for the first time candidates ran who did not belong to the party. Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Sobchak, and Oleg Bogomolov became members of parliament. Among the losers, for the first time since 1917, were the apparatchiks. The Pope listened to me with enormous attention. For him it was a completely new situation. Poland had not yet had elections, but I explained that judging by events in the Soviet Union things really were changing and we had to think in a new direction.

Among the governing elites, Hungary’s went the furthest. The change in the party began in Hungary. Imre Pozsgay, the leader of the liberal nationalist wing, was one of those responsible for the “thaw” in the public media. He also encouraged an accommodation with the “nationalist” wing of the opposition. He was the first to dispute Hungarian leader Janos Kadar’s interpretation of the 1956 uprising as counterrevolution.

The Hungarian opposition was weaker than the Polish, and from the beginning it was divided into two currents, nationalist and liberal. The national current called for an agreement with Pozsgay in order to restore Hungary’s national identity, which had been trodden upon by the communist dictatorship. The second current was based on liberal values, called for authentic democracy, and opposed a compromise with the nomenklatura. One might say that the “nationalists” intended to reconstruct historic currents, while Hungarian democrats like Janos Kis and Tamas Bauer wanted a European future for their country.

Poland went furthest, as the government’s Round Table negotiations with Solidarity broke through the iron logic of the communist regime and opened it up to ideas that had not been heard since August 1980, when it was at its height. At the time, I thought: assuming the counterreformation is not a rejection of the reformation, but the adoption of some of its motives in order to modernize and adapt the church to new challenges, then Solidarity was a reformation within communism and Gorbachev is the counterreformation. Later, in our discussions it became clear that Gorbachev knew little about Solidarity, but it seems to me that this metaphor is historically justified.

When I think about Poland’s Round Table and how it became a blueprint for other countries, several factors are striking. First of all, it was a major revolution without a revolution. No one took to the streets, there were no barricades, and no executions. Everyone remembered the barricades of 1980 and the martial law that followed all too well. None of us had a sense of what was happening. As Poland’s future president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, would say many years later, it is unclear how things would have developed if both sides in Poland had realized that their decisions would lead to German unification.

Nevertheless, in the opposition we were aware that a united Germany was only natural. Maybe this was not openly discussed, but that is what we thought. For me it was obvious that under normal conditions of democratic competition, it would not be possible to maintain the division of Germany. East Germany was a barrack-state that would not exist without the Red Army. The East German opposition thought differently. It had the most left-leaning opposition of all the East bloc countries. It sought the democratization of East Germany. The autumn demonstrations in East Germany began with the slogan “We are the people” before the slogan “We are one people” emerged.

I want to reconstruct my thinking at the time. In Poland, the idea behind the Round Table was to bring about a kind of Finlandization of Poland. We knew we could not win a war against Russia, which is why we had to work with what came to us from Russia. Thus perestroika was our natural ally. In 1988, I wrote an article called “The Fight Over Stalinism,” which I sent to the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny. The censor spiked it, although the quote that he liked least came from a Soviet newspaper. The Polish censor edited out the word “Stalinism.” This shows the delay and the resistance with which perestroika came to us. At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet press was much more liberal and free than Polish newspapers. Ultimately the censor did let the article through. It was my first article since 1966 published officially under my own name. That, too, was a sign of change.

A second factor, paradoxically, was the intra-German dialogue that intensified at the end of the 1980s. In one text I asked Poland’s leader General Jaruzelski why inner-Polish dialogue was not possible, if there was a dialogue between Erich Honecker and Helmut Kohl. After some ten years, it seemed that the project of modernization through martial law essentially meant the “Chinese model,” except that our dictatorship was not as strong as China’s. The rulers reached the conclusion that they had to try something new, since Poland with its heavy debt could not go on under its own power.

In the ruling faction in Poland there was a long quarrel over how to assess the Round Table. The strikes in May and August 1988 led to the government’s replacement. The new prime minister was Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, the longtime chief editor of the weekly Polityka, an organ of the communist party, but known for its openness.

