Sluggish Reform in the German Armed Forces
The Bundeswehr lags behind in its urgently needed post-cold war reforms. The three biggest problems are money, money, and money. The blueprints for professionalization, downsizing, and a new generation of less heavily armored, more flexible units are all available. The funds, however, are not. In the current economic downturn, the defense ministry may be spared deep additional budget cuts, but the cuts it already suffered have crippled reform.
For two years the Bundeswehr has been attempting an impossible balancing act. The German military is trying to push though far-reaching reforms that are essential for its continued effectiveness—but are not supposed to cost anything. At the same time, Germany is participating in an increasing number of international crisis operations—and this project too is underfunded.
In this delicate situation, 9/11 and the ensuing war on international terrorist networks have focused attention on previously downplayed risks both of international terrorism and also of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. In the military arena Western responses so far have included naval patrols, direct combat missions, and long-term stabilization efforts. How do these new missions affect German defense policy and military reform?
Certainly it is becoming increasingly clear that the old scenario that shaped the Bundeswehr throughout the cold war—an invasion of German or North Atlantic Treaty Organization territory—is now highly unlikely. The more Russia evolves into a NATO partner and integrates itself structurally with the West, the more improbable such a scenario becomes. More likely contingencies are sustained operations within the framework of stabilization missions, such as those in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and smaller, shorter-term operations as part of the war against terrorism.
In this new era the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself is also being tested. During Operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan the alliance role was confined to secondary tasks. The United States will probably make NATO’s reorientation toward the new risks a prerequisite for treating the alliance once again as the central guarantor of European and international security. The reasons for NATO’s relevance cited by the Germans and other European Union members—structural non-aggression, incorporating Russia into the Western system, or the transfer of stability—are mostly Europe-centered. The US, however, is demanding that NATO develop capabilities for fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the willingness to operate beyond the alliance’s European borders.
NATO’s “crisis of relevance” raises the pressure, in turn, for greater success in realizing the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). By now ESDP has become a symbol of European willingness to take part in world affairs—if not on a par with the United States, then at least with opportunities to influence American decisions. In all these processes Germany wants to be among the leaders so as to maintain its standing with the United States. It has tried to secure its status by joining allies in numerous military commitments around the world.
Lagging Reform
In this context reorienting the Bundeswehr was one of the reform projects of the center-left government that came into office in 1998. Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping presented his plans in 2000 on the basis of the relatively far-reaching recommendations of a blue-ribbon panel chaired by former German President Richard von Weizsäcker and a competing paper by Bundeswehr Inspector General Hans-Peter von Kirchbach (the equivalent of the American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
Scharping’s reform called for a reduction in troop strength but retained conscription. The Ministry of Defense issued rough structural plans and, in January 2001, a detailed roster of exact numbers of personnel and bases. Shortly thereafter the ministry announced the closure of a moderate number of 38 bases and other installations. And it added a Joint Support Command (“Streitkräftebasis”, or SKB) to the classical army, air force, navy, and central medical services. This armed services logistical base has been given responsibility for all branches in the areas of command, reconnaissance, training, and logistics.
The rest of the reform has three clusters of goals.
The new personnel structure is to consist of 285,000 servicemen and women, of whom 202,400 will be professional and regular soldiers, 80,000 conscripts, and 2600 reservists with military training. (The Weizsäcker Commission had called for a total of 240,000 troops, with 30,000 draftees). The duration of a tour of duty for conscripts has been cut from ten to nine months. Combat units are to have a total strength of 150,000 troops, with 110,400 within the basic military organization and 22,000 in training and further qualification programs.
The guidelines laid down by the NATO Defense Capability Initiative and the 1999 “Headline Goals” set by the European Union for its new Rapid Reaction Force form the basis for acquisitions planning and focus on command capabilities, intelligence and reconnaissance, strategic redeployment capacity, operational effectiveness, sustainability, and robustness. Some large-scale projects, like the A400M transport aircraft, however, are not financed by the defense budget and are therefore to some extent dependent on the availability of funding from overall economic growth.