Rakowski had been deputy prime minister under Wojciech Jaruzelski, but had to resign in the mid-1980s under pressure from the Kremlin. Rakowski was a reformer even though his personal ideas about reform differed from ours. He wanted to bring about a radical improvement in the standard of living through intelligent economic decisions, and thus achieve broad support for his policies. This would marginalize Solidarity’s opposition, he surmised.

This idea was unsuccessful, and the ruling faction saw it was necessary to negotiate with the opposition. A crucial factor was a televised debate between Lech Walesa and the chairman of the pro-government union. That evening, all of Poland sat in front of the television. It was the moment of truth: Walesa knocked his opponent out—Poland boiled over with excitement. The road to the Round Table was clear.

Ambivalence of Freedom

Communism systematized the world—even for those in the West. It conveyed to them that the essence of the world was the conflict between democracy and totalitarianism. The end of communism revealed some processes of which we had not been entirely aware. First of all, the struggle against communism meant deep faith in the purpose of human freedom. But the end of communism revealed to us the deep human need to live in a secure, predictable world. Despite its primitive relationship to democratic values, communism constantly told people: there is no unemployment, you are safe. It is a typical prisoners’ syndrome. Anyone who has been in prison knows that freedom is a prisoner’s only dream. Ultimately the prisoner is released, the world is beautiful, colorful, the birds are singing, the grass is green, people are sitting in cafes, the former prisoner walks the streets, he has space.

But after a time he realizes that he is not secure. As long as he was in prison, he knew at what hour he could eat, when he would be taken to the bathroom, that the barber would come to trim his hair, and above all, that he had somewhere to sleep. And now he is suddenly wandering through the city and does not know what will happen. He begins to miss what was—the prison. We felt something like this for a few years after the fall of communism. For the dissidents, this seems incomprehensible, but that is how it was. In prison everything had its place, and suddenly chaos prevailed.

It was similar for the whole world. The end of communism triggered unexpected and ambivalent processes. Communism undermined national and religious traditions. The end of communism therefore meant the right to return to these traditions. But at the same time, these traditions are not necessarily synonymous with freedom. In today’s Russia, the Orthodox Church is not a factor that strengthens democracy; it is subordinate to the state. In Poland, no responsible person can deny some anti-democratic forces in our church—because they exist. They do not dominate, but their active presence can be seen with the naked eye.

It was the working class who toppled communism in Poland. But it was also the first victim of the transformation. Let us imagine a large industrial enterprise that was able to convince those in power to make concessions through strikes. This company produced desk-size busts of Lenin. The workers were good workers. They did not stop being good workers in 1989. But today no one needs busts of Lenin. The market destroyed this company. The workers, who helped bring freedom through strikes, were the first to fall victim to this freedom. That is the first paradox of democracy in Poland.

The second paradox comes from the fact that the largest firms, like the Danzig shipyards, were Solidarity’s strongholds. The new government did not want to treat these people unfairly, for after all, they had brought them to power. But because these firms did not reform, they went bankrupt.

The third paradox is that the political culture that the system taught these people rested on the party’s leading role. Thus it was an obvious plan to give Solidarity a leading role and place it in a position where it could decide who became a voivode or a director, or who would find employment in a bank, in the secret service, or in the army. In this way, the democratic system quite obviously lost legitimacy. New types of conflicts appeared. All historical utopias paint a world free of structural conflicts. For the opposition in communist countries, this utopia was, almost everywhere, the utopia of the rule of the people. It was based on the construction of a new communism, but without communists. Pipe dreams prevailed in each of the communist countries of a third way between communism and capitalism. Generally, the search for this third way ended with the realization that this way led to the Third World, and it was best to put it aside. Such pipe dreams were found among both the left and the right, among those referring to conservative, religious, nationalist values, as well as those who based their ideas on plebeian, leftist traditions and ideas of popular rule.

No opposition member would have said before 1989 that we should strive for capitalism. No one demanded privatization, no one thought of it. And yet it turned out that this is absolutely necessary. That is why Francis Fukuyama thought and wrote that we had reached the end of history. Fukuyama meant a situation in which no one could realistically imagine a better political project than the market economy, parliamentary democracy, and unrestricted respect for human rights. Fukuyama could not imagine this, and I think he is right. But for millions of people, this system was not the best at all. In addition, Fukuyama held an illusion that was just as naïve as others’ belief in a system based on a government of workers’ councils.

To this day, books are published that contest the meaning of the transformation. Their authors believe that people are furious that nothing succeeded; that the last 20 years have been nothing but an accumulation of disaster and mistakes. It is true that not everything was perfect, but I have exactly the opposite view. Many bad things happened, but I have the feeling that, with the exception of the Balkans and Russia, the post-communist countries have not had such a good 20 years in their modern history; or in Poland’s case, not in the last 300 years.

The Authoritarian Temptation

Let us begin with Russia. There, people believed in modernizing socialism, but this belief collapsed quite quickly. Why did Russia take this path? There is more than one answer.

It is highly likely that historical change follows a zigzag course. Relatively quickly the Russian elite saw democracy as dermokracija (dermo meaning “shit” or “crap” in Russian), that is, “swampocracy”—babble, corruption, and criminalization of daily life. The head of St. Petersburg television told me that television under Brezhnev was terrible. You could not say anything, and you simply read official announcements from the page. But in the evening you could go for a walk with your daughter without hesitation. In the 1990s you could call Yeltsin and any other minister or governor a drunk, an alcoholic, a thief; but in the evening you could not go for a walk for fear of being kidnapped and freed only after ransom was paid. That is a very good definition of how the Russians saw perestroika and democratization. That is why Putin’s authoritarian solution has so much support in Russia today. He got the lawlessness under control and began to pay wages and pensions on time.

In Poland, this fear of chaos has manifested itself in two ways: as a return to the familiar, which explains the success of the post-communists, incidentally not only in Poland, but also in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary. The other path was the one taken by Russia’s Gennadi Zyuganovs and Slobodan Milosevic, that is, transformation into nationalism.

The critics of the democratic transformation in Poland say that the balance of the last two decades is negative. They say that the perpetrators of the greatest communist crimes have never been prosecuted, that lustration and de-communization were never completed, that corruption is spreading, that the great differences in wealth and the bitter feeling of many children of the Solidarity revolution who feel that they did not fight for a Poland like this. They also say that the criteria for assessing the heroes of the past have been lost; that in early 1989, time was not on the side of the communists, so that the path of compromise at the Round Table was a mistake.

Sometimes I think that in Poland—but also in other post-communist countries—people effortlessly win long-past wars. In 1989, the Soviet Union was still quite firmly in the saddle, and no one could foresee its self-destruction. The Polish compromise was portrayed as a model by the American government and the governments of Western Europe. June 4, 1989 has become a symbolic date. On that day, free elections were held in Poland—not entirely democratic, but real elections that snatched away the legitimacy of the communist dictatorship; on the same day in Tiananmen Square, tanks mowed down students demanding democratic freedoms. Anyone who says today that everything was obvious back then is concealing the fact that he said nothing of the kind at the time. Nor does he say today that he knows the date or the circumstances under which the communist regimes in Cuba or North Korea will collapse, even if he claims this with certainty when the defeat of communism becomes apparent in these countries as well.

In our countries, we can still predict the past more easily than the future. On the other hand, the past has become more and more difficult to predict, because its picture is painted by anti-communists of the 11th hour—people who accuse those who did the most of having contacts with the communist political police. It seems that such writing of history could set the stage for a new type of authoritarian system.

We see today how, in many countries, the ideology of anti-communist authoritarianism is emerging. In Hungary it is embodied by Viktor Orban, leader of the Fidesz party. Orban’s path is interesting. He began as the wunderkind of Budapest’s liberal intelligentsia. The party he created had an anti-communist face of peace and harmony. I well remember a campaign poster by Orban’s party: two opposing photographs. On one, we see a brotherly kiss between Brezhnev and Honecker; on the other, a tender embrace between a pretty girl and a good-looking boy. These were two different worlds. But Orban soon led his party to the right, to an authoritarian, radical, revanchist anti-communism that absorbed conventional conservatism and Hungarian ethnonationalism. In Poland, the two-year administration of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) was comparable. In Russia, the path to authoritarian government was cleared by Yeltsin, who radically overthrew the traditions and ideology of Bolshevism, but used anti-Bolshevik slogans to employ methods far removed from democratic standards. Today there is no major disagreement over the fact that the 1996 presidential elections in Russia were faked. At the time, as a democrat I was on the side of my Russian friends, who declared that it was necessary by all means to stop the communists, who would never give up their newly regained power.