Various internal Bundeswehr services, such as clothing and fleet management, have been outsourced, and disused military property has been put up for sale. The Corporation for Development, Procurement, and Operation has assumed responsibility for revamping the Bundeswehr’s service sector—though the corporation’s profit forecasts already appear to have been over-optimistic.
Downsizing, modernizing, and maximizing efficiency are all steps in the right direction. Two problems remain, however. The Bundeswehr’s basic responsibilities are still outmoded—and there is no money for the transformation.
At the core of the Bundeswehr reform lies a series of tasks, with home defense the top priority. Today this is practically synonymous with collective NATO defense. There is, however, a yawning gap between the unlikely combat scenario of an invasion of German or NATO territory and the more urgent demand for conflict prevention, crisis management, and peacekeeping on behalf of the United Nations or through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. In the latter scenarios the Bundeswehr’s task would be less classical defense than maintenance of comprehensive law and order. Yet the residual task of territorial defense and a lack of strategic vision about what the Bundeswehr might be needed for have preserved an excess of heavy units in the “new” Bundeswehr in the form of five armored divisions. A speedy re-organization in the direction of flexibility thus becomes more difficult.
Implementing planned reforms has been hampered by the lean budget, not to mention the mounting costs of current missions. In 2001 the defense budget totalled 46.7 billion deutschmarks, including special expenditures for the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) mission. After 9/11, the government raised taxes on tobacco and insurance to pay for a three billion deutschmark anti-terrorism package, of which half was earmarked for the defense ministry—at approximately E767 million, or slightly under $767 million. The annual budget ceiling thus amounts to just under E24.4 billion through 2006. As the lion’s share is swallowed by personnel costs, however, only 24.5 percent remained for acquisitions, research, and development in 2002. Experts and senior officers estimate that a share of 30 to 35 percent of total investment would be necessary to let Germany catch up with its European allies.
No Budget Increase
In practice, however, any substantial increase in the defense budget is out of the question. At the commanders’ conference in April 2002 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder even ruled out a linear increase in defense outlays and said that his austerity program would be given clear priority in order to fulfill the stringent criteria of the European Monetary Union stability pact. Following the September elections for the Bundestag, in the face of more sober tax estimates, the government has turned the screw even tighter. Following press reports, the Minister of Finance expects the Bundeswehr to cut another E500 million a year. All major procurement projects will once more become subject to review.
Conscription
In the reform debate, many have advocated ending conscription as a good way to scale down the Bundeswehr while saving money in the process. Draftees, they argue, are no longer needed for territorial defense and are ill-suited to serving in missions abroad, where a professional army would be more effective.
By contrast, proponents of extending conscription note that draftees cost less and that volunteer conscripts in fact make up a large portion of German troops in foreign operations, form a primary pool for reenlistment of career soldiers and, especially in the case of young east Germans, get a crucial education in the ways of tolerance and democracy. The “army” of conscientious objectors doing civil service instead of military one provides indispensable cheap labor for hospitals and other social services.
Opponents of the draft respond that the lower personnel costs of conscripts vis-à-vis professional troops are offset by the expense of their training, which currently keeps some 20,000 men unavailable for combat duty. Moreover, even though the Bundeswehr would be obliged to spend more on perquisites and recruitment to attract professionals, the overall economy today loses the productivity of those young men in compulsory military service. Neither of the two large parties supports the end of conscription, although, with a nod to their Green coalition partner, the Social Democrats have agreed in the coalition deal to examine the question in the coming four years.
Conscription or no conscription, the demands placed on the Bundeswehr now stretch it to the limits of its capacities. At this point the German government therefore has three options. It could substantially increase the defense budget to implement its ambitious reform project. It could reform the reform, press ahead with retrenchment in bases and heavy equipment, and promote division of labor among European countries on the pattern of the European Air Transport Coordination Cell that is currently under construction in Eindhoven as a precursor to the planned European Air Transport Command. Or it could continue the current muddling through in the hope that Germany will soon emerge from its financial straits and the government will be able to afford a larger budget for defense.
On present evidence, the most likely outcome is the third option—and a continuing failure to answer the basic question: What do we need the Bundeswehr for?
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