Against a Cynical Europe

After 20 years, it is useful to view Europe as a new whole, a Europe without utopias. This Europe purposely fosters political and cultural pluralism. At the same time, it is a Europe without a strong canon of values. The strengths of democracy are always based on a strong nation-state tradition that purposely permits pluralism and respects human rights and the principle of tolerance. But where these traditions no longer exist, we see a Europe of Berlusconi-ism, in which only clever games, social technology, cynicism, and money count: a coalition of business, politics, the media, and the mafia. There is no doubt that the communist threat—which once was strong even in France and Italy—has quite simply disappeared. In France, the communists have shrunk to a microscopically small group, and in Italy they became social democracy.

Second, a spirit is growing in Europe of selfishness and nihilism, fear and anxiety. In this regard, the European Union project is very important, and at the same time stands on such wobbly legs that it is constantly being attacked and challenged from many sides.

Third, in the post-communist countries, the gravest threat is that the experiences of Putinism will be adopted—a type of new version of Latin American systems where democratic institutions exist on paper, but in reality someone else rules. The classic example of this is Vladimir Putin, but in Poland, too, we had two years of Kaczynski’s PiS government during which this model was constructed, in which institutions of civil society were weakened by attacks on the independent judiciary and independent media.

Is there one Europe? I think not, but that need not be a catastrophe. Europe has grown together over time through crises and new attempts. It continues to be a dynamic entity that is still being built. What is important is that a European consciousness emerge on the part of the young, post-communist Europe. This need not lead to European isolationism. For example, Europe should not turn away from Ukraine. Europe will have a chance if it learns to intelligently export its soft power. If Europe were to close itself off, it would fall into neo-isolationism and lose. Europe should be a democratic project and a light for the entire world.

What threatens Europe today? On the one hand, a cynicism that weakens and that hollows out any doctrine or system of values. On the other hand, any authoritarian or even totalitarian projects. We talk of a multicultural Europe, which of course is good. Nevertheless, if we have a large portion of citizens from the Islamic world in Europe who demand rights as minorities on the basis of European principles but deny these rights to others when they become a majority, because those are their principles, then we must work to ensure that the European Union steadfastly defends its democratic values. Of course I am oversimplifying. But this is the paradox of democracy, that it always tolerates its enemies.

And it must be this way, but only to a point. When this point is passed, democracy knocks its own teeth out. I have often asked myself why the Weimar democracy fell. Because no one wanted to defend it—neither the intellectuals nor the unions, not even the workers. A selfishness prevailed and brought the Nazis to power. Of course, history does not repeat itself, or repeats itself only as farce—as Marx and Hegel said—but democracy is never guaranteed. We could still come to a point where no one wants to defend democracy.

When I see contemporary plays or read contemporary literature—especially by young Polish artists—I see contempt for the institutions of a free state. One could of course say that the elites have done everything they can to become objects of contempt, but if no one will defend the democratic state, it will ultimately succumb.

My obsession is the defense of the republic. The essence of the debate in all our countries is: do you defend liberal values or are you in agreement with a state in the Putinist mold? This is of great importance, as is the relationship between state power and the institutions independent of it. Will the state attempt to assimilate these institutions, or is it willing to consciously limit itself and permit the existence of civil, religious, professional organizations that must be independent of the state by definition, and with whom the state must deal through compromise?

A second problem—perhaps less serious today, but very important 10 years ago—is lustration and decommunization. Can a democratic system tolerate a conscious consensus in the matter of exclusion of and discrimination against a specific group of people, merely because they were informal collaborators with or members of the ancien régime? No, this path leads directly to dictatorship. In Czechoslovakia after the war, the dictatorship began with the expulsion and murder of the Germans, who were after all citizens of the republic—not, as in Poland, with the expulsion of Germans from Germany. In Czechoslovakia, a majority supported the expulsion of Germans. The principle of collective responsibility was applied. That smoothed the way for a coup. We should be very sensitive—even oversensitive—to such signals.